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ABSTRACT 
 
In World War II, millions of men found themselves at one time or another in war 
captivity. Their daily lives in captivity have been documented in memoirs and 
historical studies, but despite the abundance of detail, the experience of war 
captivity as an experience of exclusion remains un-theorised. Western POWs 
held by Germany in particular were excluded not only from further involvement 
in direct combat, but also from the states of exception associated with the foreign 
slave labour and the racial persecutions particular to Germany at the time. While 
all around them people were killed for a number of reasons, their lives were 
protected – and in the case of Jewish soldiers extraordinarily so – for no other 
reason than to keep them alive. 
 
The first part of the thesis uses Carl Schmitt’s work on sovereignty and nomos to 
situate the POW camp within the framework of an international order where war 
is bracketed – gehegt. This order reveals itself as an order of war, in which law 
takes the role of the sovereign in guaranteeing the order. The second part then 
turns to the exception to this order, the POW camp, analysing its juridico-
political situation on the example of Jewish POWs from Western forces held by 
Germany in the Second World War. The third part of the thesis looks at the war-
time experiences of Emmanuel Levinas, who spent five years as a POW in 
Germany. The struggle Levinas’s work exhibits with the experience of captivity 
exemplifies this experience’s ultimate meaninglessness, and raises questions 
about the possibility of subjectivity without engagement. 
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1. Introduction 
Contemporary literature on sovereignty treats the concentration camp as 
the spatial paradigm of the state of exception. In the camp, law as the protector of 
individual rights is suspended, while sovereign power reins unrestrainedly. 
Through the association with the concentration camp, the state of exception has 
become synonymous with the abuse of power and the decline of the rule of law. 
In this, it did not merely get a bad name; since Agamben’s diagnosis that the 
state of exception has increasingly become the rule, characterising the ‘political 
space of modernity’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 174) and even constituting the ‘nomos 
of the modern’ (p. 166), it has become the ground from which a more just 
political community must lift itself. Moreover, because it is law itself that, so 
Agamben argues, produces and depends on the exception for its establishment, 
revealing law not as the solution to the problems of political modernity, but as 
their cause, a simple return to the rule of law will not lead out of this political 
space. What is required, rather, is nothing less than a ‘completely new politics’ 
(Agamben 1998, p. 11). But what if Agamben’s turn to a new politics were itself 
found to be merely symptomatic of a more prior need to escape something 
already other? What if, after the Second World War, those who returned from 
the war to rebuild the world returned from entirely elsewhere, beyond the law-
exception complex?  
In World War II, millions of men found themselves at one time or another 
in war captivity. Davis (1977, p. 162, footnotes omitted) provides indicative 
figures: 
 
Estimates for the second world war are somewhat inflated, since that conflict 
ended with the collapse of the German state and the unconditional surrender of 
Japan. Therefore entire armies of the vanquished powers became prisoners of 
war during the last six months of 1945. These last-stage capitulators drive the 
highest estimate for the second world war up to 35,000,000. Although many of 
these were detained to work on postwar reconstruction projects, less than half 
that number could have been involved in the wartime economies as prisoners. 
On the other hand, Henri Michel's minimum estimate of 12,000,000 is probably 
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too conservative. Germany alone captured up to 8,000,000 prisoners; and the 
USSR took some 3,000,000 Germans and a few hundred thousand others by the 
end of the war. Great Britain took over 3,000,000 but brought only about a 
quarter of a million into the United Kingdom. France captured about 250,000 
Germans in 1944 and 1945 and received another 700,000 from the British and 
Americans for postwar reconstruction. The United States accepted the surrender 
of about 4,000,000 enemy troops during the second world war and interned 
some 435,000 of them in the United States.   
 
Despite these numbers, war captivity remains under-theorised in legal 
scholarship. This may partly be due to the embryonic state of broader historical 
scholarship on war captivity. Bischof et al. (2005, pp. 14-15), for example, note 
that despite significant progress in this respect over the last twenty years, 
historical scholarship from a global comparative perspective on war 
imprisonment in the Second World War is only in its beginning stages. And 
while there is much legal scholarship on the laws relating to POWs, most of it is 
narrow in focus, concentrating on specific norms and legal arrangements 
(Overmans, 1999, p. 487). 
The reasons for this are only too clear: Even if one merely considers 
POWs captured by Germany in the Second World War, the treatment and 
consequent experience of captivity varied to such an extent as to make 
generalisations all but impossible. How, for example, could one liken the 
experiences of French officers like Fernand Braudel or Paul Ricoeur, who were 
teaching and researching at the ‘camp universities’ they helped set up during 
their stay in captivity,1 with those of Soviet prisoners left to die of disease and 
starvation in open fields? Before even considering other factors, this divergence 
                                                
1 Ricoeur, for example, was not only able, with the help of a kindly guard, to borrow books from 
Greifswald university library while in captivity, but also started to translate Husserl’s Ideen I 
there (Ricoeur, 1998, pp. 16f). Braudel equally had access to an outside library for part of his 
time in captivity, during which he wrote his history of the Mediterranean, finding “the 
atmosphere of the camps conducive to his writing which rendered his mind ‘more lucid,’ and 
permitted him the time for ‘lengthy meditation on the subject’” (Dursteler, 2010, p. 65). 
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alone necessitates a historically narrow focus; there simply is no one ‘POW 
camp’ in the way in which one can speak of ‘the concentration camp.’2 
However, despite this divergence of conditions in practice, there was a 
group of POWs whose position exemplifies like no other the place of war 
captivity in international order. This was the group of Western Jewish POWs 
held by Germany in the Second World War. Excluded from the hostilities of war 
as much as from racial persecutions, the politico-juridical situation of these 
POWs represents an almost complete mirror image to the situation of the 
concentration camp inmates that Agamben describes. Almost, because even 
though these POWs were exempted by law from the sovereign decisions of war, 
their experiences were by no means positive, even without taking into account 
the inevitable contraventions of the law by the detaining power.  
This negative characteristic of war captivity, coupled with the fact that it 
is difficult to pinpoint the precise source of this negativity – POWs were no 
longer in battle, nor were they persecuted – is a surprising circumstance. If it is 
true that life in the concentration camp as a space of exception from law was a 
matter of “legal remainders or legal waste” (Zartaloudis, 2010, p. x), and that the 
process producing this waste was one of dehumanisation, then life in the POW 
camp as a space of exception from the death associated with war (which, like the 
concentration camp, represents a state of exception from legal order) should have 
been a humanising experience. The fact that this was not the case raises questions 
about the precise place and function of this space exception, which cannot 
merely have represented the exit of soldiers from combat and their re-inclusion 
under the rule of law. Apparently, the exception to the exception does not equate 
the rule. But if they were not part of legal order nor part of war as the exception 
to that order, where were they? 
After the war that saw his involvement with National Socialism, Carl 
Schmitt wrote a book on international order that took him away from the concept 
                                                
2 In their introduction to a volume on POWs in Nazi Germany, Bischof et al. (2005, p. 9-10) 
accordingly state that in trying to understand the conditions for POWs at the time, 
“generalisations are of no help.” For example, the suffering inflicted on Soviet POWs has led to 
the call to include their ordeal under the umbrella notion of the Holocaust (Soleim, 2010, p. 1; 
also se Bischof et al., 2005, p. 14) and thus potentially within the concentration camp paradigm. 
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of sovereignty he had developed for the national context and that had served as 
the basis for subsequent accounts of the concentration camp as a space of 
exception. The juridico-political constellation described by Schmitt in The 
Nomos of the Earth is that of the jus publicum Europaeum, the order of sovereign 
nation states in place sometime between the 17th and 20th centuries. The 
particularity of the jus publicum Europaeum was that it did not present an order 
analogous to the legal order of the state, such as that envisaged by Habermas in 
his notion of cosmopolitan order, nor a ‘second-order state of nature,’ in which 
sovereign states confronted each other in the absence of law (Rasch, 1999-2000, 
p. 1670). Here, a unity of difference prevailed, secured by nothing but the laws of 
war, which Schmitt describes as effecting a bracketing or Hegung of war. This 
order did not only precede the Nazi period in history, but was also designed, as 
Schmitt explains, to prevent precisely the type of existential politics that led to 
the Holocaust. And it did prevent this politics successfully as far as Germany’s 
comportment to its enemies on the Western front was concerned, exemplified by 
the fact that POWs of these nations were treated broadly in accordance with the 
laws of war. It was these laws that excepted POWs from the ongoing war and 
governed their lives in the camp. 
Emmanuel Levinas was one these POWs. Having emerged from German 
war captivity unharmed, he published a short book called Existence and 
Existents, which he had begun to write in captivity, sheltered from both the war 
and the persecutions around him. Levinas’s trajectory would soon lead him away 
from the subject matter of this early work, in which he seeks to escape from a 
state of pure being he terms the ‘there is’ (il y a), and to an ethics that, perhaps in 
some sense comparable to what Agamben has in mind, appears to respond to the 
events of the Holocaust. But for a moment, Existence and Existents and The 
Nomos of the Earth, when held next to each other, give a glimpse of a world and 
its foundations that would be lastingly destroyed by the events that followed.   
This destruction was outlived, however, by those who returned from war 
captivity. The camps, having had no other purpose than to keep the POWs alive, 
now released them into a world that had moved on without them, and that would 
not recognise their suffering. Here, they faced the task of a new beginning. For 
these ex-prisoners, ‘escape’ represented liberation not from lawlessness, but from 
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a complete suspension of political existence. The experience of war captivity, 
then, stands for more than the fact that something took place in the camps, or that 
what took place there is the manifestation of a certain juridico-political 
constellation that pertains to this day;3 the point, rather, is that whatever took 
place there involved people, who in their survival carried the traces of their 
experience forward and into their lives after the war. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 These are the two options Agamben (1998, p. 166) has in mind when outlining his methodology 
in Homo Sacer: “Instead of deducing the definition of the camp from the events that took place 
there, we will ask: What is a camp, what is its juridico-political structure, that such events could 
take place there? This will lead us to regard the camp not as a historical fact and an anomaly 
belonging to the past (even if still verifiable) but in some way as the hidden matrix and nomos of 
the political space in which we are still living.” 
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2. Sovereignty 
 In 1922, Schmitt (1985b, footnote omitted) had famously declared in 
relation to national order that “sovereign is he who decides on the [state of] 
exception.” When in 1950 he turned his mind to international order, one would 
assume that it was this concept of sovereignty against which any ordering 
element on the international level would have to measure up, and whose function 
it would need to replicate. But one searches Schmitt’s work The Nomos of the 
Earth in vain for an analysis of sovereignty that would match that provided in 
Political Theology (1922) and The Concept of the Political (1927). In fact, as 
Agamben (1998, p. 36) notes, Schmitt “makes no allusion to his own definition 
of sovereignty as the decision on the state of exception.” Perhaps Europe was 
simply not political in the sense that this was true for the nation state; perhaps it 
did not have political enemies against which it could distinguish itself, and 
therefore had no need for the sovereign decision on the exception. Even so, the 
question of order remains – not so much of what ordered Europe’s affairs, as 
what made of it an order, an entity with boundaries in the Kantian sense4 that 
could be called ‘Europe.’ For it is clear that Schmitt did not think of Europe as a 
realm akin to that of reason, characterised by its principal universality. It was 
precisely the concreteness of the European order that Schmitt emphasised; it had 
to be so if, like the state, it were to remain contingent and thus revisable, an 
attribute of order that Schmitt valued perhaps over all others.  
After all, already in relation to national order, Schmitt’s critique had 
targeted a type of liberalism that “endorses internal plurality based on a 
nebulous, yet highly threatening, universal foundation” (Rasch, 2000, p. 158, 
emphasis added). Whether such a foundation is provided for directly by 
prescribing the good that citizens ought to pursue, or whether it appears 
indirectly through procedures for reaching consensus, it would mean closure – 
not practical closure, as in practice one always must decide one way or another, 
                                                
4 “Boundaries (in extended things) always presuppose a space that is found outside a certain fixed 
location, and that encloses that location; limits require nothing of the kind, but are mere negations 
that affect a magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolute completeness” (Kant, 2004, p. 103-
104, §57). 
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but the theoretical closure that manifests itself behind liberalism’s faith in its own 
future. By contrast, Schmitt’s own theory of sovereignty saw the unity of the 
state achieved through the sovereign decision; its contingency (the sovereign’s 
continued capacity for decision-making and thus the potential for matters to be 
decided otherwise) safeguarded by an external plurality.  
So when it came to international order, then, this plurality could not in 
turn be unified without threatening the sovereignty of the state, nor could Europe 
be described as a liberal order without comprising Schmitt’s own earlier critique. 
And yet, Europe was both plural and an order. This presented a problem; a 
problem that Rasch (2000, p. 165) terms the paradox of pluralism:   
 
. . . the paradox of . . . pluralism . . . [is that it requires] a structure that cannot 
itself be pluralistically relativized. Pluralism is not self-justifying; hence it 
requires allegiance. But to what is allegiance owed if pluralism is to flourish? 
Page 17 of 195 
 
2.1. Nomos 
One way in which the question of pluralism’s allegiance, or in other 
words, sovereignty, has been answered, is by pointing to the role of nomos as 
concrete order. Schmitt had begun to revise his own brand of decisionism in his 
1928 work Constitutional Theory with a discussion of the institutional guarantees 
of rights. In the 1934 preface to the 2nd edition of Political Theology, he then 
officially introduced a new type of legal thinking to his readership: ‘institutional 
legal thinking’ (Schmitt, 1985b, p. 2). With this concept, Schmitt hoped to 
capture the concretely ‘stable content’ (p. 3) of legal rules that could be 
generated neither by universal, unchanging laws (or bureaucratic processes that 
lack personal input), nor by arbitrary decisions. In the same year, and thus some 
time before turning to international order and its nomos, Schmitt expanded on 
this idea in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, where he proposed ‘concrete 
order thinking’ as an account of the origin of law preferable to both normativism 
and decisionism.  
Norms, Schmitt claimed in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (as he 
had already done in Political Theology (1985b, p. 13) in relation to the 
sovereign’s role), cannot exist without both a conception of what is normal and 
the concretely existing state of such normality, i.e., a concrete order in the form 
of institutions such as the estates or the family as well as the typical figures they 
produce (Schmitt, 2004, p. 55). On the contrary, norms only exist because they 
have been produced by and for concrete order and its presuppositions of what is 
normal: 
 
A legal regulation presupposes concepts of what is normal, which develop so 
little from the legal regulation that the norming itself becomes so 
incomprehensible without them that one can no longer speak of a ‘norm.’ A 
general rule . . . elevates itself over the concrete situation only to a very limited 
extent, only in a completely defined sphere, and only to a certain modest level. 
If it exceeds this limit, it no longer affects or concerns the case which it is 
supposed to regulate. It becomes senseless and unconnected. . . . Even if a norm 
is as inviolable as one wants to make it, it controls a situation only so far as the 
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situation has not become completely abnormal and so long as the normal 
presupposed concrete type has not disappeared (Schmitt, 2004, p. 56). 
 
In relation to this, Schwab comments that in the continued aim to prove 
Kelsen wrong, Schmitt had turned from his earlier emphasis on the decision to 
concrete order. With his pure theory of law, Kelsen had attempted to purge law 
from all concrete social elements, first and foremost the political, and Schmitt’s 
efforts therefore went into showing how law (Recht) could not be understood as 
norms alone. “Schmitt,” Schwab (1970, p. 115, footnote omitted) writes, 
“realized as early as 1928 that his purely decisionist approach was insufficient 
[for this purpose], and therefore he began then to explore the possibilities of 
establishing a legal system based on concrete orders.” In On the Three Types of 
Juristic Thought, Schmitt (2004, p. 51) then claimed that law could be shown as 
arising out of, rather than establishing, concrete social orders:  
 
For a law cannot apply, administer, or enforce itself. It can neither interpret, nor 
define, nor sanction itself; it cannot – without ceasing to be a norm – even 
designate or appoint the concrete men who are supposed to interpret and 
administer it. Even the independent judge, subject only to the law, is not a 
normativistic but rather an order concept, indicating a competent authority and 
member of an order system of officials and authorities.   
 
The argument against Kelsen Schmitt advanced under the rubric of 
concrete order was similar to the decisionist argument Schmitt had made 
previously. In the same way in which any legal order must be said to be 
subjective if it is regarded as dependent on the friend-enemy distinction drawn by 
the sovereign, it must be said to be particular – necessarily ‘pluralist’ (Schmitt, 
2004, p. 49) in the sense that different orders would give rise to different rules, 
and different institutional affiliations to different entitlements – if it is seen as 
based on social orders. Anyone claiming the priority of objective, universal 
norms would therefore be proved wrong.5 The natural or organic conception of 
                                                
5 The possibilities these claims presented for National Socialism, which sought to establish social 
and legal hierarchies on the basis of participation in certain institutions, is only too clear, as is the 
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the origin of law was here all but natural in the universal sense of natural law. 
Rather, Schmitt sought to unearth a historically and culturally contingent origin 
of law.  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, as far as international order is concerned, it is 
the concept of nomos that on first sight appears most suitable to take the role of 
sovereign. To be sure, nomos is not the same type of concrete order that Schmitt 
discusses in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought. It denotes spatial order 
(Raumordnung) rather than an order of institutions. But it is possible to see 
nomos as a development from Schmitt’s early conception of concrete order, not 
least because the two are linked through Schmitt’s intervening concept of 
Großraum, which also denotes spatial order.6 Indeed, Schmitt already uses the 
term nomos in 1934, even if only to claim that in Pindar’s fragment Nomos 
Basileus, it ought to be interpreted as concrete order and not merely as norm: 
“One can speak of a true Nomos as true king only if Nomos means precisely the 
concept of Recht encompassing a concrete order and Gemeinschaft” (Schmitt, 
2004, pp. 50-51).  
In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt (2003, pp. 336f) then continues this 
interpretative task, proposing his own vision of nomos. After recounting how 
European sovereign states acquired the status of personhood, Schmitt (2003, p. 
147, translation modified) asks about the means and origin of international order: 
“How is an international legal order and a bracketing of war possible among such 
equal sovereigns?” It is clear that this question aims at the sovereign power 
behind the laws that make up the international legal order; who, in other words, 
draws up these laws and ensures that states comply with them? In answering this 
question, Schmitt writes that, rather than seeing states as free agents that enter 
into agreements with each other, one should take into account the binding forces 
of traditional (religious, economic) dependencies that arise out of the fact of 
belonging to a ‘Eurocentric spatial order’ (p. 148):  
 
                                                                                                                               
effect of this understanding of legitimacy on its victims, who thereby lost the protection of the 
rule of law in its substantive meaning. See, for example, Schwab, 1970, pp. 116 and 124. 
6 The link is established by the description of the basis of law as a ‘völkisch order of life and 
community.’ See Schmitt, 2004, p. 93 and 2011, p. 102. 
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We must bear in mind that the binding power of an obligation of sovereign 
states in international law cannot depend on the problematic acquiescence of 
otherwise free sovereigns, but rather must be determined by common 
membership in a defined space, i.e., must be based on the comprehensive effect 
of a spatial order (Schmitt, 2003, pp. 224-225).   
 
With this, Schmitt advances spatial order as a candidate for the power 
that ensures order. Indeed, Schmitt calls nomos a ruler (Schmitt, 2003, pp. 72f), 
something that has been taken up by various commentators.7  
On closer examination, however, nomos emerges as not entirely suited to 
this role. Schmitt begins The Nomos of the Earth by stating that nomos refers to 
“an original, constitutive act of spatial ordering” (Schmitt, 2003, p.78). Land is 
taken, distributed and used for human production. Each epoch in world history, 
Schmitt claims, has a specific way of apportioning physical space on the basis of 
the land’s natural boundaries and the measure of its productive yield, whether 
through nomadic land usage or through the more permanent and visible divisions 
of land in settled communities. One imagines the traces left by grazing animals 
or by the cut of the shovel into the ground, and the delimitation of ownership 
parcels through fences, walls, and hedges. These processes of apportionment 
then give rise to an order from the ‘inner measure’ of which “all subsequent 
regulations of a written or unwritten kind derive their power” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 
78).  
The space that Schmitt has in mind when he writes of ‘spatial order’ is 
itself inseparable from nomos. Rather than an order established subsequently to 
space, nomos is constitutive of space. This becomes apparent from Schmitt’s 
phonetic analysis of the German word for ‘space’ (Raum), an analysis first 
published in 1951, one year after The Nomos of the Earth. The Old Norse root 
for Raum, Schmitt (1995c, p. 491) writes, meant a spot in the wilderness that had 
been cleared of trees and readied for human cultivation, a man-made clearing. 
With the word ‘Raum,’ Schmitt continues, the vowels reach from ‘a’ to ‘u,’ 
                                                
7 Hooker (2009, p. 25), for example, finds that nomos is the “‘solution’ to the problem of 
pluralism” on the international level parallel to the solution represented by the sovereign on the 
national level. 
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creating a ‘tension’ that forms a ‘world.’ The consonants that surround this world 
– ‘r’ and ‘m’ – mean that it begins with an ‘active approach’ and ends by 
‘merging with the horizon.’ But despite this potential, no ‘world’ has been 
constituted until the word Raum is in fact pronounced: “[f]or it remains that a 
word acquires corporal and bodily reality only through its sound” (Schmitt, 
1995c, p. 492).8  
Space constitutes our world, and without spatial order, Schmitt (1995c, 
pp. 492-493) appears to say, there would be nothing: “Space” . . . is a world, and 
this world is not an empty space and is also not in an empty space, but our space 
is a world filled with the tension of diverse elements.” And further on, quoting 
Nietzsche: “With strong shoulders space stands against the nothing. Where there 
is space, there is being” (Schmitt, 1995c, pp. 494, n. 2). This constitutive aspect 
of nomos explains how it can be both process and order (which Schmitt (2003, p. 
186) also calls ‘spatial structure’): The ‘original, constitutive act of spatial 
ordering,’ whether understood as the dispensation by nature of her goods or the 
taking and distribution of land by men, brings into a being a world structured by 
these acts.  
Vismann (1997, p. 60) claims that this ordered world is of a material 
nature that is inferior to abstract order. She insists on the zonal, pre- or extra-
legal characteristic of Schmitt’s nomos when compared to the lines drawn by 
legal order: “Zone and line are both border-notions. The line is either a purely 
legal notion, such as the papal demarcation line, or the effect of precise 
geography. A zonal order, however, comes from filling in, not from exclusion.” 
Although she points to an important aspect that is missing from Schmitt’s 
conception of nomos, namely that of border, Vismann arguably misunderstands 
what Schmitt is getting at.  
As already mentioned, Schmitt does not regard space as something that 
precedes order, passively awaiting its imprint or ‘filling in,’ but thinks of space 
in a correlationist fashion as becoming part of one’s world only through order. 
Space, therefore, can never be neutral – on the contrary, space, even when it is 
                                                
8 Schmitt (1950, p. 90-91) remarks in this context: “Wonderful is the space-power and the 
germination-power of the German language. It has achieved that Wort [word] and Ort [place] 
rhyme.” 
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said to be empty, is neither neutral nor indifferent, but a social product, which 
means that law cannot be regarded as that which draws lines onto a (politically, 
morally) blank canvas constituted by space. Already in 1939, Schmitt (2011, p. 
80, footnote omitted) bemoans the use of ‘space theory’ by legal positivists: “In 
spite of its name, this assumed the opposite of a concrete conception of space and 
regarded country, soil, territory, and state territory as a ‘space’ in the sense of an 
empty dimension of planes and depths with linear borders.” 
At the same time, Schmitt contrasts the view that law is made up of 
commands addressed only to human beings, relegating concrete spatial order to 
the role of “a contentless general form of cognition”9 (Schmitt, 1995d, p. 317), 
with his own view, namely that law arises from, implements, and serves to revise 
spatial order. He sees space neither as external to norms and commands issuing 
from reason partitioned off into a separate realm, nor as a merely formal 
component of law. Space, in Schmitt’s view, is part of the constitution of law, 
which in turn produces space on an on-going basis. Law’s substance is 
inseparable from real space itself, or in more general terms, norms cannot exist 
separately from concrete order. When Schmitt (2003, p. 98) quotes an ‘age-old 
maxim’ that “[a]ll law is law only in a particular location,” he thus means more 
than the fact that law needs to establish the sphere of its own applicability. 
Without order that is referable to a specific spatially-situated group, there is no 
law, as it would have been robbed of its constituent elements: “Law is bound to 
the earth and related to the earth” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 42). To claim the 
universality of law would merely mean the imposition of order that incorporates 
a local way of life on others – hegemony.    
Furthermore, while it is useful to think about nomos as a zone in order to 
highlight its beginnings in practice rather than in contemplation, Vismann’s view 
that nomos is an order in which “[s]pace and necessity instead of law and 
definition are the coordinates” (Vismann, 1997, p. 60) would hardly find 
agreement in this radical form with Schmitt (1995b, p. 578), who regards the 
                                                
9 Nunan (Schmitt, 2011, p. 121) translates this as “a universal form of knowledge and perception 
without any content.” 
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distinction between nomos and law10 as being in itself artificial and ideologically 
motivated. Rather than seeing nomos as historically preceding and eventually 
being overcome by political formations and legal rules, and thus as distinct from 
law conceived as positive norm or agreement, Schmitt regards all law, political 
as well as religious and social order, as reflecting the constitutive order of nomos: 
“Nomos is the measure by which the land in a particular order is divided and 
situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by 
this process. Here, measure, order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity” 
(Schmitt, 2003, p. 70).  
Schmitt, then, does not intend to outline an alternative to the ordering 
function of legal norms in his concept of nomos, but an alternative to the origin 
of these norms. It is a matter of being able to explain why definitions used in law 
go one way rather than another, and who or what decides on them; in other 
words, a matter of sovereignty. For Schmitt (2003, p. 73), nomos is neither 
abstract law nor “the arbitrary right of the stronger,” but “the full immediacy of a 
legal power not mediated by laws; . . . a constitutive historical event – an act of 
legitimacy, whereby the legality of a mere law first is made meaningful.” 
In highlighting this constitutive origin of law, Schmitt follows the schema 
of his earlier critique of liberalism. He had found the latter forgetful of “human 
nature in its dangerousness and endangeredness” (Meier, 1995, pp. 30-35), as it 
entailed the false belief that the state of nature could be overcome through the 
social contract, whose alleged effect was to ban the dangers of the state of nature 
once and for all. Schmitt (1995b, pp. 577-578) saw this tendency of forgetting 
law’s legitimising measure once order had become secure and predictable (in the 
case of international order, this legitimising measure was law’s concrete earth-
boundedness) as lying at the root of normativism and positivism. By contrast, he 
himself recognised the threat to life in the state of nature as always emergent and 
continuously motivating (and thus directly linked to) the establishment of legal 
order in the form of the sovereign decision. 
                                                
10 This is usually expressed as the association of nomos as law with logos, aimed at signalling the 
rationality of law, and its distinction from physis as referring to all that is ‘natural,’ i.e., drives 
and passions. 
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It follows that by excavating the notion of nomos, Schmitt sought to 
establish not an order’s necessity vis-à-vis the freedom of choice associated with 
norms residing in a metaphysical realm (a freedom which itself merely masks the 
compelling weight of the universal that lurks behind the belief in the possibility 
of a right choice11), but the contingent origin of international law. Law thus 
conceived would both be grounded (in the international context, literally so) and 
unstable, as order would be practice-derived and could therefore always be 
otherwise. Thus, it is this order that is ‘frail,’ rather than, as Vismann (1997, p. 
49) claims, order based on abstract rules. After all, it is the latter that rest on 
universal moral foundations. 
Schmitt’s nomos, therefore, is neither the pre-legal order established in a 
hypothetical state of nature under the duress of individual necessity, nor abstract 
law founded on absolute truth, but the spatial aspect of order, its ‘inner measure’ 
that always already points to space as its constituent element. In this, nomos is 
‘tangled’ in the Latourian sense, constituting neither pure value nor pure fact. 
Despite these indications of the sovereignty of nomos, the question of a 
boundary persists. For the fact alone that law is bound to the earth, to space, and 
thus to concrete order, or in the terms employed in On the Three Types of Juristic 
Thought, the fact that there cannot be norms without something that defines the 
normality that give these norms their meaning, does not make an order out of 
order. If nomos designates the normal, where is the exception, or to ask the same 
question differently: Who or what safeguards this normality from becoming any 
other normality; who draws the limit that for Schmitt (1985b, p. 13 and 1996, p. 
46) is the function of sovereignty? 
To be sure, Schmitt (Schmitt, 2003, p. 75) refers to nomos as a ‘fence-
word.’ Not, however, because nomos fences something in, but because it denotes 
order made up of individual elements, it is the tension between two parcels of 
land; in other words, it stretches across a fence. The clearing was in Schmitt’s 
view not a fixedly bounded space, “not a closed circle and not a zone” (Schmitt, 
                                                
11 Galli (1999-2000, pp. 1604-1605) writes that Schmitt did not see any rational basis for the 
political system of his time; he did not belong amongst the ‘fundamentalist thinkers’ for whom 
politics was grounded in “a kind of rationality – whether it is the single man or society, the 
market or the state or God.” 
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1995c, pp. 492-493), but an order that had no “beginning and endpoints, no lines 
and demarcation lines” (Schmitt, 1995c, p. 492). A clearing is a type of ordering, 
not an order. For the latter to arise, it needs a delimited area ‘in which it is what it 
is’ (Schmitt, 2003, p. 75). Only then can one type of ordering (nomos) be 
distinguished from another.  
In relation to institutions, Schmitt indeed identified this problem of the 
delimitation of order on two levels. On the state level, he wrote, “isolated 
institutional thinking leads to the pluralism characteristic of a feudal-corporate 
growth that is devoid of sovereignty” (Schmitt, 1985b, p. 3), i.e., the precise type 
of pluralism Schmitt was set against. On the institutional level, he thought that a 
leader figure was necessary to make an institution out of a hierarchical structure. 
Allegiance is and must be shown to the leader, as it is he who safeguards order 
by arbitrating conflicts according to the institution’s notion of normality. 
This function, then, is what the concept of nomos cannot on its own 
provide. Nomos denotes an unresolved dialectic, a relation between self-
sameness and difference that is not anything itself until it is referred to a third 
term. It is this third term that must assume the role of sovereign. 
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2.2. The constitutive outside 
According to Schmitt, national law has the function of neutralising 
internal conflict that could endanger order. The sovereign also expels 
troublesome elements if these cannot be managed otherwise. For Schmitt, such 
an enforced peace has its drawbacks, as he sees human beings as naturally 
antagonistic, their subjectivity dependent on a process of self-distinction from 
what or who is other. The weakening of such subjectivity can, however, be 
mitigated by focussing the collective attention of citizens on the external enemy, 
most effectively so in war. While the transgression of order towards its outside 
brings instability, it also invigorates order and allows it to gain mastery over 
itself. Ungureanu (2008, p. 306) thus writes that “. . . for Schmitt, the moment at 
which ‘concrete individuality’ is realized, designates . . . the pure self-
recognition of a homogenous grouping at the highest point of destructive conflict 
with another grouping.” For Schmitt, identity is therefore dependent on what 
Mouffe (2005, p. 15) terms, with reference to Henry Staten and Derrida, the 
‘constitutive outside.’ Prozorov (2007) similarly describes the Schmittian subject 
as constituting itself through a continuous ‘act of distinction’ (p. 234) from the 
enemy or other, who presents an ‘irreducible excess’ (p. 224). “The consequence 
of this logic,” he writes, “is the rejection of any claim to the ’self-immanence’ of 
the social order, of any possibility of a wholly self-sufficient system without an 
outside” (Prozorov, 2007, p. 224). 
Perhaps, then, the sovereignty present in the European order can be traced 
through an outside or ‘other,’ from which Europe can be said to have 
distinguished itself. The obvious candidate here is the ‘New World,’ the “’free’ 
soil of non-European princes and peoples open for European land-
appropriations” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 148). Schmitt (2003, p. 148), for example, 
writes about the ‘important distinction’ that the difference in status between 
recognised European sovereign nation states and the rest of the world presented 
in international law.  
The difference between Europe and the New World, however, was not 
the same kind of difference as between the in- and outside of the nation state, or 
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in other words, the difference between European nation states. It is therefore 
unlikely that it could have functioned in the same way in which the friend-enemy 
distinction functioned to delimit and define order on the state level. The reason 
for this is the effective status of the New World as the state of nature rather than 
an enemy. If the ‘outside’ is to function as constitutive, it needs to be someone or 
something rather than chaos; “[t]he political entity,” Schmitt (1996, p. 53 
emphasis added) writes, “presupposes the real existence of an enemy and 
therefore coexistence with another political entity.” The friend-enemy distinction 
as “the founding event of a political community” (Prozorov, 2007, p. 223) is 
neither about a particular difference (e.g., in economic terms), nor about 
difference per se, but about alignments, co-operation, and expressions of 
intention, about ‘union or separation,’ ‘association or disassociation’ (Schmitt, 
1996, p. 26), ‘determined opposition, opposition itself’ (Derrida, 1997, p. 85). It 
denotes the constellation of identifiable entities in relation to each other. Without 
an identifiable opponent, difference alone cannot be said to be political in 
Schmitt’s sense: “It is an important part of a determinable political idea that a 
certain nation carries it and that it has a certain opponent in mind, through which 
this political idea gains the quality of the political” (Schmitt, 2011, p. 87, 
footnote omitted). War as the culmination of the friend-enemy distinction can 
take place only between two orders; a conflict between order and disorder is not 
war, but civil war (Schmitt, 2011, p. 105).  
The problem thus emerges with some more clarity: Europe could be 
distinguished as an order from the rest of the world, but did not, as Europe, have 
identifiable friends or enemies. “Most essential and decisive for the following 
centuries,” Schmitt, (2003, p. 87) writes, “. . . was the fact that the emerging new 
world did not appear as a new enemy, but as free space, as an area open to 
European occupation and expansion.” Only through the identification of the 
enemy, who could be anyone, but must be someone, does the community define 
who it itself is (Derrida, 1997, p. 106). Europe, however, lacked both the figure 
of the enemy and of the sovereign who could declare such enmity. The New 
World effectively constituted the state of nature in which there were no 
equivalent entities to Europe – at least this is what Schmitt (2003, pp. 92f) 
suggests, referring to the New World as analogous to Hobbes’s state of nature, 
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where “man is nothing but a wolf among other men, just as ‘beyond the line’ 
man confronts other men as a wild animal” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 95). In light of the 
dependence of subjectivity on reciprocal recognition, this, however, meant that 
even if Europe had wanted to engage with the rest of the world, it could not have 
done so as Europe.  
In fact, the same reciprocity applied to the nation state; it also could only 
act as a state in relation to other states and not in relation to the New World. As 
Schmitt writes, beyond the line (European) man confronted other men ‘as a wild 
animal,’ meaning that European man conducted his affairs there not at all like he 
conducted his affairs in relation to other European states; in the New World, 
there were only wild animals.12 And because only the European enemy could be 
the ‘constitutive outside’ needed for distinguishing the internal order, the 
subjectivity of European nation states was split into two: On the one hand, states 
were engaging with the New World in ways non-constitutive of a European, 
‘civilised’ subjectivity, while on the other hand they carried out limited war with 
European enemies. Accordingly, Schmitt only considers the European enemy 
relevant for his definition of the political. Already in The Concept of the 
Political, the enemy is he who is recognised as legitimate opponent and 
encountered within the bracketed space of war: “Also the enemy is recognised in 
the war of the inter-state law of nations as a sovereign state on the same level. . . . 
Also the enemy has a status; he is not a criminal” (Schmitt, 1963, p. 11).13 
The distinction between intra- and extra-European opponents may at first 
appear surprising, given that Schmitt also describes the relation with the 
(European) enemy in explicitly existential terms,14 which would place it in the 
                                                
12 This includes the European states in their relations with each other, as beyond the amity lines in 
the New World, Europeans were fighting not only non-Europeans outside the laws of war, but 
also other European states. 
13 Therefore, while in war it is not a crime to kill, the enemy may not be treated like a criminal.  
14 For example, in The Concept of the Political, Schmitt (1996, p. 27, emphasis added) writes 
about the enemy: “[I]t is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, 
existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are 
possible.” In accordance with this definition of the enemy in existential terms, Schmitt then sets 
out his opposition to all justifications of war other than those referencing an existential threat: 
“[N]o  program, no ideal, no norm, no expediency confers a right to dispose of the physical life of 
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state of nature equivalent to that assumed to prevail in the New World. Here, the 
necessity of survival, rather than law, determines all action; each one is their own 
judge of what necessity demands, all of which is right, as each one has the right 
to do whatever is necessary for their self-preservation.15 These characteristics of 
the state of nature appear to match those of European inter-state relations 
precisely, given that each state determined for itself the justness of its cause in 
war, all enemies being considered equally just. War thus mirrored the division 
between internal morals and external right. However, this would be to mistake 
the artificial construct of the European order for its opposite, as it was not only 
characterised by the absence of an overall framework of justice, but also by the 
limitation of war that ensured that states’ existence itself was never threatened. 
By contrast to the “fight for existence, for life or death” associated with total war, 
the limited war of the jus publicum Europeaeum was “principally partial and 
measured” (Schmitt, 1995e, p. 389).16    
  Schmitt’s use of the term ‘existential’ therefore cannot be taken as 
referring to existential wars in the state of nature. Its meaning, rather, emerges 
when considered in opposition to ‘normative.’ Rasch (2004, p. 12) in this context 
explains that Schmitt’s dismissal of normative justifications should be seen in 
light of his opposition to attempts at the time to outlaw all war unless it could be 
                                                                                                                               
other human beings. To demand seriously of human beings that they kill others and be prepared 
to die themselves so that trade and industry may flourish for the survivors or that the purchasing 
power of grandchildren may grow is sinister and crazy. It is manifest fraud to condemn war as 
homicide and then demand of men that they wage war, kill and be killed, so that there will never 
again be war. War, the readiness of combatants to die, the physical killing of human beings who 
belong on the side of the enemy – all this has no normative meaning, but an existential meaning 
only, particularly in a real combat situation with a real enemy. There exists no rational purpose, 
no norm no matter how true, no program no matter how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how 
beautiful, no legitimacy nor legality which could justify men in killing each other for this reason. 
If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one’s own 
way of life, then it cannot be justified” (Schmitt, 1996, pp. 48-49). 
15 Schmitt (1928, p. 143) therefore writes that in the state of nature, one has only rights, no duties. 
16 If Strauss (1996, pp. 89f.) had commented on the Nomos of the Earth rather than on The 
Concept of the Political, he would have been less likely to have claimed so apodictically that 
Schmitt’s notion of the political reflected the state of nature; after all, war in the European 
context could hardly be said to constitute Hobbes’s ‘war of all against all.’ 
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justified on the basis of universally valid reasons, such as the protection of 
humanity, or peace. Such reasons would themselves be based on what was 
thought to be absolute values; values that necessitate action without allowing for 
an alternative vision of the good. It was the closure of decisions – the end of 
possible contestation that follows from the reference to a source of truth – that 
Schmitt wanted to avoid; “the loss of our ability to make political decisions once 
their contingency is masked by a facade of necessity” (Rasch, 1999-2000, p. 
1682). Schmitt thought that war should only be justified by reference to the 
concrete situation that each individual state finds itself in.  
The meaning of ‘existential’ as ‘pertaining to concrete existence,’ then, 
does not automatically entail that all action on the international level should be 
seen as driven by necessity in an assumed state of nature. On the contrary, in 
order to preserve an international situation in which no one value or vision of the 
good gained a predominance that would allow for wars to be seen once again as 
the enforcement of a (necessary) justice,17 wars of existence had to be avoided. If 
international order should be an order in which difference was allowed to persist 
rather than be sacrificed to shared values, war needed to be limited by laws that 
ensured that even the defeated state would continue to exist. The only necessity 
connected to European order, then, was the necessity to prevent necessity, 
whether in its existential or its truth forms, and it is from this framework that the 
term ‘enemy’ derives its meaning. 
Given that there were no such enemies outside of the European spatial 
order, the difference between enmity within the nation state (neutralised) and 
enmity on the European level (gehegt) could not be replicated between intra- and 
extra-European enemies. Europe, although in one sense repeating the 
management of the intensity of conflict that took place on the national level by 
limiting wars that took place within it, had no enemies on its outside, and it is 
therefore not possible to speak in relation to the European order, as in relation to 
the nation state, of “the irreducible excess of order that is nonetheless 
indispensable for its emergence as its unfounded foundation” (Pozorov, 2007, p. 
224). There was no transfer of enmity to a higher level via a sovereign who 
                                                
17 This was the view adopted by medieval natural law theory, which regarded war as acts of 
(natural) law enforcement within an otherwise peaceful state of nature (Neff, 2005, p. 177). 
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would neutralise enmity within by focussing it on the external opponent, simply 
a different kind of warfare between the same opponents, now taking place 
outside of juridical order. In other words, there was no political connection 
between Europe and the New World other than through individual nation states. 
In a sense, from the perspective of the European order, the New World did not 
exist. 
It is unlikely that Schmitt would have entirely agreed with this analysis; 
in fact, in The Nomos of the World he gives several alternative accounts of 
Europe’s relation to the New World, which are difficult to present as a coherent 
story. Firstly, as already mentioned, he describes the New World as constituting 
the state of nature. Secondly, he appears to suggest that Europe did act as one 
entity when appropriating land in the New World, even if only in agreeing, 
“precisely because they [the nation states] lacked any common presupposition 
and authority . . . nor any principle of distribution other than the law of the 
stronger . . .” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 94, emphasis added), that the land ‘beyond the 
line’ was free for the taking. Schmitt (2003, p. 134) then proceeds to call this 
“the common land-appropriation of non-European territory by European 
powers.”18 In fact, he criticises the opinion of jurists at the time, who regarded 
land appropriation in the New World as something in which individual European 
states competed with each other (Schmitt, 2003, p. 130). He objects to this view 
by stating that, because religious justifications were no longer available after the 
destruction of the medieval order of the respublica Christiana, the only legal 
basis for land appropriation in the New World was ‘discovery,’ which in turn 
could only give rise to legal title from the perspective of the European order as a 
whole (Schmitt, 2003, p. 131). Such title was only recognised in European 
international law, and had its legitimacy in the ‘superior knowledge and 
consciousness’ (p. 132) of European peoples, who expanded that knowledge 
through discovery. Schmitt (2003, p. 132) writes:  
 
                                                
18 Presumably it is this that leads Minkkinen (2011, pp. 14-15 and n. 37) to suggest that land 
appropriation played a role on the international level equivalent to the decision of the sovereign 
on the national level, thereby constituting the decisionist element of Schmitt’s international 
thought. 
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European discovery of a new world in the 15th and 16th centuries thus did not 
occur by chance and was not simply one of many successful campaigns of 
conquest in world history. Neither was it a just war in any normative sense. 
Rather, it was an achievement of newly awakened Occidental rationalism . . .  
[that had become] a great historical power.  
 
While this may explain a Euro-centric view of the New World, it is hard 
to see how such a ‘free’ and ‘empty’ space, waiting to be discovered by 
Europeans, could have been constitutive of legal order within Europe, even if one 
assumes there to have been a European agency.  
Nevertheless, Schmitt (2003, pp. 97-98) thirdly claims that “[t]he 
designation of a conflict zone outside of Europe contributed . . . to the bracketing 
of European wars, which is its meaning and its justification in international law.” 
Schmitt here appears to suggest that the New World functioned as a pressure 
valve of sorts for the European order by providing the setting for an 
unencumbered contest of forces not permitted in this form within Europe itself. It 
was as if the order of limited war in Europe could only be maintained by 
externalising unlimited conflict to the space beyond the amity lines: “Everything 
that occurred ‘beyond the line’ remained outside the legal, moral, and political 
values recognized on this side of the line. This was a tremendous exoneration of 
the internal European problematic” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 94).  
Although this may at first appear like a similar displacement of enmity as 
from the national to the international sphere, this is not in fact the case. Firstly, as 
already mentioned above, the European order was made up of the very same 
opponents that were also fighting each other outside of Europe over land in the 
New World, and not, as on the state level, of formerly internal opponents united 
against an external enemy. Secondly, if war in the New World stood in a similar 
relation to the European order as European stood to the nation state; if, in other 
words, the New World constituted a space of exception analogous to martial 
law19 as Schmitt (2003, pp. 98f.) maintains, then it would have needed to harbour 
                                                
19 Schmitt (2003, p. 98, translation modified) in fact sees it the other way around, stating that 
martial law “is obviously based on an analogous conception of an excluded, free and empty 
space,” but this is of no significance here.  
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a threat to the European order on the basis of which such an exception would 
have been justified. In the European context, however, there was not only no 
sovereign who could make such a decision on behalf of Europe, but it is unclear 
whether the New World even presented a threat in relation to European order. 
This threat, surely, did not come from outside of Europe, but was present within 
it in the form of the hegemonic ambitions of nation states. 
There are also the limiting characteristics of the state of exception that 
Schmitt himself points out, such as its temporal and physical limitations,20 and 
these do not seem to have applied to the New World. Here, there was no law, and 
everything was therefore truly possible. Although Agamben maintains that it also 
was a characteristic of the concentration camp that within it everything was 
possible,21 which may have been correct historically speaking (Levinas (1996b, 
pp. 119-123) also associates with the Holocaust a time and space lacking any 
fixed points of moral orientation, where institutions no longer existed, nothing 
was ‘official’, nothing ‘objective’, and ‘all was permitted’), such unlimited 
possibilities do not characterise Schmitt’s state of exception. The latter does not 
simply signify a return to the state of nature, or even, as Agamben claims, the 
establishment of the state of nature in the first place,22 but a state that continues 
to derive its legitimacy from, and is responsible to, the legal order. The 
exception, then, must be regarded as belonging to the legal order, and not as 
something simply ‘abandoned outside.’23 The New World, however, exhibits 
                                                
20 “. . . English martial law remained limited: a suspension of all law for a certain time and in a 
certain space. In terms of time, it began with the declaration of martial law and ended with an act 
of indemnity; in terms of space, the precise area in which the normal legal order was suspended 
was specified. Within this context, everything required by the situation was permitted” (Schmitt, 
2003, pp. 98-99). 
21 “It is only because the camps constitute a space of exception - a space in which the law is 
completely suspended - that everything is truly possible in them” (Agamben, 2000, p. 39). 
22 As Rasch (2007, p. 102) explains, “[f]or Agamben, . . . the problem that Hobbes thinks he 
solves [through the social contract] is in reality the product of the political space he creates and 
the consequence of the sovereign ban.” See, for example, Agamben (1998, pp. 35-36). 
23 Although Agamben thinks that the state of exception is anchored within law, he conceives of 
this relation merely in a formal sense. He writes that, through its ‘self-presuppositional’ power 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 59), law gives rise to the exception by ‘withdrawing’ from it, ‘taking’ the 
exception ‘outside’ of its scope of application and ‘abandoning’ it there: “. . . [T]he rule, 
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none of these limitations; it is made up of everything ‘beyond the line,’ and law 
here is not merely temporarily suspended, but has simply never been applied. On 
Schmitt’s own account, the New World could therefore not have been an 
equivalent construction to that of the state of exception.  
If the New World thus constituted neither the ‘enemy,’ i.e., Europe’s 
constitutive outside, nor a space of exception from the European legal order, it 
could perhaps be characterised as the environment to the system of Europe. In 
systems theory, the environment comes into being when the system makes its 
first and most fundamental distinction: that between itself and the environment 
(Schütz, 1997, p. 257). This distinction, however, does not distinguish pre-
existing entities. It is a contingent distinction made by the system, or rather, by 
what will be the system once the distinction has been made (Luhmann, 1989, p. 
18). What matters is control: Within its boundaries (i.e., on one side of the 
distinction between system and environment), the system is able to perform 
operations that simplify the complexity of the world, making it meaningful 
(Luhmann, 1989, p. 12). In this way the system delineates a space in which it can 
grow. It pulls itself out of the world and into existence (Luhmann, 1989, p. 16), 
creating at the same time that which in relation to it (and only to it) will be the 
environment. The environment as a meaningful entity is therefore a ‘self-made 
construction’ (Schütz, 1997, p. 259) of the system that – like all other systemic 
meaning – resides within the system. The environment ‘lives’ and ‘dies’ with the 
system, and cannot be ‘overcome’ by it: “there are precisely as many 
environments as there are systems” (Schütz, 1997, p. 259). 
This could be a description of the relation between Europe and the New 
World if one assumed the relevant distinction to be that between limited and 
unlimited war, or in other words between law-governed war and war that takes 
place outside of any legal framework. But already problems arise, as there seems 
to be no link between the legal order of Europe and its outside other than that the 
latter was not included within; war in the New World was not criminal, not was it 
excepted, it simply took place outside of the European legal order altogether. If 
anything, the free spaces of the New World functioned to relieve the pressure of 
                                                                                                                               
suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, 
first constitutes itself as a rule” (Agamben, 1998, p. 18). 
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the European order, turning on its head Luhmann’s distinction between system 
and environment, in which the complexity of the environment presents for the 
system “a constant pressure to develop and refine strategies for the reduction of 
complexity” (Pottage, 1998, p. 3). The contingency of the European order did not 
arise as a result of “being forced to select” from what the environment presented 
to it (Luhmann, 1995, p. 25), but from the open nature of conflict within the 
European order, whose outcome was contingent in the way Luhmann (1995, p. 
25) defines the term, namely as something that could always be otherwise and 
whose “best possible formation” was not guaranteed at any time: neither 
necessary nor impossible (Luhmann, 1998, p. 45). 
It therefore offers itself to view the laws of war not as having put into 
effect a distinction, unifying one side of the distinction as against its outside, but 
as having guarded distinctions already in place, namely those between the 
juridical, political and moral systems of each nation state. The law functioned as 
‘ethics’ in Luhmann’s sense, namely “as a decision-making process, . . . in the 
need of social systems to protect themselves from the effects of morality” 
(Rasch, 2000, p. 148).  
It then becomes apparent, that the New World did not play any role in the 
constitution of Europe at all, the process of which must instead be sought on its 
inside. In fact, European order presented a reversal of national order in a number 
of respects. For instance, the representation of Europe by Schmitt as “a sphere of 
peace and order ruled by European public law” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 97, emphasis 
added) is not entirely accurate, as in Europe, it was not the neutralisation of 
conflict by law that created order (that was then guaranteed by the sovereign), 
but conflict itself through which disputes were resolved, and whose protection 
became the task of law. By contrast to the nation state, which sought to establish 
internal peace and externalise political relations of war, Europe was protective of 
its internal conflict as war, and not as discussion or competition.24 The outwards-
                                                
24 Schmitt (1996, p. 33, translation amended) thus writes: “Just as the term enemy, the word 
combat, too, is to be understood in its original existential sense. It does not mean competition, nor 
the ‘purely intellectual’ combat of discussion, nor the symbolic ‘wrestling’ that every human 
being somehow always carries out, for it is a fact that the entire life of a human being is a 
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looking sovereign actor that was the result of ordering processes on the national 
level (i.e., internal depoliticisation) was the precondition for international order 
in which enemies confronted each other. What the nation state had on its 
(European) outside, Europe had within, namely a coexisting unassimilated 
multiplicity of sovereigns engaging each other in war as a political process. 
Schmitt’s (1938, p. 74) statement that “[t]he state has its order [i.e., unity] within 
itself, not on its outside” therefore did not apply to Europe, as the latter was 
made up precisely of the ‘difference and otherness’ that Ungureanu (2008, p. 
306) finds lacking in what he calls Schmitt’s ‘identity thinking’ on the state level. 
If this inversion is indeed the case, then European sovereignty would not, 
like on the national level, need to unify internal order and distinguish itself from 
the outside; its sole purpose would be to safeguard the difference that already 
existed within, this difference constituting the sole basis of its unity. In Europe, 
states clearly found themselves within a balance, but this was not the sort of 
“balance of opposing forces from which truth will emerge automatically as an 
equilibrium” that Schmitt (1985, p. 36) ascribes to liberal rationalism’s demand 
for a division of powers. There was no consensus, no reason or truth that would 
ultimately, even if perhaps only in an imagined future, guarantee unity. 
Sovereignty did not stand for the creation of order through the neutralisation of 
conflict, but for its encouragement; not for unity, but for difference. ‘Peace’ (in 
the sense of order) was conflict.25  
If the sovereignty founding this order of war were to be sought in a place 
analogous to the place in which the sovereignty that founds legal order resides, 
namely in the middle between the legal and the criminal – Lindahl (2009, p. 59), 
for example, writes that acts which found the legal order “do not fall on either 
side of the master distinction between selfhood and alterity. To the contrary, they 
introduce the cleavage, both ‘othering’ and ‘selfing’ at one fell swoop,” and 
accordingly terms these acts ‘alegal’ –, and if this distinction at the foundation of 
the European order is not to be sought somewhere between Europe and its 
                                                                                                                               
‘combat’ and every human being a ‘combatant.’ The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive 
their real meaning especially because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing.”  
25 Because with enemies, peace as a relation other than a self-relation was possible: “It takes two 
to make peace” (Stengers, 2005, p. 1003). 
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outside, but on its inside, then it lies perhaps in the middle between the sovereign 
states confronting each other in war. After all, the defining aspect of the 
European order was that all enemies were regarded as just, if not from the 
national standpoint (nation states would still regard their own cause as just 
(Schmitt, 2003, p. 157), indeed they had to make a distinction between friend and 
enemy if they were to be states at all26), then at least as a matter of European law: 
“The principle of the juridical equality of states made it impossible to 
discriminate between a state that pursues a just war and one that pursues an 
unjust war. This would make one sovereign a judge over another, and that would 
contradict the legal equality of sovereigns” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 167). 
While the nation state pushed what it regarded as criminal outside of its 
remit, thus establishing its sphere of sovereignty, a closed sphere headed by the 
sovereign and above him, God; a sphere in which justice was always already 
determined and merely needed to be implemented (a just war, like a trial, is one 
where the only objective is to correct a transgression of justice), the European 
order protected these same spheres of sovereignty as its sphere of sovereignty, 
and did so not by substantively extending the scope of the legal or just, but “by 
eliminating the question of justa causa” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 165), keeping the 
question of justice open until the outcome of the conflict would determine it one 
way or another. The function of sovereignty on the European level was therefore 
one of establishing a closed (procedurally guaranteed to be just) order that at the 
                                                
26 This had consequences for the understanding of neutrality. According to Schmitt (2003, p. 
157), being neutral does not involve a decision: “The aequalitas of ‘just enemies’ leads third 
parties to neutrality. There can be only a decisionist answer: each sovereign state-person decides 
autonomously concerning justa causa. The state that does not decide remains neutral and, vice 
versa, the neutral state abstains from deciding the justice or injustice of the belligerent states.” 
Derrida (1997, pp. 126-127), however, picks up on the impossibility of true neutrality understood 
as the absence of decision: “The very concept of neutrality, as we shall see, is swept away by its 
own possibility; it contradicts itself and is destroyed in itself. There is a neutrality of the neutral, 
but it cannot be found politically. One would be friend or enemy, friend and enemy before all 
possible neutrality, yet that would not keep neutrality from being possible. How is this; how 
could this be possible?” Perhaps what Schmitt means is that the neutral state does not decide on 
this particular conflict, as he acknowledges Bynkershoek for having drawn the conclusion that 
“[t]he neutral party . . . remains a friend of both belligerent parties and is obligated to aequalitas 
amicitiae with both (Schmitt, 2003, p. 165). 
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same time remained substantively open,27 and remained so not onto the ‘other’ 
but onto itself.  
This substantive openness had been known from Hobbes’s state of nature, 
where everything necessary for one’s own survival and advancement was also 
said to be just. Now, the state of nature had been exited in favour of an order, 
without, however, thereby instituting an overarching sovereign who determined 
what was just and thus sacrificing the order’s openness.  
Rather, it was justice itself that was banned. But how does one ‘ban 
justice?’ Agamben uses the term ‘ban’ to denote the process of excluding 
someone from the legal order, who thereby finds himself in a negative relation 
with that order; law applies to that person in no longer applying (“holds him in 
its ban in abandoning him outside itself” (Agamben, 1998, p. 34)). A ban is a 
measure of identity and peace used by the sovereign to expel internal enemies, a 
measure that determines the identity of the legal order by deciding who may be 
protected by it, and who may not.28 The ban constitutes a movement of exclusion 
issuing from the sovereign, closing the circle by pointing away from it and 
moving something to its outside, and through this abandonment Agamben 
                                                
27 Žižek (1999, pp. 18-19) claims that this same openness or, as he calls it, formalism, was 
already part of Schmitt’s concept of national sovereignty: “This is the main feature of modern 
conservatism which sharply distinguishes it from every kind of traditionalism: modern 
conservatism, even more than liberalism, assumes the lesson of the dissolution of the traditional 
set of values and / or authorities – there is no longer any positive content which could be 
presupposed as the universally accepted frame of reference. (Hobbes was the first explicitly to 
posit this distinction between the principle of order and any concrete order.) The paradox thus 
lies in the fact that the only way to oppose legal normative formalism is to revert to decisionist 
formalism – there is no way of escaping formalism within the horizon of modernity.” However, 
the difference to the international level would be that here it is not merely a matter of assuming a 
theoretical distance from the concrete order that the sovereign establishes – after all, Strauss 
(1996, p. 105) had already made the similar point, but had made it clear that the neutrality 
occurred at the level of “he who affirms the political” and not the political itself, which always 
has content –, but that in practice no such order is established. On the international level, order 
was no longer achieved through hierarchy, not even any hierarchy, but through the horizontal 
limitation of different elements. 
28 “’To ban’ someone is to say that anyone may harm him,” Agamben (1998, pp. 104-5) quotes 
Cavalca. 
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distinguishes the ban from other forms of punishment that take place within the 
community (Laclau, 2007, p. 13). In the European order, what was moved 
‘outside’ was the parties’ feeling of righteousness, of having justice on their side. 
This was accomplished not through an eradication of such righteousness as such, 
but only where it presented itself on the European level, i.e., as part of the 
limitations placed on war and thus as part of the borders of Europe. Where 
prisoners of war were taken, the righteousness of either party was suspended by 
not allowing the prisoners’ punishment, nor allowing the prisoners to re-join the 
war effort in order to continue fighting for their cause. 
The European inter-state order, therefore, “did not,” as Odysseos and 
Petito (2007, p. 7, emphasis added) write, “seek to end war as such, to abolish or 
banish it from its international relations,” but banned justice or right. It was this 
banishment by which Europe constituted and defined itself as an order, here that 
its ‘ethical work’ took place, “those practices in which the subject engages in 
order to constitute herself” (Pozorov, 207, p. 233), which are also political 
practices in Schmitt’s sense.  
The justness of the order, then, consisted in its banishment of any 
particular notion of justice, and an injustice would have been committed if one of 
the states tried to disturb this order by imposing its own conception of what was 
just or right. It was the limit or fence around the conflict that eliminated the 
question of justa causa on the European level,29 resulting in an order in which no 
single state could realise its vision of justice and ambition for domination by 
annihilating the other. The European order depended on this limit, Hegung, the 
bracketing of war. 
The fence around order, which, in the national context, had produced the 
latter through a decision – the excluded middle between the realm of the legal 
and the illegal, self and other, friend and enemy, inside and outside – in the 
international context became the legal distinction between war and peace. This 
distinction guarded both war and peace as separate realms, assuring that one 
                                                
29 And not, as Schmitt (2003, p. 165) claims, the other way round: “The non-discriminatory 
concept of war essential to the construction of the international law of the interstate European 
spatial order and to the bracketing of European war was possible only by eliminating the question 
of justa causa.”  
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could not become the other without ending itself first. War, in other words, 
became limited to a specific time (between the declaration of war and the 
declaration of peace) and to specific parties and participants. 
From this, one could be led to conclude that sovereignty in the European 
order was to be found in the neutrality of states that did not want to participate in 
any given conflict. Rasch (2004, p. 36), for example, writes that, “. . . unlike the 
decision made within the state, on the international scene the conflict caused by a 
plurality of decisions cannot be resolved by a reigning sovereign. If a conflict 
arises between two sovereign entities, others line up as friends or enemies. 
Whoever remains neutral becomes the excluded middle . . ..” But this would be 
to mistake the middle between friend and enemy, i.e., the sphere of potentiality 
for a sovereign decision by a nation (at any time, the neutral can declare himself 
to be taking sides) for the excluded middle that appears from an international 
point of view. Here, the laws of neutrality may exclude neutral states from war, 
and through that exclusion, may render neutral states symbolic (Schmitt, 2003, p. 
297) of an order of limited war in which it is possible to remain neutral (which 
would not be the case in just wars), but all that happens is that they are thereby 
assigned to the realm of peace. Given that the relevant distinction on the 
international level is not the one between friend and enemy, legal and illegal, but 
between war and peace, neutral states, which do not join wars, invariably find 
themselves on one side of the distinction rather than in the middle. The areas 
they make up are “excluded . . . from becoming possible theaters of war” 
(Schmitt, 2003, p. 248). Hence, the picture Strauss (1996, p. 106) evokes in the 
context of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism also holds here:  
 
The battle occurs only between mortal enemies: with total disdain . . . they 
shove aside the ‘neutral’ who seeks to mediate, to maneuver, between them. . . .; 
they do not deign to notice the neutral; each looks intently at his enemy; in order 
to gain a free line of fire, with a sweep of the hand they wave aside – without 
looking at – the neutral who lingers in the middle, interrupting the view of the 
enemy. 
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The neutral, once he is pushed out of the way, returns, however, to 
protect the real excluded middle, the space between war and peace constituted by 
the laws of war, under which POW camps are situated, its inhabitants in a state 
of suspension between the war from which they come and the peace to which 
they will eventually be liberated. In the course of the Second World War, 
Switzerland and Sweden thus increasingly took on the role of ‘independent, 
impartial authorities’ as they were often acting as the neutral protecting power 
for the POWs of both parties (Overmans, 2005, p. 840). In this, they did not, 
however, become arbitrators of the conflict, nor did they stand between the 
parties to the conflict as such. Rather, by policing the limits of combat, they 
assured the middle between war and peace. It is in this sense that one should 
understand Schmitt (2011, p. 106) when he writes that strong neutral powers 
were “the real guarantors and guardians of international law.” Guardians, not 
because they guaranteed international order like the sovereign guarantees the 
legal order of the state, but because they guaranteed an international law that 
itself took on the role of the sovereign in the international sphere, governing 
nation states through war and drawing a limit around war so as to safeguard the 
European order. Accordingly, Schmitt (2003, p. 74, translation modified) writes 
that it was the bracketing of war which played a vital role in establishing 
international order: “[L]aw and peace originally rested on enclosures 
[Hegungen] in the spatial sense. In particular, it was not the abolition of war, but 
rather its bracketing [Hegung] that has been the great, core problem of every 
legal order.”  
Before looking closer at what is involved in the process of Hegung, there 
is, however, one further source of order that needs to be considered, as it, rather 
than the bracketing of war, is often regarded as the real guarantee and limit of 
international order: mutual recognition of their status by sovereign nation states. 
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2.3. Sovereign nation states and recognition 
The emergence of the secular nation state in Europe had brought in its 
wake the decline of religion as the yardstick by which acts of war could be 
judged. Rising above confessional differences and turning itself into the focal 
point of external enmity, the state enabled the dissociation of the enemy concept 
from religious notions of justice, eventually ending confessional wars. The 
opposing parties in a conflict were now states,30 and with justice no longer being 
determined in a realm of irrefutable truth, it was up to sovereigns to decide, 
without the need to have regard to higher law,31 when to enter into conflict: 
“Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the 
concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 27). 
This possibility of focussing external enmity on itself was the essence of the 
state’s political existence (Schmitt, 1996, p. 49).  
Given that the state’s ability to determine its friends and enemies 
autonomously was a function of its ability to secure peace internally, any higher-
level sovereignty neutralising inter-European conflict would have curtailed this 
ability and would thus have directly affected the continued existence of the state 
as a sovereign entity (Schmitt, 1996, p. 49). The form of the nation state thus also 
in part determined the form of a pluralist international order. While for Hobbes 
the religious neutrality of the state had functioned to pacify only relations within 
                                                
30 This type of state war became known as ‘public’ and could as such be distinguished from other 
types of conflict: “Everything that can be said about the justice of state wars lay in this new 
concept of ‘state.’ A non-public war is a non-state war. Not only was it unjust; it was no longer 
war in the sense of the new international law. It could be anything else – rebellion, mutiny, 
breach of the peace, barbarism, and piracy – but not war in the sense of the new European 
international war” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 158, translation modified). 
31 Indeed, Neff (2005, p. 90) describes the ethos of the period between 1600 and 1815 as having 
been “relentlessly utilitarian, with little place for sentiment, moralism or ideology”. Sovereigns 
acted on the smallest pretext for starting a war if it was in their interests; “. . . it was a 
depressingly materialistic time, with no ideological divides, no great causes, no spirit of heroic 
self-sacrifice.” 
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the state, for Schmitt its function extended to inter-state relations, where it 
prevented just wars (Rumpf, 1972, p. 82): 
 
On the European continent, this new order was created by the state. . . . First, it 
created clear internal jurisdictions by placing feudal, territorial, estate, and 
church rights under the centralized legislation, administration and judiciary of a 
territorial ruler. Second, it ended the European civil war of churches and 
religious parties, and thereby neutralized creedal conflicts within the state 
through a centralized political unity. . . . Third, on the basis of the internal 
political unity the state achieved vis-à-vis other political unities, it constituted 
within and of itself a closed area with fixed borders, allowing a specific type of 
foreign relations with other similarly organized territorial orders (Schmitt (2003, 
pp. 128-129). 
 
According to this view, it is state sovereignty in its decisionist form that 
is “the linchpin that holds together both the ‘top-down’ homogeneity of the state 
and the heterogeneity of a structured plurality of states that guarantees the space 
of legitimate politics” (Rasch, 2004, p. 37). Or in the words of Schmitt, the state 
was the sole agency of order: 
 
[T]he sovereign, European, territorial state . . . constituted the only ordering 
institution at this time . . .  the state was the spatially concrete, historical, 
organizational form of this epoch, which, at least on European soil, had become 
the agency of progress in the sense of increasing the rationalization and the 
bracketing of war (Schmitt, 2003, pp. 148-149). 
 
The argument here is that the mutually recognised right of sovereign 
states to decide on their cause for war prevented the establishment (or, in the case 
of religion, the continued authority) of a higher-order sovereignty, and that the 
laws of war were only effective in limiting wars because they were based on (and 
re-enforced) this pre-existing nomos. With this, political relations between nation 
states became the ‘guarantee for the lack of unity’ in the European order (Rasch, 
2004, p. 41), an order that was a ‘self-organising structure’ dependent on ‘the 
logic of autonomy and differentiation’ (Rasch, 2004, p. 37).  
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For Schmitt, mutual recognition of the status of states as enemies indeed 
constituted the basis for the limitation of warfare: “The removal and avoidance of 
wars of destruction is possible only when a form for the gauging of forces is 
found. This is possible only when the opponent is recognized as an enemy on the 
same level – as a justus hostis. This is the given foundation for a bracketing of 
war” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 187, translation modified).  
This coincides with the way in which the relation between mutual 
recognition and the laws of war is commonly portrayed, namely as one whereby 
the application of law is directly dependent on the recognition of the equal 
standing of the opponent.32 In part, this application of law to equals is referable 
to the professionalisation of violence, which, according to Neff (2005, pp. 87-
88), is linked to both a separation of war from other fields of occupation 
(bringing about, for example, a uniformity in dress that sets the particular 
occupation of soldier apart from others, with war becoming the exclusive affair 
of military men marked as such) and to increasing costs for states associated with 
maintaining large standing armies. Both these factors contribute to the bracketing 
of war (Oeter, 1999, pp. 45-46); but perhaps most decisive in this respect is the 
assessment of the enemy’s desert in benefiting from restraint, hidden beneath an 
‘objective’ judgement on the latter’s equality. 
Schmitt (2003, p. 166) passes such a judgment when he justifies the 
subordination of Poland by saying that, by the late 18th century, Poland had not 
yet reached the threshold of statehood. Apparently, because Poland had not yet 
‘overcome the stage of feudalism,’ it was not a proper state and could be divided 
amongst those that were. But then Schmitt also provides a different version of 
recognition, one that resembles Latour’s description of how reality is established 
in the laboratory, where a successive number of experiments incrementally 
reveals the ‘competences’ (Latour, 1987, p. 89) of the tested material. 
“[R]eality,” Latour (1987, p. 93), writes, “as the latin word res indicates, is what 
                                                
32 See, for example, Stacey, 1994, p. 39. Interestingly, the relation between similarity and the 
application of laws of war appears to have been subject to circularity early on. Neff (2005, p. 24), 
for example, quotes Cicero as voicing the opinion that the difference between enemies and 
‘piratical savages’ (this difference presumably justifying the harsher treatment of the latter), was 
that the former respected each other’s religion and customs, while the latter did not. 
Page 45 of 195 
resists. What does it resist? Trials of strength.” Schmitt similarly sees Poland as 
unworthy of the badge of statehood not simply because it does not have certain 
easily-recognisable characteristics, but because it did not withstand the trial that 
would prove it had those characteristics: Poland “did not have the power to 
launch a defensive state war to prevent the divisions and land-appropriations of 
Polish soil by neighbouring states” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 166). According to this 
view of recognition, Schmitt regarded only those states as equal that were able to 
resist the others’ attempts to overpower them: “Each [state] was the equal of the 
other, because each constituted a component of the system of equilibrium” 
Schmitt (2003, p. 168). 
There is, however, confusion here about what ‘the thing’ in question is 
that needs to be discovered through a trial of strength. In the context of European 
wars, there were, on the one hand, the states involved in war, which were subject 
to recognition. Then there was, on the other hand, the subject matter of the war 
itself.33 It is the latter whose identity was revealed through a trial of strength, as 
victory established a right or truth that could not be established by any other 
means. The status of the states themselves, however, was not a subject for truth-
finding, but for politics, and politics or recognition involves a struggle not for 
knowledge, but for inclusion, not discovery, but boundary-drawing. The one 
precedes the other, as in order to have a fight about a subject matter (whose 
outcome may be determined by resistance), one must first have an opponent with 
whom to have that fight. 
It is, then, surprising that Schmitt (1938, p. 74) draws an analogy between 
inter-European war and the institution of the duel:  
 
As in a legal order that recognises the duel as a legal institution such a duel has 
its internal legal guarantees in the fact that certain qualities are presupposed for 
each duellist, in other words that they are men capable of rendering 
‘satisfaction’ who are duelling each other, and that therefore every real duel 
cannot as such be called just or unjust, so it is equally impossible to speak in 
                                                
33 The 12th and 13th century commentators on Roman law translated causa, concilium, 
conventus, curia, ius, mallum and negotium with Ding (‘thing’) (Kaufmann, 1971, col. 742-744). 
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international law of just or unjust war between states, as long as this law is 
essentially a law ‘valid between states.’  
 
As he himself states, the duel works on the basis of a presupposed 
equality, which, although in practice tied to a certain class of person, does so as a 
matter of definition rather than of natural traits. After all, the purpose of the duel 
is to institute formal fairness precisely in order to render any consideration of the 
actual inequality between the parties redundant. Schmitt appears not to recognise 
that, if the duel analogy is to hold, the definition of statehood is of no real 
significance, as it could be moved one way or the other without affecting the 
nature of the conflict as such. In fact, he himself points to the fact that limited 
war is possible not because the opponents are equal, but because they have equal 
rights:  
 
The justice of war is no longer based on conformity with certain content of 
theological, moral, or juridical norms, but rather on the institutional and 
structural quality of political forms, which pursue war against each other on one 
and the same level, each side viewing the other not as traitors and criminals, but 
as justi hostes. In other words, the right of war is based exclusively on the 
quality of the belligerent agents of the jus belli, and this quality was based on 
the fact that sovereigns holding equal rights pursued war against each other 
(Schmitt, 2003, pp. 142-143, translation modified).34 
 
If it is true that the distribution of rights formed the basis for the 
application of law, then, rather than taking the distinction between state and non-
state entities as given in defining the threshold of the European order within 
which the laws of war were applied, one should ask about the process that led to 
the view that a political entity was or was not included in the definition in the 
first place. In other words, not where, but how was the border around Europe 
drawn? 
As with the social contract (in relation to which Schmitt already in 1914 
(p. 107) observed that it presupposes a legal order), recognition as the basis for 
                                                
34 See also, for example, Schmitt, 2003, p. 167 
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participation in the political process appears to presuppose a prior political 
process. Rasch (2004, p. 21) writes: 
 
Conflict is possible as a structure of difference, and such a structure is only 
possible as a differentiation of unities, a differentiation, that is, of bundled 
differences. Thus, the specific nature of politics is determined by the specific 
constitution of opposed unities, making the origin of politics already political, 
already a battle about what constitutes a politically legitimate unity.35 
 
That the recognition of state sovereignty was a process rather than an 
acknowledgment of facts, should have been obvious to Schmitt, for whom states 
were only then sovereign states if they made their own political decisions, i.e., 
decisions as to who their friends and enemies were. This presupposed that there 
were other states already in existence, who themselves would need to distinguish 
themselves from other states in turn, each depending for their own identity and 
their outward display of statehood on the existence of like states. To each state, 
recognition by others was vital if it were to exist as such, namely as a state that 
was sovereign in relation to its internal affairs and could act as a state externally. 
In this sense, the inside of a state was existentially dependent on its status on the 
outside. Paradoxically, therefore, independence could only be achieved in 
dependence on others, a fact that had already underpinned Hegel’s account of 
recognition as achieved through struggle. “And it is thus clear that his [Hegel’s] 
ethical thought means to appeal at bottom to an inescapable, binding form of 
human dependence which when properly (or normatively) acknowledged 
                                                
35 In addition to this external struggle for recognition, there is also the internal politics of each 
state to consider. This is what Žižek (1999, pp. 28f) criticises about Schmitt’s notion of the 
political, namely that Schmitt disregards the internal struggle involved in the formation of a 
political entity even before this entity can itself act politically: “The clearest indication of this 
Schmittian disavowal of the political is the primacy of external politics (relations between 
sovereign states) over internal politics (inner social antagonisms) on which he insists: is not the 
relationship to an external Other as the enemy a way of disavowing the internal struggle which 
traverses the social body” (Žižek, 1999, p. 29)? 
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becomes itself the means for the achievement of a collective form of 
independence” (Pippin, 2008, p. 196).  
For Hegel, recognition must ultimately be mutual because the subject is 
only then truly the subject of its deeds when it can think itself as independent of 
the natural world, rather than as given up to it in dependence. This necessitates, 
firstly, that the subject no longer be objectified by the other, but be recognised by 
him as free. Such recognition overcomes the contradiction between the subject as 
internally free (“what they [the subjects] essentially are in themselves or 
according to their Notion” (Hegel, 1971, p. 171, §431)) and externally unfree, 
i.e., treated by the other as an object. But it also necessitates, secondly, that the 
other be recognised by the subject as free in return. This is necessary because a 
treatment of the other in strategic terms as an object implies dependence on him; 
although objects can be destroyed or assimilated, in which case they either 
become nothing or one with the subject, they cannot, having no inner life, 
orientate themselves towards the subject in the way that another consciousness 
can, and are thus unable to remain outside while also being appropriated. The 
freely directed attention of the other onto the subject in recognition, on the other 
hand, allows the subject to integrate the outside world within its consciousness 
and think itself central to, and containing, the world:  
 
Only in such a manner is true freedom realized; for since this consists in my 
identity with the other, I am only truly free when the other is also free and is 
recognized by me as free. This freedom of one in the other unites men in an 
inward manner, whereas needs and necessity bring them together only 
externally. Therefore, men must will to find themselves again in one another 
(Hegel, 1971, p. 171, §431). 
 
The point in taking the other into servitude rather than killing him in 
battle, is therefore to prevent his death, which would collapse the tension that 
constitutes the link between the victor and the vanquished, having arisen out of 
the fact that each one was thinking himself to be free but treating the other in 
strategic terms. When one is dead, “. . . the two do not reciprocally give and 
receive one another back from each other consciously, but leave each other free 
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only indifferently, like things” (Hegel, 1977. p. 114, §188). Hence the need to 
prevent the death of the opponent: “For the dead man is no longer anything more 
than an unconscious thing, from which the living man turns away in indifference, 
since he can no longer expect anything from it for himself” (Kojeve, 1980, p. 
14). 
However, the submission of the other into a bondsman similarly falls 
short of the freedom gained through mutual recognition, as the lord “still does 
not consider [the bondsman] as his equal or as a rational being. . . . [The 
bondsman] is only an animal, an instrument to satisfy his desires” (Beiser, 2005, 
p. 188). Until lord and bondsman mutually recognise each other as free, neither 
has achieved freedom. Or, to transfer this to the area of war between European 
nation states, until states applied laws of war that prohibited wars of destruction, 
i.e., laws by which the defeated army could neither be killed nor enslaved, it 
would not have been possible to speak of mutual recognition of each other as 
autonomous sovereign states. In the same way in which on the national level law 
needs the sovereign, on the international level this same sovereign is dependent 
on law, a law that puts in place a structure that allows for mutual recognition. 
Recognition, then, is no longer about the acknowledgement of commonality 
between two otherwise independent entities, an acknowledgement that may then 
lead to the strategic limitation of each party’s actions, but about the 
acknowledgement of an essential inter-dependence that prevents independence 
unless certain limiting rules are applied. 
The friend-enemy distinction, which is also the recognition of the enemy 
as one to which the laws of war apply, is therefore not that which cuts the knot of 
inter-dependence in the way described by, for example, Prozorov (2007, p. 234), 
who suggests that it brings into being self and other in one stroke, or by Lindhal, 
who terms it ‘one fell swoop,’ but the result of a process of recognition through 
which inter-dependence is resolved into independence only through an 
acknowledgement of the former. Sovereignty may lie in a distinction, but this 
distinction itself is dependent on a process of struggle that limits the two 
emerging entities, thereby uniting them at the same time that they gain their 
independence. 
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This is why Schmitt can maintain, in what amounts to ‘a Hegelian 
exercise’ (Derrida, 1997, p. 162), that the enemy is both “existentially something 
different and alien” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 27) and that he can be ‘only I myself or 
my brother:’ 
  
Who can ever be my enemy? And in such a way, that I recognise [anerkenne] 
him as an enemy, even have to recognise that he recognises me as an enemy. In 
this mutual recognition of recognition lies the grandeur of the concept. . . . 
Who can I ever recognise as my enemy? Obviously only he who can put me into 
question. By recognising him as an enemy I recognise that he can put me into 
question. And who can really put me into question? Only I myself. Or my 
brother. That’s it. The other is my brother. The other reveals himself as my 
brother, and the brother reveals himself as my enemy (Schmitt, 1950, p. 89). 
 
In this emergence of the enemy as brother through the process of 
recognition – “by recognising him as an enemy I recognise that he can put me 
into question” – lies the essence of the European order as a family of states. 
Recognition of enmity, however, was itself a process of war: “The question [by 
which the other puts me into question] is no longer a theoretical question, a 
question of knowledge or of recognition, but first of all, like recognition in 
Hegel, a calling into question, an act of war” (Derrida, 1997, p. 162). 
The laws bracketing European war played a vital role in the process by 
which states negotiated their sovereign status, rather than being merely a result of 
its achievement. The ‘legal status of sovereign equality’ was not ‘a fact,’ as 
Hooker (2009, p. 20) claims36, although he is right in saying that it was ‘not a 
norm.’ There was no European overarching sovereign who could have decided 
on the application of such a norm; and yet, this status was true only within a 
certain sphere, a bracketed (gehegter) space, established through the reciprocal 
application of the laws of war. This space was not a space of reason, 
characterised by universal law and limited merely as to its current extent, but a 
space constituted by the participation of concrete entities in limited war. Stepping 
into this space had a two-way effect: On the one hand, within the sphere of 
                                                
36 “The exercise of sovereignty is the international status of the state.” 
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bracketed war, the parties to a conflict would agree to apply certain limits in 
fighting each other. On the other hand, by entering the sphere as enemies (rather 
than foes), the opponents would presuppose themselves (i.e., recognise 
themselves in their existence outside the sphere) as otherwise peacefully co-
existing neighbours, whose conflict constituted an exception to that peace. It was, 
then, not the equality of states within a pre-defined space that provided the basis 
for the application of the laws of war within Europe, but the application of the 
laws of war that led to Europe, a space defined by the equality of states. 
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2.4. Hegung 
The necessary supplement of nomos (concrete order) with that of Hegung 
(the limiting of the relation between the elements of that order) is not a new idea. 
In the cosmology of Anaximander, formless, indefinite substance was separated 
into the elements (earth, water, air, fire) at the beginning of the world, each of 
them acquiring their own region: 
 
The separation of the elements into their several regions was caused by the 
‘eternal motion’ – which perhaps we should conceive as a ‘whirling’ motion 
(δίνη) of the whole universe, which sifts out the opposites from the primary, 
indiscriminate or ‘limitless’ mixture, in which they will again be all merged and 
confused when they perish into that from which they arose” (Cornford, 1957, p. 
9, footnote omitted).  
 
The resulting order was thought to be a juridical order in the sense that 
the disturbance of the ‘equal balance’ (δίκη or ‘justice’ (Burnet, 1930, p. 54, n. 
1)) between the opposing elements, the ‘predominance of one element over 
another’ (Burnet, 1930, p. 54) was perceived as an injustice: “The warm commits 
‘injustice’ in summer, the cold in winter . . . (Burnet, 1930, pp. 57-58). How, 
then, was it proposed that these elements would be kept from merging with each 
other, especially if, as Cornford (1957, p. 9) writes, they were “at perpetual war 
with one another, each seeking to encroach upon the domain of its antagonist?” 
In this respect, it is notable that the characteristic of war did not only 
determine the relation between elements after they had been separated, but was 
already part of the ‘whirling motion’ that created and placed the elements within 
a certain order in the first place. Thus, what was ‘eternal motion’ for 
Anaximander had previously been conceived of as a process of “division, 
repulsion, ‘strive’” (Cornford, 1957, p. 18). From the beginning, this war must 
have been of such nature as to allow the emergence of separate elements; it must 
have been limited. Accordingly, the answer adopted by Anaximander to the 
question of how the elements would be kept from merging with one another is 
that in the ongoing process of separation from the infinite substance (Burnet, 
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1957, p. 58), they each underwent a limitation, as their infinity would have meant 
the expansion of one at the expense of all the others (Burnet, 1930, p. 53). 
Cornford (1957, p. 12) traces this limitation to the term moira in Homer 
and Hesiod. Moira first denoted one’s part or allotted portion (Cornford, 1957, p. 
16), before then becoming the representation of Fate. The latter was not a 
personified power with a purpose and will, she was “the blind, automatic force 
which leaves their [men’s, the Gods’] purposes and wills free play within their 
own legitimate spheres, but recoils in certain vengeance upon them the moment 
that they cross her boundaries” (Cornford, 1957, pp. 20-21). She maintains order, 
but does not judge; she is natural law in the sense that what she ordains is both 
necessary and just, but brings into being neither a realm of necessity (she ensures 
that no one element overpowers the others) nor one that reflects a substantive 
vision of justice (within each sphere, there is freedom).    
Nor is the limitation of each element to its own sphere absolute. After all, 
‘things’ exist that are made up of several elements, to which they eventually 
return (Cornford, 1957, p. 8). These things can be seen as the wars in which 
European nation states came together. As Heidegger (1975, p. 177) would later 
claim in his essay The Thing (Das Ding), things ‘gather’ or ‘bring near’ to each 
other the four elements of the world. In coming together, the elements represent 
the world, they dance a ‘round dance’ that joins them into unity as world: “The 
round dance is the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring [the world]” (p. 
180). Heidegger then more explicitly implies the restriction placed on the 
elements in the enclosure, where each one is limited and yet, in Hegelian fashion, 
gains a new freedom. He remarks that none of the four elements that the 
assembly, the thing or Ding, assembles, “insists on its own separate particularity” 
(Heidegger, 1975, p. 179). On entering into relation with the other elements, an 
‘expropriation’ happens at the same time as an ‘appropriation,’ a new ‘belonging 
to one another,’ while each one is nevertheless released ‘into its own being’ (p. 
179).   
To return to the ancient Greeks, when the process of dividing and 
dispensing the universe was later attributed to a personal God, a sovereign, it 
turned into legislating. Moira became nomos (Cornford, 1957, p. 28). As law, 
nomos, however, did not lose the spatial connotations of moira as an order of 
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spheres, in which each element had its proper place. Derivatives of nomos, for 
example, denote the shepherd’s allotted pasture, as well as ‘dwelling place,’ 
‘quarters’ and ‘range;’ the term ‘law-abiding’ “has the older sense of ‘quartered’ 
or ‘dwelling’ in a country, which is, as it were, the legitimate range of its 
inhabitants” (Cornford, 1957, p. 30, footnote omitted).37 Nomos thus became 
associated with that which is proper to a certain place, with “normal behaviour 
prescribed and enjoined within a given province, and so custom” (Cornford, 
1957, p. 34); as order it was “dynamic and incline[d] to the positive” (p. 34), 
while moira became that which was ‘limiting and forbidding’ restricting the 
regions and thus guaranteeing the order as a whole. Moira was “always static, a 
system rather than a force, [and] lean[ed] toward the negative” (p. 34). 
But despite this later distinction between nomos and moira, it is difficult 
to entirely separate these two ordering elements, their entanglement 
foreshadowing the paradoxes that would come to characterise the relation 
between law and sovereignty. Schmitt recognised this, and even though it is 
commonly held that his conception of sovereignty in the state of exception would 
leave the sovereign free to act as he wishes,38 Schmitt in fact describes the role of 
the sovereign as substantively tied to the legal order. The sovereign is not he who 
takes his leave of the legal order, but he who protects it, gathering it up both by 
guaranteeing its elements and by suspending legal order in an emergency. As a 
‘border concept,’39 a concept “pertaining to the outermost sphere” (Schmitt, 
1985b, p. 5), sovereignty in this sense is not only that which limits order; it 
provides the condition for its possibility and therefore is a “limit (in the double 
sense of end and principle) of the juridical order” (Agamben, 1998, p. 15).  
This orientation of the sovereign towards the order he delimits becomes 
apparent in two situations. In times of normal legal order, the sovereign protects 
                                                
37 When an enemy force ‘gives no quarter,’ this accordingly does not only mean that no mercy is 
shown to captured soldiers, exemplifying itself in the fact that they are killed rather than 
imprisoned (assigned quarters, or a place to stay), but that the existing order of divisions 
(quarters), in which each party has its proper place, is not upheld.  It is a war in which not merely 
matters of concern, but existence itself is at stake. 
38 See, for example, Agamben, 1998 or Gross, 1999-2000. 
39 ‘Borderline concept’ in Schwab’s translation, ‘Grenzbegriff’ in the German original (Schmitt, 
2004, p. 13). 
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the order – nomos – of the political community by neutralising internal conflict 
(Schmitt, 1995b, p. 581). Zarmanian, (2006, p. 45) writes:    
 
This is the point where the political and the juridical converge. In order to 
neutralize internal political conflicts, obtaining that they give up armed conflict, 
the sovereign’s decision must guarantee all parties. This guarantee function is 
the essence of legal order as a concrete order . . . By taking a decision that can 
avoid a conflict within the group . . . the sovereign respects the asset of power 
and interest which is necessarily pre-existent in the political unit, but gives it a 
legal form. That is, the sovereign renders conflicts capable of mediation and 
non-violent adjudication. The particular shape of a legal order, in which the 
lawfulness of the sovereign’s decision lies, consists, therefore, in its respecting 
(or establishing) such a concrete order (Zarmanian, 2006, pp. 52-53). 
 
Schmitt (1938), who regarded himself as an heir of Hobbes, thus reads 
the Leviathan not as proposing an absolute right for the sovereign to legislate 
truth, but as a right to suspend truth claims between citizens in return for the 
guarantee of their physical safety. In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt (1996, 
p. 46, emphasis added) writes that “the endeavor of a normal state consists above 
all in assuring total peace within the state and its territory.” Even if Schmitt does 
not follow Hobbes in establishing a right of citizens to make their obedience 
conditional on the successful protection of their lives by the sovereign (Strauss, 
1996, pp. 90f), it is clear that the function of the state is tied to the successful 
guardianship of order. It is therefore unsurprising that Schmitt finds that it is the 
responsibility for the protection of the order that defines sovereignty, setting the 
‘direct’ power of the state apart from the ‘indirect’ power of religious and social 
associations, which assume no such responsibility (Schmitt, 1938, pp. 116-117). 
In times of emergency, the sovereign is similarly bound to order. In 
Schmitt’s account of dictatorship, for example, both the commissarial and the 
sovereign dictator are constrained in their actions. The commissarial dictator, 
Schwab (1970, pp. 32) explains, is appointed by the sovereign under the 
constitution (as pouvoir constitué) for a limited period of time and for a specific 
purpose (e.g., in order to restore normality internally or to fight a war), but 
ultimately in order to preserve the existing legal order. The sovereign dictator, on 
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the other hand, is appointed directly by the people (as pouvoir constituant) in 
order to bring about (revolutionary) changes to the existing legal order. In both 
cases, the orders of the dictator are not expressions of an arbitrary will as in the 
state of nature (Schmitt, 1914, p. 21), but constitute ‘norms of the realisation of 
law’ (Normen der Rechtsverwirklichung). They are the means to protect, i.e., 
‘realise,’ certain ‘norms of law’ (Normen des Rechts) (Schmitt, 1928, p. VIII). 
And of the latter, not any random norm may be suspended by the dictator:  
 
That every dictatorship comprises the exception from a norm does not mean the 
random negation of any norm whatsoever. The inner dialectic of the concept lies 
in the negation of that particular norm whose rule is to be safeguarded through 
the dictatorship in the historico-political reality (Schmitt, 1928, p. VIII).  
 
Norms of the realisation of law thus receive their legitimacy from the 
legal order they aim to protect. Even the sovereign dictator, in Schmitt’s (1928, 
p. X) view, “remains a commissary, but due to the particular nature of the non-
constituted, but constituent power of the people, a direct people-commissary, a 
dictator, who also dictates who commissions him, without ceasing to legitimate 
himself through the latter.” He is sovereign, but only until the conditions are 
created in which the constituent power of the people ‘can become actual’ 
(Schmitt, 1928, p. 146). As with the commissarial dictator, this legitimacy 
represents a legal [rechtlich] (Schmitt, 1928, p. 137, 139) bond that prevents the 
dictator from being completely free. His decrees, therefore, also constitute norms 
of the realisation of law, even if this is a law that is of the future,40 whether in a 
political, positive-constitutional or historico-philosophical sense (Schmitt, 1928, 
p. VII).41 
                                                
40 Cf. in this respect DeCaroli’s (2007, pp. 55) description of the practice of banishment in 
Aristotle, who writes about it not in relation to those who have committed crimes, but in relation 
to those outstanding individuals who threaten the established legal order by commanding the 
respect of others, and who are a law onto themselves.  
41 The problem is that such a sense of commission is not only difficult to enforce in practice, but 
that by commissioning someone who is not himself bound by law, can just as convincingly be 
interpreted as the wilful destruction of the legal order by opening it up to arbitrariness and 
individual opportunism, as it can be interpreted as the safeguarding or closing of the legal order 
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Against this background, it makes sense to look for international 
sovereignty not amongst its outward-looking elements (such as Europe’s 
engagement with the New World, if that in fact existed), but amongst elements 
protective or turned towards the European order, such as the laws that bracket 
war, the process Schmitt terms Hegung.    
The term Hegung itself – still reflected by the current German phrase 
hegen und pflegen, perhaps best translated as ‘to hold and cherish’ – refers to the 
delimitation or containment of something, initially space, in order to protect it 
from outside influences. The word is still mainly used in its verbal form hegen, 
of which the English form is given in the Grimms’ dictionary as the verb ‘hedge’ 
(vol. 10, col. 777). Primarily, therefore, Hegung refers to a process of containing 
something, not the container or enclosure itself. Gönnenwein and Weizsäcker 
(1953-1960, pp. 557-558) accordingly list the verbal meaning of Hegung before 
its meaning as the bracketed space itself, i.e., the space won through the erection 
of fencing that is Hegung.  
From the aim of protection in Hegung follows that it is employed as a 
mechanism in relation to something that is vulnerable, if not precious, and 
therefore warrants such protection; in forestry, for example, it is young trees that 
become the object of Hegung, and in hunting terms Hegezeit means closed 
season, the time in which animals breed or for other reasons need protection from 
hunters (Grimm and Grimm, vol. 10, col. 784).  
                                                                                                                               
by providing an individual with the powers to defend, invigorate, or develop it (for a defence of 
the latter view, see, for example, Bendersky, 1983 and 2004; for a defence of the former, see 
McCormick, 1997 or Scheuerman, 1999). All that stands between Schmitt the Nazi and Schmitt 
the conservative in this respect is an orientation in the intention of the dictator. In Schmitt’s view, 
it is dictatorship that does not orient itself towards the law that would need to be situated in the 
state of nature: “A dictatorship that does not make itself dependent on a normatively imagined 
but concretely achieved success, and that hence does not have the purpose of making itself 
redundant, is arbitrary despotism” (Schmitt, 1928, p. VIII). Although intentions had already in 
Vattel’s time distinguished legitimately necessary actions from illegitimate ones (“[d]evastations 
and destructions and seizures motivated by ‘hatred and passion’ however are clearly unnecessary 
and wrong” (Best, 1980, p. 65, paraphrasing Vattel)), Schwab (1970, p. 36) writes that one thing 
Schmitt gave to political philosophy was a way of analysing “the types of rule by the intentions 
of the power holder as reflected in his actions.”  
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Schmitt uses the term Hegung to mean the bracketing of intra-European 
war through the laws of war, die Hegung des Krieges. This corresponds to a brief 
entry in Grimms’ dictionary, where Hegung is given as the spatial delimitation 
and Einfriedung of the knightly battlefield (vol. 10, col. 777). If Einfriedung (or 
Befriedung) means the protection of a space from assaults by the enemy and thus 
its pacification (Grimm and Grimm, vol. 1, col. 1274), from what would the 
battle itself need to be protected, given it takes place with the enemy? How 
would the delimitation of the battlefield achieve pacification, other than in the 
obvious sense of a conflict coming to an end there (the Grimms appropriately 
refer to the Friedhof (‘graveyard’) as a gehegter place (vol. 10, col. 777)?42 
What, in other words, so deserves care and protection in war, and why should 
Schmitt claim that ‘law and peace originally rested on enclosures [Hegungen] in 
the spatial sense,’ or in other words, that order depended on care bestowed on 
precisely such enmity as it reveals itself in war?  
A possible answer to these questions emerges under the rubric of 
‘containment:’ Perhaps it is not war that is to be protected, but the rest of society 
that is to be protected from war. After all, in the national context, it is the 
sovereign who protects the order from its internal and external enemies. In this 
respect one could point to another word that developed from the verb hegen, 
namely the adjective heikel, which meant and still means ‘sensitive.’ At first 
heikel was used in the sense of a person being brought up in a careful manner (as 
in häckel), being ‘delicate,’ ‘fastidious’ (Grimm and Grimm, vol. 10, col. 101 
and 815) and ‘thorough’ (Kluge, 1975, p. 298), but today it has the sense of a 
delicate matter that demands handling with care, a matter which, if handled in the 
wrong way, could lead to potentially uncontrollable and in any case undesired 
consequences. Here, what can be observed is the transition in language from 
something that is delicate because it is protected (cut off from the outside world) 
to something that is delicate because of its connections to many points, thereby 
warranting such cutting off. Hegung would then refer to the mechanism by which 
a matter is addressed in such a way as to avoid its escalation. It is in this latter 
sense that Schmitt’s use of the term to denote war’s limitation or bracketing 
                                                
42 For the view that war can only lead to permanent peace through the annihilation of the parties, 
see Kant’s joking explanation for the title of his essay Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 
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through the laws of war could be understood. In other words, if moira is the 
limitation of elements to prevent them from engulfing each other, Hegung might 
be the limitation of war to protect order from escalating conflict. 
The containment of conflict certainly appears to be one of the aims in the 
bracketing of war, of which Schmitt (2003, p. 100) says that it leads to war’s 
‘rationalisation, humanisation and legalisation.’ Law, in this sense, would serve 
the limitation of conflict by confining war to a certain sphere of an otherwise 
peaceful and stable order. 
In the European spatial order, containment was in fact achieved on a 
number of levels. Not only was war aimed at military victory rather than the 
annihilation of an entire people,43 exempting civilians from combat, but the 
involvement of third states was also managed, namely on the basis of friend-
enemy groupings and the laws of neutrality, which assured that third states were 
not unnecessarily drawn into the conflict. Soldiers, having attained a new status 
as representatives of the state, were, furthermore, included in the scope of laws 
relating to prisoners of war that had previously only applied to a privileged few, 
and by virtue of which they became, if not excluded from war altogether, at least 
excluded from further combat once they surrendered. Taken together, these 
elements of containment meant that conflict could be kept to the minimum 
necessary to achieve its aims. War was made finite, as potentially open-ended 
action such as that which may spring from a belief in truth or the desire for 
revenge was disallowed. Conflict was now restricted to the military 
establishment and its technical concerns, so that the energies of war were 
                                                
43 As an early commentator (inconveniently named Schmidt) on Schmitt’s Nomos remarked: 
“The war between states only wants to decide on territorial change in favour of one or the other 
state; it does not want to influence the nomos, the sense of ownership culture within the 
conquered area” (Schmidt, 1963, p. 104). Schmidt (1963, p. 96) explains in this respect that each 
state was reliant on an existing domestic nomos – which he defines, amongst other things, as “the 
relation of general power and concrete place of man in space” (p. 92) – that determined the 
means and resources the state had available for war. If a state were to challenge not only just the 
territorial borders of another state, but also that state’s nomos by declaring total war upon it, not 
only the balance of the European spatial order as a whole, but each state’s own nomos would be 
altered, as the states would need to have recourse to a wider range of powers and make use of 
more resources than required for limited war. 
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effectively channelled to a particular sphere within the spatial order, whose 
‘rupturing’ (Schmitt, 2003, p. 187) as a whole was thereby prevented. Schmitt 
(2003, p. 187) thus concludes: 
 
Such wars are the opposite of disorder. They represent the highest form of order 
within the scope of human power. They are the only protection against a circle 
of increasing reprisals, i.e., against nihilistic hatred and reactions whose 
meaningless goal lies in mutual destruction. The removal and avoidance of wars 
of destruction is possible only when a form for the gauging of forces is found.  
 
However, finding ‘a form for the gauging of forces’ in society in order to 
protect it from uncontrollable and interminable conflict, and delimiting the 
sphere of combat accordingly, does not account for the internally-oriented, 
protective aspect in the meaning of Hegung, which primarily protects what it 
delimits and not its outside. In its dictionary meaning, the encircling movement 
of Hegung is oriented towards that which is encircled, an enclosure for the sake 
of the enclosed. Something is gehegt not so that it may be neutralised, 
extinguished or expelled, but so that it may grow and be protected. Containment, 
then, takes on precisely the opposite meaning to that first suggested. Rather than 
containing war for the benefit of peaceful society, the laws of war protect war, 
containing society for its benefit.  
Schmitt followed Hobbes in regarding human nature as essentially 
fallible, and the state of nature as that state in which this fallibility can play out 
without containment in the form of unlimited violence (the war of all against all). 
Taking the state of nature as a starting point, limited war becomes the realm of 
the political “in which the effects of fallibility are contained and minimized;” “in 
which this violence can be contained, limited and redirected, but never 
abolished” (Rasch, 2004, p. 97 and 99). Paradoxically, therefore, the containment 
of war contained society, which was not at all peaceful, but threatening in its 
violence. The ‘fence’ represented by the laws of war would need to be imagined 
as erected from the inside of war as against its outside.44 
                                                
44 This becomes especially apparent when considering that until the 20th century, protections for 
civilians were limited. Best (1980, p. 145) writes about the period from 1860 to 1910: 
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The protective aspect of Hegung appears clearly when it is considered in 
the meaning it took in the juridico-political sphere, where from the very 
beginnings of German legal history up into the 19th century, it came to denote 
“the formal procedure of opening (court) assemblies” (Köbler, 1978, col. 36). 
According to Köbler (1978), this procedure entailed, firstly, the spatial 
delimitation of an area in which the dispute was to be heard, using branches or 
pegs around which rope was wound. For this, hazel branches were often used, as 
it was believed that they had magical powers that would protect from lightening 
and poisonous snakes, and grant fertility and virility (Schmidt-Wiegand, 1971, 
col. 2013-2015). Secondly, the procedure entailed the question by the person 
presiding over the assembly whether it were now Dingtime. Ding (‘thing’) was 
the term for the case brought or the matter of concern. As with Hegung, the word 
Ding, having originally been itself a Hegewort, i.e., a word that brackets or 
encloses – it meant ‘time’ in its Indo-Germanic form of origin and only through 
an association with the time for assembly came to denote first the assembly and 
later the dispute itself (Kaufmann, 1971, col. 742-744) – performs a movement 
from the process of bracketing space to the bracketed space itself and finally its 
contents.  
Thirdly, the procedure entailed the president’s demand for silence or 
peace. Such a demand is also part of the concept of ‘ban,’ the German word for 
which, Bann, is related to Hegung. If one disregards for a moment the meaning 
of Bann in modern (secular) language as “the authoritative [obrichkeitliche] 
order or prohibition issued under threat of punishment” (Kaufmann, 1971b, col. 
308), a meaning that can also be found in the verb verbannen (‘to banish, send 
into exile’) that Agamben (1998, p. 58) links to the state of exception, then what 
emerges is a meaning in which Bann is inclusive rather than exclusive, gathering 
                                                                                                                               
“Humanitarians who worried more about civilians – and there were some who did – found that 
there was a larger sympathetic response to the wartime sufferings of combatants; which was not 
surprising, in a Europe where universal conscription for military service became the rule for all 
European great powers but one, and national resistance to hostile invasion the realistic 
expectation of all the lesser ones. In promoting and applauding developments of that part of the 
law which protected combatants, the manhood of the ‘civilised countries’ was in a strikingly real 
sense attending to its own interests, and the womanhood was looking after its menfolk’s.” 
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rather than expelling. In its original form, Bann meant either ‘emphatic, 
ceremonial speech’ or ‘to give a sign.’ As Kaufmann (1971b, col. 308) explains, 
the word bannen (‘to ban’) in its Proto-Germanic meaning as the formal 
proclamation of peace (Dingfriede) at the beginning of an assembly. Here, 
ceremonial speech acted as a sign, a sign that, even though it was set up against a 
certain type of enmity (in the same way in which the hazel was used to keep 
poisonous snakes away), served primarily as a threshold for an order within. In 
this order, it was not he who banned who took the place of the sovereign, but the 
ban itself.45  
The demand for silence or peace thus in particular relates to the protective 
aspect of Hegung. The necessity of such a demand, Köbler (1978, pp. 36-37) 
writes, should be regarded as self-evident for a time when the resolution of 
disputes was not yet undertaken by judges in court and depended on the ceasing 
of direct hostilities between the parties thus brought together. Before any conflict 
could be articulated, which involved its heightening, its bringing-to-the-point, it 
first had to be suspended. This was not an ordinary peace such as would prevail 
after the resolution of the conflict, but a forced silencing of the opposing parties. 
From the point of view of the latter crossing over the threshold, it constituted a 
limit between endemic war outside and limited war within. Once the conflict was 
resolved, however, the parties crossed this threshold from limited war within to 
peace outside. The threshold thus appeared to swap the descriptions of the two 
realms; what had been (unlimited) war now became a realm of peace, while what 
had been (relative) peace from the perspective of unlimited war, namely the 
limited war that took place within the threshold, appeared as an exception from 
peace in the first place.   
                                                
45 However, even where ‘ban’ was connected to a sovereign, its inclusive aspects are apparent, 
such as in the sovereign banner (Banner), which was used to communicate commands to soldiers 
in battle where voices could no longer be heard, thus gathering them together in concerted action, 
the phrase in seinen Bann ziehen (‘to cast a spell on someone,’ or more literally, ‘to pull someone 
into one’s ban’) and in legal compounds of the word, such as Burgbann (‘castle ban’), which 
denoted the radius within which in Ottonian times inhabitants near a castle had both the right to 
flee into the castle when in danger and the duty to aid its construction (Kroeschell, 1971, col. 
315-316). 
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This explains how this threshold, which was nothing other than the laws 
of war that also governed prisoners of war, acted as a three-way threshold 
between unlimited war (persecution), limited war and peace. In fact, war and 
peace were always contained within the threshold in the first place, which 
brought into being a new order that replaced the distinction between limited and 
unlimited war with one between limited war and peace. That this order could also 
be exited, crossing the threshold between limited and unlimited war, was 
exemplified by Germany in the Second World War, which conducted its war to 
the West as limited, while at the same time engaging in unlimited war to the 
East.  
For now, however, it is interesting to note how from the point of view of 
this very threshold of silence, both sides began to look ambiguous – was outside 
the war that one had left, or the peace one was going to? Was the enemy whom 
one was meeting on the threshold, he with whom peace was the more primary, 
more natural, relation, or was he one’s eternal foe? Was one still confronting 
anyone at all if one could no longer tell whether he was a friend, enemy, or foe?  
Crossing the threshold meant engaging in limited war. War was now no 
longer an attribute of an action that could occur at any time, even at the same 
time as peaceful action, but a distinct, declared, and normalised46 state that was 
reached by proceeding through the silence of the threshold. War was separate 
from peace, also a declared state, and both states were exclusive of each other. In 
limiting war, the parties, despite their declared hostility, guaranteed each other’s 
continued existence, and thus presupposed that it was at least possible to exist 
side by side, even if perhaps not before the current, and any following, disputes 
had been successfully resolved.  
Peace thus began to appear as the more natural relation, to which war as a 
distinct dispute about certain matters of concern formed an exception. Limited 
war thus had the effect of asserting society’s essential state as peaceful even and 
                                                
46 Rasch (2004, p. 37, emphasis added) thus writes: “During the hiatus or transition period from 
universal Catholicism to universal (secularized) Protestantism – and Schmitt dates this period 
precisely, from 1713 to 1914 – a legal and diplomatic system develops which normalizes war, 
thereby limiting it, and normalizes the friend/enemy distinction, calibrating clearly defined fries 
and clearly defined enemies with clearly defined states of war and peace.”  
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especially when a dispute arose, which then appeared as a secondary matter.47 
Regarded from a different angle, one could say that by treating disputes as 
secondary, i.e., by bracketing them, peaceful, civilised society came into being – 
not as a consequence, but as a presumed point of origin. The process of 
bracketing war and thus protecting it from society,48 reached back and behind 
this society to establish it as peaceful. 
War, therefore, became the primary agent of order, which is why Schmitt 
(2003, p. 187) calls it ‘the opposite of disorder,’ representing ‘the highest form of 
order within the scope of human power.’ By entering into limited war, the parties 
would show their allegiance to the principle that war should be limited, thus 
confirming an order in which a plurality of states could co-exist without the 
danger of mutual annihilation. This is also the answer that Rasch (2000, p. 167) 
gives to his own question about the allegiance that ought to be owed if pluralism 
is to flourish – “[i]t would seem, then, that the structure to which advocates of 
pluralism should show allegiance, if allegiance must be shown, would be the 
structure of modernity itself, modernity as pluralist differentiation.” 
Schmitt explains in Die Raumrevolution why peace was only possible as 
a result of this order. Having already made a similar argument in relation to the 
possibility of neutrality if war were to be criminalised,49 Schmitt (1995e, pp. 
                                                
47 Neff (2005, p. 138, emphasis added), for example, writes that the contractual school of thought 
on the laws of war held that “[r]elations during war were determined by the agreement made by 
the parties to lay aside their peaceful relations and resort to arms instead.” Best (1980, p. 129) 
writes: “The European law of war, it may once again be remarked, had its origins in a religious-
based philosophy which exalted peace as the highest and most ‘natural’ condition of humankind 
and reluctantly accepted war as no more than an occasional, unwelcome and discreditable 
incident of mortal frailty and wickedness.” 
48 Best (1980, p. 156), for example, writes that, “[s]o far as prisoners of war were concerned, its 
[the law’s] language indicates both a keen awareness that among the law’s classical purposes was 
the prevention of things being done in war which might hinder the return to peace, and an 
awareness that popular passions were actually pressing for the execution of such drastic and 
severer war measures as were sure to do that.” 
49 Schmitt (1996, p. 35) writes: “As with every political concept, the neutrality concept too is 
subject to the ultimate presupposition of a real possibility of a friend-and-enemy grouping.  . . . 
The politics of avoiding war terminates, as does all politics, whenever the possibility of fighting 
disappears.” 
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389-390) here sets out the difference between the possibility of peace in the jus 
publicum Europaeum and in times of total war. He finds that the state between 
two wars “could rightly be regarded as peace” (p. 389)50 only where wars were 
limited and threatened neither the existence of the opponent nor of the order as a 
whole. In an era of total war, however, where states seek to annihilate each other, 
war is neither limited in time nor scope, nor as to its participants; it does not 
assume a prior state of peace, seeking instead to revolutionise the order (hence 
Schmitt’s title Raumrevolution). It may flare up at any time, its all-engulfing 
nature eradicating the very pre-condition of peace, namely the existence of two 
(rather than just one) parties. Thus, as long as the prospect of total war persists, 
the state of nature prevails, in which war is endemic.51  
If international order was shaped by conflict rather than law, this was 
conflict that was bracketed through the laws of war. Like sovereignty on the 
national level, the process of bracketing war “was simultaneously the vehicle for 
peace and war, for life and death” (Kahn, 2013, p. 204). It protected war, but in 
protecting it, also created the possibility of peace on its other side. In this, 
Schmitt corrects Hobbes, who thought that only a carefully constructed legal 
order could lead out of the state of nature. At the same time, Schmitt breaks away 
from the just war tradition, in which peace is assumed to be the normal condition 
of international relations, with war forming an exception necessary for the 
purpose of law enforcement. Peace, for Schmitt, is only ever the fragile outcome 
of pervasive antagonistic relations, even at a time when wars increasingly 
become the exception to the norm (Schmitt, 1996, p. 35). 
It was thus membership of the bracketed space of war, whether directly as 
one of the warring parties or indirectly as a neutral state or witness, which 
became the determining factor in deciding on the boundaries of the European 
                                                
50 Although strictly speaking, in Schmitt’s sense of war as order, even the state of war could be 
regarded as peace, as war effected incremental changes to the order without changing the order as 
such. It therefore matters little that Neff (2005, p. 90, footnote omitted), for example, points out 
that the period 1600 to 1815 “. . . was nothing resembling an era of peace. On the contrary, the 
major European powers oscillated into and out of war with one another, in various ever-shifting 
combinations, with monotonous regularity.” 
51 In ancient times, for example, the relation with those designated as barbarians was seen as one 
of ‘endemic conflict’ (Neff, 2005, pp. 25 and 29). 
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spatial order. If the European spatial order only came into being through the 
process of bracketing war, the ‘threshold’ of Hegung, despite having been 
described as that, is not to be understood as something that was established and 
then overstepped in passing from an outside to an inside, but as a process of 
collection by which the European spatial order as a political collectivity emerged.  
This process of collection has been described by Jost Trier, a German 
linguist contemporary to Schmitt, on whom Schmitt relies for tracing the origins 
of the word Hegung to cultic and religious ceremonies. Trier explains the 
function and meaning of Hegung with the example of the bracketing [hegende] 
character of dance in such ceremonies. When dancers formed a ring and moved 
in a circle, in this way delimiting an encircled space, the enclosing circle itself 
[der hegende Ring] formed by the dancers constituted “a primeval form of cultic, 
legal, military and political communal life, all of which belonged together 
undifferentiable in the old time” (Trier, 1943, p. 233). Ultimately, Trier writes, 
words denoting and belonging to Hegung made up the basis for the word 
‘people’ and even for the name of the Germanic people as the “the people of our 
enclosure [Hegung], of our thing [unseres Dings]” (p. 244).  
Heidegger (1975) similarly views the relation between the elements of the 
world (states within the European space) and things (wars) as one of gathering. 
The thing gathers or assembles the elements, bringing the world as a whole into 
nearness; things are thus seen to ‘inhabit nearness’ (p. 181). However, Heidegger 
then clarifies that “[t]he thing is not ‘in’ nearness, ‘in’ proximity, as if nearness 
were a container. Nearness is at work in bringing near, as the thinging of the 
thing” (p. 178). War did not take place in Europe, it made Europe. 
When, as Trier writes, the collectivity defined itself as the collectivity of 
the Ding or the enclosure, or Europe emerged as space of limited war, this was 
equally not a matter of relation (as if the ‘we’ existed independently of the 
enclosure), but of belonging in a constitutive sense. The movement that had led 
from an initial circle towards its centre was reversed; the bracketing circle 
enclosed space and at the same time exceeded itself to include, and found on the 
basis of its own foundations, a larger space engulfing its outside. As Prozorov 
(2007, p. 223) writes of the friend-enemy distinction, the bracketing circle can be 
seen as “the founding event of a political community that subsequently recedes to 
Page 67 of 195 
its borderline as both exterior to its existence and indispensable for its 
formation.”  
In this sense, Europe came to be defined by and as Hegung. This explains 
why Schmitt (2003) writes both about the single instance of war in Europe as “a 
regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed space [in einem 
gehegten Raum]” (p. 187, translation modified) and of Europe as a whole as this 
bracketed space: “In a certain sense, European soil became the theatre of war 
(theatrum belli), the enclosed space [der umhegte Raum] in which politically 
authorized and militarily organized states could test their strength against one 
another under the watchful eyes of all European sovereigns” (p. 142). In another 
context, Schmitt (2003, p. 55) writes about the ‘orbis of the same empire’ as that 
which determines the law applicable between its members, and this can be 
understood both as the ‘world’ created by spatial order and the ‘ring’ or ‘circle’ 
necessary to draw that order together into an order. The laws of war in the jus 
publicum Europaeum as the procedure of establishing a bracketed space of war, 
the ‘theatre of war,’ were therefore not laws emanating from what Zarmanian 
(2006, p. 61) in the European context calls ‘a collective sovereign decision,’ but 
established this collectivity in the first place. 
The way in which the circle was formed was furthermore key to the type 
of collectivity produced. A circle as a space – and in this case, the collectivity as 
a whole – only emerges through the distances, linkages and movements of its 
participating members in relation to each other. European war, both in the 
imagination and in actuality, was something circling and encircled. Circling, in 
that the opponents in war, which was now conceived in analogy to a duel, could, 
despite their on-going concrete situation, theoretically swap sides, as their causes 
were now seen as equally just.52 European war was encircled, in that a circle was 
drawn around the action, severing it from its connection to truth, separating 
legitimate targets of violence from illegitimate ones, and distinguishing those 
who were participating from those who were merely witnessing.  
                                                
52 Stengers (2005, p. 995) writes that the ‘interchangeability of positions’ depends on ‘a common 
measure,’ which here is the equal justice of the parties. However, as justice becomes meaningless 
when both parties are said to be equally just, the interchangeability of positions may perhaps also 
be seen to depend on an absence of a common measure. 
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Both aspects of the circle taken together had the effect of lifting war out 
of its spatial and moral embeddedness as if onto a stage, even though it remained 
real war with real territorial consequences (by contrast to debate or theatre, 
whereby the antagonistic aspect of the encounter is either simulated or 
subordinated to an assumed possible consensus). Here, war was staged before a 
European audience of states surrounding it on all sides, an audience turned 
towards the conflict. The bracketed space of war thus assembled the parties to the 
conflict, its witnesses, and those who were excluded, forming the centre and 
focal point of the collectivity. 
Every new war re-enforced the existing order, which was fixed to 
concrete spatial co-ordinates. Schmitt put forward culturally conservative, if not 
outright racist justifications as to why the laws of war were not universal.53 But 
he also rejected universalism for another reason, which could be termed the 
possibility of revision: While universal concepts function as facts, and no 
responsibility is therefore involved in their application, concretely determined 
concepts can always be determined differently, burdening those who determine 
their parameters with responsibility for their decisions. 
                                                
53 For example, in 1939 he contrasts “the universalism of the powers of the liberal-democratic, 
nation-assimilating West and the universalism of the Bolshevik, globally revolutionary East” 
with the German Reich, which “has the honor of defending a non-universalistic, völkisch order of 
life with respect for the nation” (Schmitt, 2011, p. 102). For a critical analysis of Schmitt’s 
concept of space and concrete order in this respect, see Vismann, 1997. Bendersky (2004, p. 25) 
observes that Schmitt’s language during the Nazi period “ . . . could be read either way. 
Traditional cultural conservatives could see in Schmitt’s ideas an attempt to rejuvenate a 
distinctly German culture and nationality whose identity and homogeneity had been dangerously 
diluted within modern liberal bourgeois society or by foreign cultural influences. . . . Nazis could 
perceive his ideas as articulating a variant of the National Socialist racial principle of Blut und 
Boden (blood and soil) as the basis of a unique German nature and identity.” Böckenförde (1984) 
accordingly observes that Schmitt’s notion of concrete order has attracted criticism from Marxists 
for being both fascist and bourgoise-conversative: Fascist, because it was appropriated by the 
Nazis for their purposes, bourgoise-conservative, because, as a way of thinking about law, 
concrete order thinking stresses the importance of existing institutions as against the 
establishment of a new social order through the passing of new laws that do not originate from 
such institutions. 
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Change was produced through war, which incrementally altered the 
constellation of states but did not “jeopardize the comprehensive spatial order as 
a whole” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 186). The time of change itself was circular, being 
represented by successive calibrating turns of the collectivity. Limited war, 
repetitively conducted in front of an audience of states, was therefore essential 
both to the development and the stability of the European order, which was 
neither spatial nor united by a sovereign person or body, but an order in which 
the common element was the limitation of war.  
It thus becomes clear that the role of the sovereign on the national level 
was mirrored by the laws of war on the international level. Here, law acted as the 
neutraliser not of enmity (difference) in accordance with a conception of justice 
(identity), but of justice in accordance with a conception of difference. As Galli 
(1999-2000, p. 1605, footnote omitted) writes, “[s]ubstance persists in the 
modern age not as a legitimizing foundation of politics, but only in a plural 
sense, as substances fighting one another, where substance persists only as the 
struggle of enemy substances (that is, nation, parties, ideologies, civilizations, or 
races).” One question, however, remains: If sovereign is he who decides on the 
state of exception, where was such a state to be found on the European level? 
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3. The exception 
Until about the middle of the sixteenth century, judicial duels in France 
took place under authorisation from the king, who, on application by the parties, 
granted them ‘a closed field’ in which to conduct the fight (Billacois, 1990, p. 
18). Such a field, which did not have to be a field as such, but tended to be 
“roped or fenced off, or even delimited with large stones or a wall of snow” (p. 
10), marked a space which the king, even though he was himself in attendance to 
witness the duel, “in some sense abstracted  . . . from his jurisdiction” (p. 13). 
After all, it was not the king who decided the outcome of the disagreement; he 
was merely “a guarantor content with ratifying a decision – the victory – which 
was not his” (p. 13). Later, when the duel had to take place in secret, away from 
the eyes of the law; when it was no longer excepted from law but a crime under 
law, the significance of the duelling ground as one in which the application of 
law was suspended persisted in language. A second assisting one of the duellists 
might, for example, “’take his man off the ground’ – the phrase favoured on 
these occasions” (Kiernan, 1988, p. 148), rather than agreeing to another shot, 
thus ending the duel. The duellists would also enforce the space of the duel in 
other ways, for instance by protecting each other from the reach of the law: “[I]t 
was proper for each man to do his quixotic best to shield the other from 
prosecution. They had after all joined in a conspiracy to flout the law” (Kiernan, 
1988, p. 149). Kiernan (1988, pp. 145-146) furthermore notes that the 
codification of the rules and forms of the duel developed parallel to those 
governing international wars: “The two things were evolving side by side, with 
men from the same classes taking the lead in both. . . . Monarchs embodied the 
cosmopolitanism of the upper classes. They might detest and attack one another, 
but they addressed one another as ‘my brother.’”  
For Schmitt, European war as a duel certainly took place in a state of 
exception from each national order. As Derrida (1997, p. 131) summarises, from 
the national point of view war is to be understood “as an extremity, as the 
extreme limit of a state of exception, as ‘extreme eventuality’ (als extreme 
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Eventualität).”54 In the state of exception, the legal order is suspended and the 
sovereign’s decision – he has a ‘monopoly to decide’ (Schmitt, 1985b, p. 13) – 
acquires legal force. The decision, in other words, becomes the exception to the 
rule of law.55 It is from such sovereign decisions, the ‘double possibility’ 
(Schmitt, 1996, p. 46) of the state to demand the sacrifice of their lives from its 
members and to kill (but also to spare) the enemy, that the state of exception 
from the international point of view must take its leave.56  
Schmitt himself, however, did not comment on the state of exception in 
relation to international order. Agamben, who comes to regard spaces of 
exception as an essential component of nomos,57 explains this omission as 
follows: 
 
                                                
54 For support of the view that soldiers generally fight in a state of exception, see Norris, 2005, 
pp. 269-270. 
55 The exception making up the state of exception is not so much the exceptional circumstance, 
but the fact that action is governed by the decision of the sovereign rather than by law. In Die 
Diktatur, Schmitt (1928, p. VI) accordingly identifies the normal to which the state of exception 
presents an exception as the rule of law, and writes that “every dictatorship comprises the 
exception from a norm” (p. VIII). In Political Theology, Schmitt (1985b, p. 12) again refers to 
‘extraordinary or police emergency measures’ and ‘emergency decrees’ when discussing the state 
of exception (‘exception’ in the English translation, ‘state of exception’ (Ausnahmezustand) in 
the German original (Schmitt, 2004, p. 18)), and not to the factual bases giving rise to them. 
56 This ‘exception from the exception’ is thus analogous to what Schmitt (1928, p. IX) calls “the 
other case of a concrete exception” in addition to dictatorship, namely amnesty. The latter is an 
exception made from the sovereign’s right to violence, itself a remnant from the state of nature 
that now forms an exception from law within law.  
57 Agamben aims to add to Schmitt’s notion of nomos, which he understands as the combination 
of localisation (Ortung) and order (Ordnung), another necessary, although until now unnoticed, 
component, namely the suspension of order (the state of exception), localised in the form of the 
camp. He writes: “The link between localization (Ortung) and ordering (Ordnung) constitutive of 
the ‘nomos of the earth’ (Schmitt, Das Nomos, p. 48) is therefore even more complex than 
Schmitt maintains and, at its center, contains a fundamental ambiguity, an unlocalizable zone of 
indistinction or exception that, in the last analysis, necessarily acts against it as a principle of its 
infinite dislocation. . . . The camp . . . is the space that corresponds to this originary structure of 
the nomos” (Agamben, 1998, pp. 19-20). 
Page 72 of 195 
What Schmitt wishes to establish above all is the superiority of the sovereign 
nomos as the constitutive event of law with respect to every positivistic 
conception of law as simple position and convention (Gesetz). This is why 
Schmitt must leave the essential proximity between nomos and the state of 
exception in obscurity, even though he speaks of ‘sovereign nomos’” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 36). 
 
Like Schmitt, Agamben focuses in his analysis of spaces of exception on 
the national order, without more than repeating Schmitt’s remarks on the 
resemblance between the free spaces of the New World and martial law, the state 
of nature and the state of exception. Agamben’s main claim is that without the 
state of exception, or at least the possibility thereof, a juridical order linked to a 
territory cannot be established,58 and that, paradoxically, the state of exception 
can make such an order possible only through a ‘dislocation’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 
175), dissolving the connection between people, land, and order. He sees the 
appearance of concentration camps in the late 19th century as a manifestation of 
an overly strong reliance on, and thus pervasiveness of, the state of exception: 
“The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to 
become the rule” (Agamben, 2000, p. 38). However, it is difficult to apply this 
insight directly to international order for the following reason. 
In the order of the jus publicum Europaeum, and thus before the time for 
which Agamben diagnoses the rise of the exception, the exception as war had 
already established itself as the rule of a new international order.59 Here, order 
                                                
58 “The banishment of sacred life [to the space of exception] is the sovereign nomos that 
conditions every rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes possible every 
localization and every territorialization” (Agamben, 1998, p. 111).  
59 When Rasch (2003, p. 37) writes that, given there is no higher level sovereignty on the 
international level that unites and thus homogenises states under a common order, no “meta-
sovereign [that] exists to settle disputes,” “conflict becomes the functional equivalent of 
sovereignty, the mechanism by which decisions are made in the extreme or exceptional case,” he 
is suggesting that war forms the exception to international order. War, however, is not 
exceptional to international order; on the contrary, it constitutes the agent for change within the 
order, the way in which decisions are made not in the exceptional, but in the normal case. War is 
the functional equivalent of law, and can therefore not itself occupy the position of the sovereign 
who decides when this order of war is to be suspended.  
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itself was made up of exceptionality and disconnection, as to enter war meant to 
enter a space in which one was no longer subject to the law of the land on which 
one fought. While in this space, the combatant was subject only to the sovereign 
decision, the military order, the space was neither a prison like the concentration 
camp, nor open like the state of nature. It was bracketed – gehegt – by the laws 
of war and thus became an order in its own right. This means that order and 
dislocation are not by necessity opposed concepts. 
But this international order also had itself a state of exception, its spatial 
form being the POW camp. Like the sovereign on the national level, who was 
employing the device of Schutzhaft (‘protective custody’) ostensibly for the 
protection of the individual, but in fact for the protection of the legal order, law 
on the international level was interning soldiers in POW camps not primarily for 
their own protection, but for the protection of war. As on the national level, 
where it was the sovereign who decided (or rather: whoever decided was 
sovereign) on whether to declare the state of exception that was itself governed 
only by sovereign decisions, on the international level it was law that drew the 
distinction that created a space governed only by law.60 It follows that the 
exception is not by necessity associated with an absence of law, but more 
generally with the absence of the ordering element, which in this case is war. 
Viewed at the time of the Second World War, when the jus publicum 
Europaeum was already in a state of dissolution, although its order continued to 
function between Germany and its enemies on the Western front, what emerges 
is a surprising picture: At the same time that Agamben’s new political order 
came to prevalence, exemplified by the rise of concentration camps set up to end 
the lives of millions of people, many more times that number passed through 
prisoner-of-war camps, the sole purpose of which was to keep them alive – and 
only alive. While the concentration camp was filled by sovereign power,61 
nothing but law reigned in the POW camp.  
                                                
60 On both levels, therefore, the distinction between rule and exception relies itself on one side of 
the distinction. 
61 Because of Agamben’s focus on law’s self-suspending force in creating the exception, his 
analysis loses view of the fact that within spaces of exception, there is an intensification of the 
relationship with sovereignty. Agamben’s analogy with the sovereign ban is unhelpful in this 
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In both camps, therefore, ‘naked’ or ‘bare’ life, as Agamben variously 
calls it, was at issue, even if for inverse purposes. While in the concentration 
camp “power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any 
mediation” (Agamben, 2000, p. 40), in the POW camp prisoners encountered 
only said mediation, being excluded from the engagement with and by others, 
whether in the form of war, persecution, or civilian life. 
 
                                                                                                                               
respect, as it describes merely how what is banned is ‘pushed out’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 18) of the 
order’s perimeter, rather than captured and killed. Perhaps it is for this reason that DeCaroli 
chooses the ‘voluntary’ (induced through acts of exclusion from the community) abjuring of 
citizenship in Roman times as an example of Agamben’s notion of banishment from the legal 
order over that of imprisonment, pointing to the intensification of the sovereign-subject relation 
that accompanies incarceration. DeCaroli (2007, p. 63) writes: “Whereas the removal of liberty 
requires either incarceration or bondage, and consequently an intensification of the relation 
between the individual and the state, the loss of citizenship alone does just the opposite.” 
DeCaroli here tries to better exemplify Agamben’s state of exception as ban, not realising that it 
is precisely the intensification of the relation with the sovereign that characterises the state of 
exception. Agamben (1998, p. 110, emphasis added) approaches this most closely when he writes 
that “[w]hat has been banned is delivered over to its own separateness and, at the same time, 
consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons it – at once excluded and included, removed and 
at the same time captured.” Ex-capere, then, as ‘captured outside’ (Agamben, 2000, p. 39) by the 
sovereign rather than ‘taken outside’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 18) by law. 
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3.1. Jewish POWs in Nazi Germany 
In 1940, the order of the jus publicum Europaeum that Schmitt describes 
in The Nomos of the Earth was at the brink of its final dissolution. Dismissing the 
possibility that the acceptance of Switzerland’s neutrality in 1938 by the League 
of Nations had revived the order’s life forces (Schmitt, 2003, p. 250), Schmitt 
himself did not believe it to have survived into the Second World War, which 
right from its beginning exceeded the spatial and motivational scope associated 
with war as a limited contest of forces between European states. Although 
initially Schmitt had seen Germany’s efforts in the Second World War as aiming 
at its own establishment as the hegemonic power presiding over a European 
Großraum, he soon found to his disappointment that Germany was fighting “a 
war of racial annihilation in the East and a worldwide sea war in the West” 
(Schmitt, quoted in Balakrishnan, 2000, p. 240, footnote omitted). When France, 
which Schmitt had credited more than any other nation with the successes of the 
sovereign nation state – he regarded it as “the classical political achievement of 
French spirit” (Schmitt, 1995, p. 198) – surrendered in 1940, this marked for 
Schmitt the end of an era (Balakrishnan, 2000, p. 236).  
And yet, the reciprocal treatment of prisoners of war in accordance with 
the laws of war both by Germany and its enemies to the West suggest that in this 
area at least, the old European order had not yet been wholly dissolved. Best 
(1980, p. 218) gives this account:  
 
[T]he German military (one must distinguish them, so far as facts permit, from 
the more direct agencies of Nazi rule) seem to have conducted their Blitzkriegs 
of 1940 with much professional propriety, and the desert wars of 1941-3, like 
the battle of Britain in 1940, are looked back upon by some as fine late 
flowerings of old-fashioned gentlemanly warfare, each side taking pride in its 
respect for the rules and the opponent, thankful that there were no wretched 
civilians or amateurs to get in the way. Right to the end of the second great war, 
proprieties continued, however unpredictably, to receive some respect in the 
fighting between Germans and their foes on the European western side. 
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Not only were the laws of war applied, they were regarded as valid only 
in relation to those states who had ratified the Geneva Convention. Here, in other 
words, was a regime that was spatially limited and had not yet, despite the 
aspirations in this respect of the Convention and the Red Cross symbol, made the 
transition to universality it would undergo after the Second World War. Although 
Schmitt regarded the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which represented the 
American initiative to criminalise and abolish war, as an important step towards 
the dissolution of the old European spatial order, particularly together with 
Soviet attempts to define aggression and aggressor,62 its ultimate failure can be 
seen as contributing to the fact that the European concept of war continued its 
function of limiting warfare at least in some areas. 
Thus, the question whether Germany did in fact comply with the 
requirements of the Geneva Convention in relation to POWs from the Western 
front is invariably answered affirmatively. Overmans (1999b, p.14), for example, 
cites the low mortality rate of both Western allied POWs in German hands and 
German POWs held in the West in support of his assessment that, “despite great 
differences according to the detaining power and nationality, . . . cum grano salis 
. . . treatment . . . must have broadly accorded with the laws of war.”  
Such compliance is most readily certified for Germany’s relation to 
Anglo-American prisoners. French POWs were in a slightly different position, as 
the particular relation between France and Germany after 1940 meant that 
Germany was able to disregard some of the requirements, compliance therefore 
being merely partial. Durand (1999, p. 72), who conducted a considerable 
amount of research on French POWs held by Germany, nevertheless concludes 
that the German military kept to its obligations under the Convention, even 
though he also mentions exceptions, such as the use of French POWs to clear the 
mines of the Maginot Line in 1940.63 He states that apart from these exceptions, 
                                                
62 “Thus, the axis of power that had created the concept of war in European international law 
became unhinged, as power in the East and in the West came to dominate European states no 
longer certain of themselves” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 280). 
63 Although the relevance of this is not entirely clear, most commentators mention at this point 
that this breach was reciprocated by the use of German POWs to clear mines on the French 
Atlantic coast in 1945. 
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abuses happened only in single cases where individuals acted on their own 
initiative or where guards lacked confidence and reacted overly strictly to 
transgressions in order to ensure future compliance with their orders. Examples 
of such abuses, however, are not hard to come by: Hoch (1992, pp. 232-233) lists 
various cases of clear harassment and breaches of the Convention, such as the 
denial of the use of bomb shelters to POWs, while Bories-Sawala (1996, pp. 
225f) mentions the employment of French POWs in the arms industry, also in 
contravention of the Convention. Overmans (2005, p. 763 and 772) adds to this 
list that provisions and accommodation were, “if not unbearable, at least 
insufficient,” but nevertheless concludes that, although the fate of the French was 
a difficult one, their “treatment could not have generally been in breach of the 
laws of war.”  
What is more difficult to determine is why exactly the provisions of the 
Convention were observed in the case of POWs from the Western front when 
they were so easily set aside in relation to those from the East.64 The technical 
legal question whether and to whom the law applied – the Geneva Convention of 
1929 was binding only between signatories, and the Soviet Union was not 
amongst them; Poland was, but Germany no longer regarded it as a separate state 
– would here obscure the fact that there was no arbitrator that could have 
enforced compliance, and that Germany had a choice in deciding whether or not 
it would declare itself bound by the Convention.  
While reasons to do with reciprocity, propaganda and the need, at least in 
relation to France, for an atmosphere in which collaboration remained possible 
certainly played a role, they cannot be said to have been overriding. Hitler clearly 
had no qualms about endangering the lives of German soldiers in foreign 
captivity by mistreating foreign POWs held by Germany, as both the Soviet 
example and various proposals that would have breached the Geneva Convention 
                                                
64 Beyond this duality, Overmans (2005, 876) finds no tendency towards a ‘barbarisation’ in the 
Second World War. Neither, however, was there an equally high level compliance with the laws 
of war: “It is rather that after a first unspectacular phase from 1939 to 1941, one can observe a 
tendency of radicalisation until 1943 – based on the different kind of warfare of the Wehrmacht 
and the Red Army in the Eastern theatre of war –, which was, however, followed by a regressive 
development until 1945.” 
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show.65 Indeed, Nazi Germany only completed the ratification of the Convention 
in 1934 (until then it had not been internationally binding on Germany) for 
superficial, propaganda reasons (Overmans, 2005, pp. 729f).66  
Compliance with the Convention out of a belief in its intrinsic value can 
therefore be to a certain extent discounted, at least in relation to the higher 
echelons of the Nazi hierarchy. A more likely explanation for the difference in 
treatment of the various POW groups would be the national-socialist racial 
ideology, in which Nordic and Western European peoples were situated above 
those from Russia and Eastern Europe. Soviets were branded ‘subhuman,’ and 
their army was declared to exhibit a complete lack of the professionalism that 
was said to characterise Western armies. From the beginning, Hitler had regarded 
the war on the Eastern front, not as “a formal battle between two states, to be 
waged in accordance with the rules of International Law, but as a conflict 
between two philosophies” (MacKenzie, 1994, p. 505, quoting from Field 
Marshall Wilhelm Keitel’s Nuremberg testimony).67 It was not so much a 
question of finding a reason for exempting Soviet prisoners from the application 
of law – Germany’s claim that it was not obliged to provide for these prisoners 
under the Geneva Convention because it had not been signed by Russia can 
                                                
65 Overmans (2005, p. 730 and 865) lists a number of examples, such as Hitler’s idea to shoot all 
air force officers of the Western allies after the bombing of Dresden. 
66 And in relation to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Overmans (2005. p. 729) cites 
Hermann Göring as having remarked in front of the International Military Court in Nuremberg in 
1946 that “if he had been conscious of what kind of fetters the German Reich had bound itself 
with through the signing of the Hague Conventions, he would have advised Hitler to break with 
them even before the beginning of the war.” 
67 Rosas (1976, p. 78, footnote omitted) cites the following response made by General Keitel, 
Chief of the German High Command, when he was challenged by a subordinate on the explicit 
order to disregard international law when it came to Soviet POWs: “The objections arise from the 
military concept of chivalrous warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I 
approve and back the measures.” As Spoerer (2005, p. 506) writes, “[t]he legal status of Polish, 
Yugoslav and Soviet prisoners of war . . . was therefore from the point of view of the national 
socialist regime not bound to the law of nations, but could be determined at its discretion.” 
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therefore be considered a mere pretext (Stelzl-Marx, 2000, p. 46)68 –, but of 
calibrating their treatment to the prevalent ideology.  
However, although this ideology underpinned most national-socialist 
policies and would therefore also have been a contributing factor in relation to 
the treatment of all POWs, it does not explain the discrepancy in treatment of 
POWs from countries whose populations were equally ranked in racial terms, 
such as France and Italy. 
Overmans (2005, p. 732 and pp. 870-871) therefore prefers a motivation 
he calls ‘national-conservative.’ In this light, the enemies Germany was facing in 
the Second World War were ranked and treated according to the constellations 
prevalent in the First World War. These were both cultural and political; while 
Western European nations were regarded as ‘cultured,’ “Russians,” Overmans 
(2005, p. 871) writes, “had already in the First World War been rated as 
culturally backward and were already then discriminated against.” The French, 
although they had been Germany’s enemy in the First World War, ‘had known 
how to fight,’ and were therefore more highly regarded than the Italians, who 
were looked down on as traitors (p. 732). In comparison to some of the other 
Western European states, however, French POWs received much worse 
treatment,69 which Overmans (2005, p. 760) in turn attributes to Hitler’s wish to 
make up for the humiliation of Germany by France in 1918. Taken together, 
these factors meant that Germany’s attitude towards France was one whereby 
“[t]he French were to learn to regard Germany as victorious power that no one 
could stop, but that could also be generous vis-à-vis those subjugated” 
(Overmans, 2005. p. 761). 
This explanation suggests not only historical continuity generally, but 
continuity with the previous war specifically and thus the process of Hegung. 
This connection is in danger of being disregarded when only the racial aspects of 
German policies during the Second World War are treated as relevant. Looked at 
                                                
68 This view is also supported by Spoerer (2005, p. 503), who in this respect points out that the 
Soviet Union offered to confirm to Germany even in July 1941 its signing of the Hague 
Convention of 1907, which was, however, ignored by Germany.  
69 MacKenzie (1994, p. 499) writes of disciplinary action against the French that was sometimes 
‘draconian in the extreme.’ 
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from a different angle, the racial hierarchy cannot itself be separated from 
historical, cultural and political determinants,70 and it is perhaps for this reason 
that it was never stated in a ‘pure form’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 94). If 
previous honourable conduct determined the current treatment of POWs,71 then 
the relation of Germany to both France and Italy was one still thought of within 
the old regime of European warfare, even if it would mean that Italy, in German 
eyes undeserving of the recognition due to European states under that regime, 
would be excluded from its limitations.  
Indeed, the Geneva Convention of 1929 harks back itself to the laws of 
war in the late Middle Ages, the ‘Age of Chivalry.’ Here, captivity in war was 
governed by the chivalrous code of honour. The surrendering knight was bound 
by honour to the oath that accompanied the contract he concluded with the victor 
on the battlefield, where the victor had saved his life. The prisoner would now 
have to pay the ransom agreed: “In the language of the law, the captor’s 
actionable interest in the contract was acquired by the service he performed in 
saving his captive’s life; the prisoner’s body, in turn, became the pledge for his 
ransom” (Stacey, 1994, p. 37).  
When the laws of war were first codified in 1907, the function of honour 
explained their brevity: For officers of largely aristocratic background, who saw 
themselves bound by a code of honour, the need to comply with the rules that 
were now drawn up appeared self-evident (Oeter, 1999, p. 50). In 1929, the 
Geneva Convention did not only make explicit reference to the prisoner’s 
honour,72 but also prohibited the employment of prisoners in work directly 
connected to the operations of war, a provision that mirrors the chivalrous 
                                                
70 In late 1942, the French were categorised by the Chief Security Office of the Reich 
(Reichsicherheitshauptamt) together with Slovaks, Croats, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians 
and the Spanish as “‘non-Germanic peoples, with whom we are allied or with whom we are 
connected on account of their cultural or pan-European significance’” (cited by Bories-Sawala, 
1996b, p. 95). 
71 More basically, Overmans (2005, p. 869) claims that the releases/detainments of POWs by 
Germany in the first place followed the constellations of the First World War: “The then-enemies 
of Germany were imprisoned, but the soldiers of previous allies or friendly-neutrally minded 
states were released.” 
72 See, for example, article 3, paragraph 1. 
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requirement that the captor ought to respect the prisoner’s status as a man of 
honour by refraining from asking him to fight against his liege lord. The 
Convention also provided that officers should receive their full salary from the 
detaining power so that they could secure their own food and clothes. Behind this 
provision, Overmans (2005, p. 736 and 840) explains, was “the image of a 
captured officer who is not confined in a POW camp, but stays in private 
accommodation on his word of honour not to flee.”73 Officers were, in other 
words, still treated as if they were the members of the aristocracy they had been 
when national armies were first established and officer positions were not open 
to other social classes (Rosas, 1976, p. 49). However, different rules applied to 
officers also for other, if related, reasons. They were, for example, not only not 
forced to work because this would have contravened the Geneva Convention, but 
because it was feared that their resistance, due to their presumed education and 
political awareness, would have constituted a threat to internal security.74  
Similarly, other factors at times overrode the requirement for honourable 
treatment in relation to normal soldiers. Bories-Sawala (1996, pp. 218-219 and 
276f.), for example, points to German calculations about the use-value of 
prisoners for work. The French were supposed to be good workers and thus 
worth treating well, and this was to inform their treatment rather than any 
misplaced notions of ‘excessive chivalry.’ But the fact alone that German 
officials sought to discourage such chivalry shows the framework in which 
relations were set. Indeed, the notion of honour in relation to the treatment of 
POWs was of particular relevance to French POWs, due to the personal 
significance that First World War relations with France held for Hitler. Without 
                                                
73 Given the fact that officers were detained in POW camps in the Second World War and needed 
to be provided with food and clothing by the detaining power, this provision was not applied in 
practice. 
74 Incidentally, the same did not apply to Soviet and Italian officers; not because they had (or 
where thought to have) no such education or awareness, but because the lack of protection 
afforded to them under the Geneva Convention meant they could be oppressed with measures the 
Germans “did not dare to use against other groups of POWs” (Spoerer, 2005, p. 553). Overmans 
(2005, pp. 763-764) mentions that French officers were pressured to volunteer for work (for more 
on this in relation to French NCOs, see section 3.2 below), but that only 5-10% did so, and that 
they were subsequently looked on as traitors by their colleagues. 
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any apparent necessity, the latter, for example, personally ordered the release of 
60,000 French First World War veterans held captive (Overmans, 2005, pp. 765 
and 772), and in 1942 claimed that the escape of General Henri Giraud from the 
POW camp Festung Königstein, which in Hitler’s view constituted an 
“’unworthy answer to the chivalrous treatment [of the French] by the German 
Wehrmacht,’” had ‘deeply hurt’ him (Overmans, 2005, pp. 766-777). Overmans 
(2005, p. 869 and 871) thus concludes that economic factors did not become 
primary in determining the release or detention of POWs until 1943, when the 
need for workers became overriding.  
Broadly speaking, then, and while recognising that there were a 
multiplicity of motivations and considerations behind the treatment of POWs that 
were sometimes able to exist side-by-side, but sometimes also conflicted with 
one another, one can distinguish two ‘regimes:’ One in which the treatment of 
prisoners was determined, if not by actual compliance with the laws of war, then 
by the extent in which the laws of war were said to apply, i.e., in which the laws 
of war were used as the main mechanism by which the relation to the enemy was 
framed and calibrated. This regime included both those states in relation to which 
the Geneva Convention was almost fully complied with, such as the United 
States and Britain, and those in relation to which it was set aside for some reason 
or other, but whose treatment was still conceived to be justified by some notion 
of legality, which was the case to some extent for France, and more so for Italy.  
The other regime was one in which the laws of war had no purchase 
whatsoever; where, in other words, considerations of legality played no part in 
determining how the enemy would be treated, rendering it a relation wholly 
outside the bracketed space of war. This was most obviously the case for 
Germany’s relation to the Soviet Union, whose captured soldiers were either 
killed or left to die until the spring of 1942, at which point more than two million 
had already died. When it dawned on Germany that no quick victory would be 
achieved in Russia, and that therefore the men deployed at the Russian front were 
unlikely to return to their civilian jobs in the foreseeable future (Speckler, p. 
177), the economic need for the labour of Soviet POWs took precedence over 
military aims, and it was determined to keep the Soviet prisoners alive (Herbert, 
1997, p. 141). However, this did not substantially change the nature of their 
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treatment, as outright killing was merely substituted with slavery. Living and 
working conditions for Soviet POWs were dismal, and in the mining industry so 
bad that Herbert (1997, p. 391) writes of “a continuation of the war of 
extermination by other means.”  
Against this background, it comes as a surprise that Jewish members of 
the Western armed forces received the protection due to them under the Geneva 
Convention, thus being included in the first, rather than the second, regime. It 
seems almost astonishing that Jews, who formed the bottom tier of the German 
racial hierarchy and were being persecuted with such diligence and such a wide 
and imaginative variety of means across Germany and the occupied territories, 
should have been able to openly declare their faith to their captors and on this 
account receive no more than a certain amount of discrimination. This was due to 
a number of factors. 
Generally speaking, the persecution of Jews as a racial policy constituted 
an aim that was pursued by Hitler independently of any military objectives and at 
times even collided with their achievement (Herbert, 1991).75 This independence 
manifested itself in the choice of armed forces that were tasked with the 
oversight and administration of POW and concentration camps; broadly 
speaking, it was the SS who supplied the administration and guards for 
concentration camps, while POW camps were run by the military.  
This separation, however, did not remain unchallenged, as the different 
agencies competed for access to, and control over, the 10m POWs Germany held 
in total during the war. Overmans (2005, p. 852) writes in this respect that Hitler 
frequently meddled in the POW administration, but that he was by no means the 
only one who attempted to do so:  
 
. . . despite the actually required focus on the war effort, the POW 
administration, too, by no means remained untouched by the power struggles 
                                                
75 An example of the sometimes counterproductive separation of racial from military policies is 
Hitler’s order to keep starving Soviet prisoners in improvised enclosures in the occupied 
territories rather than transfer them into Germany and employ them there, so as not to 
‘contaminate’ Germany with their presence, even though the Wehrmacht had already constructed 
camps to receive them (Davis, 1977, p. 627). 
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that characterised the national socialist system. Whether out of functional 
necessity or with the intention to enlarge their sphere of influence: the Ministry 
for Nutrition [Reichsernährungsministerium], the Foreign Office [Auswärtiges 
Amt], the organisations concerned with labour deployment – the job centres, the 
Chief Representative for Labour Deployment [Generalbevollmächtigter für den 
Arbeitseinsatz] or Albert Speer –, but also the security apparatus under Heinrich 
Himmler, the party, as well as, last but not least, the Ministry for Propaganda 
[Reichspropagandaministerium]; they all tried to take influence on the POW 
administration (Overmans, 2005, p. 853). 
   
This struggle for power over prisoners of war meant that the Wehrmacht 
had increasingly less control over their fate. To the extent that other agencies 
were able to show more success in, for example, catching escapees, and were 
able to argue on this basis in front of Hitler that they were more competent than 
the Wehrmacht when it came to the administration of POWs, the Wehrmacht had 
to tolerate these agencies’ involvement (Overmans, 2005, pp. 852f). This puts 
any claim that the Wehrmacht acted out of purely moral motivations when it 
defended the POW administration against encroachment by other agencies into 
perspective – power and influence were often fought over for their own sake.   
And yet, it is the treatment of Jews in particular, or rather, the difference 
in treatment that opened up between Jews held in concentration camps and those 
who were POWs of Western forces, which, according to Durand (1999, p. 73), is 
the best example for the fact “that the German armed forces by no means 
followed national socialist principles in this case, but complied with the general 
rules of the laws of war.” Indeed, the general lack of co-ordination between 
Hitler’s racial policies and his military aims to some extent allowed the military 
to concentrate on its own interests and priorities, which precluded the adoption of 
the motives and actions of the paramilitary organisations of Nazi Germany. Even 
when the Wehrmacht was willing to support a war of annihilation, as it did on the 
Eastern front, it thought it counterproductive from the perspective of discipline 
and morale to let its soldiers kill outside of combat (Overmans, 2005, p. 858). 
Such interests were not necessarily morally honourable; for example, the 
resistance of the Wehrmacht most often related merely to having to do the ‘dirty 
work’ of murder itself, and it sometimes achieved this objective of non-
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involvement (when it could, which was not always the case) by trading in control 
over part of its area of competence to the security forces, with well-known 
disastrous consequences (Overmans, 2005, pp. 858-859).76 Nevertheless, these 
interests fell squarely within the organisation and limitation of war thought to be 
conducted for tangible military aims set out in advance. As Best (1980, pp. 23-
24) writes: 
 
Few bodies of trained men are more intensively trained to do what they are told 
to do, and not to do what they have been told not to do, than professional 
soldiers. And they are thus instructed, not only because it is a condition of their 
success in their particular business, but also because it is a condition of their so 
conducting that business as not to mar the end for which that business was 
undertaken. . . . Nations call armed forces into being to become their experts in 
violence, indeed; but it is controlled violence, directed to politically-determined 
ends . . ..    
 
In other words, the mind-set needed for compliance with the laws of war 
could not easily be combined with a racial ideology that would do away with all 
aims and limits, whereby the killing of the opponent in war could no longer be 
distinguished from the killing of the opponent in peace, as all rules were now 
sovereign decisions. For military commanders, the freedom to kill in war was 
only thought to be possible because it was limited to combat, i.e., because laws 
forbade the killing outside of combat, and to continue to kill, for example, Jewish 
POWs once combat was over would have meant not only the eradication of this 
limit, but also the dissolution of the category of war as they knew it. The 
Wehrmacht did proceed some way along the path of transition from one type of 
war to the other on the Eastern front, but in the West, a limited war continued to 
be fought and fought for. 
                                                
76 There are a few examples one could mention here, the perhaps best known being the activities 
of the Einsatzgruppen at the Eastern front.  
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Within this framework of limited war, concerns around reciprocity77 
played a prominent role particularly in the department responsible for POW 
administration. This department’s remit included both foreign POWs in German 
hands and German POWs in the hands of Germany’s enemies, and it was 
therefore the department in the Wehrmacht that most often made itself strong for 
a compliance with the laws of war (Overmans, 2005, p. 867).78 Conscious 
attempts were made to observe the requirements of the Convention and resist 
orders for maltreatment of POWs that would have come to the attention of those 
nations (MacKenzie, 1994, p. 504-505). Such attention would have been likely, 
given that the bureaucratic mechanisms of the Convention entailed the 
notification of each prisoner’s presence in German hands to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the protecting power, rendering the deportation 
of Jewish prisoners to extermination camps difficult without anyone’s noticing. 
Although this rationale appears least convincing for France, which was holding 
no German POWs in the first years of the war,79 it was as a Western state 
included in Germany’s general attitude of compliance with the Convention; its 
soldiers had been recognised as being of equal status and therefore attracted the 
professional solidarity of German army personnel. Durand (1982, p. 324 and 
354) thus writes of an ‘effective respect of the quality of Jewish soldiers’ by the 
German Wehrmacht despite the occasional bullying of Jewish POWs.  
In summary, one can say that the actions of the Wehrmacht reached from 
a protection of POWs in line with the Convention in the West to an active 
involvement in extra-legal killings in the East, via the in-between steps of 
allowing the security forces free reign in deciding on the fate of POWs and 
                                                
77 Lador-Lederer (1980, p. 72) indeed holds the view that “only in those rare cases of Jewish 
prisoners of war of the nationality of a belligerent who had the power to enforce such treaty 
protection, were Jews given the protection provided by international law.” 
78 Overmans (2005, p. 867) writes that by contrast to the department responsible for the 
administration of war imprisonment, decision makers in the Chief Command (Oberkommando) 
of the Wehrmacht were supporting, if not even propagating, some of the regime’s criminal 
policies, and that it was only in the end phase of the war that the generals persuaded Hitler not to 
follow through some of his most radical ideas as to the use of Western POWs. 
79 This changed, however, once the free France began to hold German POWs in 1943 (Overmans, 
2005, pp. 841-842). 
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effectively handing Jewish POWs over to the SS.80 But looking only at the 
treatment of Western POWs, the distinction between limited war and the various 
wars of persecution and annihilation is clear: The Wehrmacht looked after the 
POWs, and this included their protection, including Jews, from the security 
forces.  
Admittedly, Hitler transferred the command over all POWs on 1 October 
1944 from the jurisdiction of the military to that of the SS,81 which appears to 
blur this division of their respective competences. The claim made in this respect 
in a party circular from late 1943 was that the military had been too lenient in the 
treatment of the POWs, that it had even developed into their ‘protectors’ and 
‘carers’ (cited by Bories-Sawala, 1996b, pp. 108-109, n. 61). This allowed new 
persons and institutions to take part in policy making regarding POWs, leading to 
a radicalisation of, if not the actually carried out policies, then at least the policy 
proposals (Overmans, 2005, p. 864-865). However, this in itself is thought not to 
have worsened the situation of POWs significantly (Spoerer, 2005, pp. 508-509). 
POW camps continued to be guarded by the Wehrmacht and remained an 
institution of the army.82  
Against all expectations, some of the orders issued under the new 
command even raised the living conditions for some of the worse-off prisoners 
(Overmans, 2005, pp. 863-864), providing little support for the views of those 
who, like Karner (1999, pp. 388f), claim on the basis of this transfer of 
responsibilities that the legal framework governing POW camps ultimately failed 
to substantively distinguish them from concentration camps. On the contrary, it 
                                                
80 For example, over 60,000 Polish Jewish POWs were transferred to concentration camps by the 
SS after their release from war imprisonment. Only a few hundred survived (Spoerer, 2005, pp. 
504-505). 
81 This was an effective rather than a formal transfer, as Germany did not want to risk objections 
to such a change by the allies (Overmans, 2005, pp. 862-863). 
82 Ricoeur (1998, pp. 19-20) remarks quite categorically that “. . . the German army had always 
succeeded, against the SS, in retaining control of the prisoner-of-war camps. The SS never 
commanded these camps, and for this reason it was possible for [Roger] Ikor and Levinas not to 
have to worry. I know that a certain number of Jews were sent into separate camps, sometimes 
with prisoners reputed to be subversive; but I have not read that these Jewish prisoners who were 
moved were made to suffer harsh treatment.”  
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was precisely the legal framework, understood not only as the legal, but also 
historical space in which actors thought themselves as operating, that determined 
the difference between life and death. To recognise this, one only needs to 
consider the prospects of survival associated with each type of prisoner: 2-3%83 
mortality rate for those protected by the Geneva Convention (including Jews), 
10% for Italians (who were not classified as POWs and were therefore 
unprotected), over 60% for Soviet POWs (also unprotected) (Overmans, 1999b, 
p.14), and almost certain death for all Jews in concentration camps.  
In addition to the role the Wehrmacht played in the protection of Jewish 
POWs, political factors may also have played a certain role. For example, 
France’s resistance when it came to the deportation of French Jews from its 
territory to concentration camps (Hilberg, 1985, 2:654) may have contributed to 
the protection of French Jewish POWs in German hands. Hilberg (1985, 2:627) 
accordingly finds that it was for political reasons that Western POWs of the 
Jewish faith largely escaped persecution.84 
This does not mean, however, that Jewish POWs were not subjected to 
particular discrimination and harassment.85 Durand (1999, p. 73), for example, 
writes:  
 
For sure, the Jews were particularly harassed. In most cases they were assigned 
to those barracks or special commandos in the camps that had to carry out the 
                                                
83 As Overmans (2005, p. 772) points out, most of these deaths occurred in the beginning and end 
phases of captivity; at the beginning, due to those dying who had entered captivity already 
wounded or sick; at the end; due to allied bombardments and the final battles that took place in 
Germany itself. Bories-Sawala (1996b, p. 110) writes that the conversion of conditions for POWs 
and foreign workers in the end phase of the war was due to the German exclusive focus on 
productivity at that time, if necessary to be achieved through force, combined with increasingly 
inadequate accommodation and the allied bombardments.  
84 Those who had joined a Western army after emigrating from the Reich were an exception, and 
so were foreign Jews that had volunteered for the French army; the former, on falling into 
German hands, were killed on the spot, while the latter were transferred to the camp at Burg 
Hohenfels or into concentration camps (Bories-Sawala, 1996, p. 241). 
85 Although in this, they were not alone. Bories-Sawala (1996, pp. 383-384), for instance, 
describes the harassment of French catholic priests due to a ‘profound distrust’ of them by the 
German authorities. 
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most humiliating work. Nevertheless, it is most astonishing that French Jewish 
POWs, who were during the entire length of their imprisonment put up in the 
heart of the Third Reich, escaped the Holocaust, while their families remaining 
in France lost their lives. . . . This is certainly one of the most surprising 
paradoxes in the way the NS-regime functioned and in the behaviour patterns of 
the population or the decision makers that were subjected to this regime. 
 
 There are also accounts that Jewish inmates were tasked with looking 
after those that had fallen ill in epidemics without receiving prior vaccinations 
(Stelzl-Marx, 2000, p. 77, Durand, 1982, p. 354, Berg, 1990, p. 201), and that the 
special work units or ‘commandos’ to which Jews were assigned were ‘in most 
cases’ disciplinary in nature (Berg, 1990, p. 201), or that Jews simply had to 
carry out especially strenuous work (Durand, 1982, p. 354). Levie (1977, p. 175 
n. 324, reference omitted) states that “Germany attempted . . . to separate Jewish 
prisoners of war from the other prisoners of war of the same nationality, with the 
admonition that ‘in all other respects’ they were to receive treatment identical to 
that received by their fellow nationals.” As an exception to this, Levie (1977, p. 
299, n. 163) notes only one instance of discrimination, in which the prison 
command refused to deal with a prisoners’ representative once they found out 
that he was Jewish. Bories-Sawala (1996, pp. 239f) concludes from a survey of 
the materials available to her that it is not possible to speak of an equal treatment 
of non-Jewish and Jewish POWs, even if in the main, the German Wehrmacht 
did respect the rights of Jewish prisoners. One of the ways in which Jews were 
discriminated against was by not allowing their release, as happened, for 
example, with Jewish doctors during the Relève des médicins in 1943, although 
any benefits of such a release would have been doubtful given the treatment of 
civilian Jews in France (Bories-Sawala, 1996, p. 241 and n. 95). Indeed, the 
majority of undisclosed Jewish POWs from the Alsace and Moselle preferred 
continued war imprisonment to the repatriation offered to them in 1940; not a 
surprising choice given that the return to civilian life and subsequent discovery as 
Jews would have meant their certain deportation to concentration camps under 
Nazi racial laws (Durand, 1982, pp. 353-354). 
Page 90 of 195 
In summary, it is fair to assume that most Jews were held separately from 
the rest of their fellow countrymen, and that, where they were required to work, 
they were often subjected to discrimination and harassment. Jewish officers who 
were not required to work, however, appear to have provided less opportunity for 
such harassment,86 and for officers, NCOs and soldiers alike the Geneva 
Convention can be said to have been complied with overall.87 This had the 
consequence that, as Lador-Lederer (1980, p. 71) expresses it, “for the Jewish 
prisoner of war of a Western country who benefited from the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention of 1929, his sufferings measured against yardsticks of 
Jewish martyrology, were a matter de minimis.” 
Jewish POWs therefore found themselves part of a legal and historical 
space that differed from the other camp spaces present in Germany at that time.88 
Although they shared this characteristic with other Western POWs, the 
protection they experienced took on a special significance in the face of the 
ideologically motivated persecution of Jews all around them. They thus were 
excluded from two exceptions of national order: the war and racial persecution.
                                                
86 For accounts of Jewish officers’ war imprisonment experience, see, for example, Berg, 1990, 
pp. 204-206. 
87 This is also the conclusion Overmans (1999, p. 503) reaches, who writes that while Jews in 
German war imprisonment were discriminated against, they were not in danger of their life. 
88 And of these there existed an astonishing amount, governed by a complex bureaucracy. Apart 
from POW camps for members of Western and Eastern armed forces, of which alone there were 
almost 250 by the end of the war, each with countless satellite work camps, in total numbering in 
their thousands (Overmans, 2005, p. 853), there were prisons, concentration camps 
(Konzentrationslager), special camps (Sonderlager), workers educational camps 
(Arbeitserziehungslager), security camps (Sicherheitslager), penal or punishment camps 
(Straflager, Strafgefangenenlager), work camps (Arbeitslager), civilian workers camps 
(Gemeinschaftslager), housing units (Wohnlager) and civil internment camps 
(Internierungslager), each of them further subdivided by the gender, nationality and offences of 
their inmates, the law governing the internment and its expected duration or permanence, and 
many of them with associated smaller work camps (for details, see Weinmann, 1990). The 
categories of those interned in all of these camps far exceeded this list, making for a confusing 
array of people, regulations and spaces. Just the category of ‘foreign worker’ had so many 
subcategories, the rules underlying some of which were so complicated, that they were barely 
understood at the time and – in the case of Ostarbeiter (‘worker from the East’) – cause 
confusion until today (Spoerer, 2005, pp. 497-498). 
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3.2. Work 
One of the main features that can be said to have distinguished Western 
POWs from other camp inmates in Germany at the time was that they were to be 
repatriated after the war and in themselves played no further part in Germany’s 
future. The POW camps were holding camps with the simple function of keeping 
prisoners alive until the end of the hostilities. However, this is not to say that 
holding prisoners of war was of no use to Germany. Apart from their use as 
hostages – both for influencing the enemy’s treatment of one’s own captured 
soldiers89 and for influencing the enemy’s actions generally90 – Davis (1977, p. 
624) notes the following benefits of capturing enemy prisoners:  
 
Capturing prisoners prevents them from inflicting damage on the captor and 
reduces the total fund of manpower and skills available to the enemy. Prisoner 
counts are also useful for calculating one's military success, for gauging the 
morale of enemy forces, and of course for deciding on promotions to higher 
ranks. POWs produce a high yield of military intelligence.91 
                                                
89 Davis (1977, pp. 624-625), for example, writes, “POWs are by nature hostages, even though 
international agreements forbid reprisals against them. The captor state may nevertheless 
modulate its benevolence according to enemy treatment of their prisoners.” However, this 
meaning of hostage should not be confused with another, whereby people who may or may not be 
POWs are moved by a state to a certain place where their presence is thought to prevent the 
enemy from attacking (see Scheidl, 1943, pp. 234f.). 
90 This applied particularly to French POWs, whom Germany used in order to influence actions 
by France in its favour. Bories-Sawala, 1996, p. 242) thus describes Fench POWs as ‘hostages’ 
(Geisel) and Durand (1982, p. 315) as ‘security’ (gage). At the end of the Second World War, 
allied POWs generally were one of the last bargaining chips left to the Germans when the allies 
were closing in on them (Overmans, 2005, p. 865). Overmans (1999, p. 495) also refers to the 
importance of adequate documentation about prisoners as a bargaining tool in peace negotiations. 
In the peace negotiations after WW1, Germany had been in a disadvantaged position due to the 
lack of documentation relating to prisoners of war that could have supported its claims with 
evidence. At the 1929 Geneva conference it was attempted to decouple the repatriation of POWs 
from the agreement of peace treaties, but this was not achieved (Overmans, 2005, p. 735). 
91 One could also consider the use of prisoners as recipients of propaganda. But while there was a 
certain amount of propaganda that prisoners, depending on their nationality and political 
affiliation, were subjected to by the detaining powers, this seems to have met with limited 
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But in all these uses, it is not the prisoner as a person that the detaining 
power takes an interest in, but merely his category, and only to the extent that it 
is of significance to others. For example, in the Second World War POWs were 
neither supposed to attract punishment for having taken part in the war on the 
enemy’s side – this had been prohibited by the Geneva Convention –, nor were 
they in fact subjected to concerted efforts for ideological or other re-education on 
the part of Germany, as was the case for normal prisoners and foreign labourers 
if they transgressed the law, nor were their lives ‘worked’ upon for the benefit of 
the social body in the radical way in which this took place in concentration or 
extermination camps intended for Germany’s internal and external foes; the 
camps Levi (1989, p. 47) calls ‘drainage sites.’ 
In this, POW camps formed their own category of camp that was neither 
like the various spaces of detention in which the state would punish, reform, or 
treat those sent there under law, i.e., those spaces and disciplinary regimes that 
Agamben for the purposes of his own argument explicitly distinguishes from 
spaces of exception (see, for example, Agamben, 2000, p. 37), nor like the 
concentration camps set up for similar purposes outside the law. If the 
concentration camp is the paradigm of a mechanism by which a part of the social 
body is excluded from the protection of the law in order to concentrate upon it an 
effort aimed at its transformation (in its widest sense), and through this, aimed at 
the transformation of the social body as a whole, resulting in an intensification of 
the relation between prisoners and the sovereign, then the POW camp constitutes 
its opposite in a number of respects: While here, also, a part of the population (of 
combatants) is excluded from war for the ultimate benefit (protection) of war, 
this exclusion is not effected for the purpose of working on the prisoners, but for 
abstaining from any ‘work;’ POWs are protected by law from precisely the kind 
                                                                                                                               
success, at least in relation to German propaganda directed at French POWs (Overmans, 2005, p. 
761 and 854). The role that prisoners themselves could play in propaganda (their armies typically 
proclaiming that they were mistreated, while their captors were denying such claims (Davis, 
1977, p. 625)) generally appears to have been more useful than their subjection to it. The French, 
however, constitute an exception to this, due to their massive subjection to French propaganda 
(see below). 
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of sovereign acts concentration camp inmates are subjected to.92 They experience 
intensification in their relation with law, rather than the sovereign power. 
In its most radical form, the protection of POWs under law resulted in 
their waiting, sometimes for years, for their release, without either being 
maltreated – in fact, ‘treated’ at all in the sense of engaged by their captors –, or 
having any structure to their days other than that which they themselves would 
establish. This group of POWs consisted in the main of officers from Western 
armed forces, who could not be required to work under the Geneva Convention. 
The same, however, did not apply to other soldiers, whom Germany required to 
work. Despite such work being provided for under the Convention, its status 
deserves further elaboration, not least in order to establish whether this work 
took prisoners, particular Jewish ones, out of the realm of war imprisonment and 
into the realm of punishment and reform (as the term ‘hard labour’ or ‘labour 
camp’ might suggest), legal discrimination (as in ‘foreign slave labour’) or 
persecution (as in ‘extermination by other means’). All of these ‘work regimes’ 
existed side by side in Nazi Germany, organised according to the different 
categories in which foreign workers were divided.  
Indeed, Herbert (1997, p. 96) writes of a large-scale influx of foreign 
workers into Nazi Germany, organised with the specific purpose of supporting 
the German war effort by relieving the acute shortage of labour caused by the 
rising needs of a war economy that was losing workers to the front. The building 
of a foreign workforce was pursued at first by means of recruitment, then by 
means of deportations from the occupied territories and the increasing utilisation 
of POWs. Such utilisation had become economically justifiable during the two 
world wars not only because of the large number of POWs the wars generated, 
but also because of the progressive involvement of large parts of civil society in 
the war effort (Rosas, 1976, p. 75). 
                                                
92 In fact, not precisely the same, as the concentration camp went beyond the limited purposes of 
the state of exception that Schmitt outlines, and in which bracketed war is also situated. For 
Schmitt, arbitrary killing that is no longer related to the order it is supposed to protect belongs in 
the state of nature. This does not come out in Agamben’s analysis, who accordingly views the 
state of exception and the state of nature as interchangeable (see footnote 22 above.)  
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Levinas was one of the many POWs transferred into a POW camp in 
Germany for work purposes. He had served as a translator with non-
commissioned officer (NCO) status in the French army before being captured 
together with hundreds of thousands of others by German forces at Rennes in 
June 1940. He was one of up to 55,00093 Jewish members of the French forces 
that fell into German hands, out of a total of 1.9m94 French POWs. 
Most of these POWs initially remained in Frontstalgs (holding camps for 
POWs established at the front) in France. To the extent that the already 
overcrowded POW camps in Germany could be cleared by distributing prisoners 
to work commandos, (Overmans 2005, p. 765), 1.6m prisoners were gradually 
transferred to Germany, of which 1m remained in Germany until the end of the 
war. Levinas, too, was transported to Germany after an initial detention first at 
Rennes and Laval, then at Vesoul (Caygill, 2010, p. 27). He became interned at 
the POW camp Stalag XI B at Fallingbostel near Hanover, a large Stammlager95 
for POWs of different nationalities. Here, he remained until 1945, being 
employed – fittingly in the context of Hegung – in a forestry commando for 
Jewish POWs.  
The strategy of importing foreign workers into Germany, including 
POWs that were known to be Jewish, may from today’s perspective appear 
counterproductive for a country that was not only fighting a war on the basis of a 
racial ideology that subordinated the populations of those same countries on 
whose workers it now came to rely, especially those of Eastern Europe, but was 
                                                
93 Wieviorka (2001, p. 106) gives a figure of 10,000 to 15,000; Spoerer (2005, p. 505) of 55,000. 
94 This and the following figures are approximates based on the number provided by Durand, 
1987, p. 11 and 1999, p. 71. Other authors cite slightly different figures, depending on their 
sources. Overmans (2005, p. 760), for example, writes that there were approximately 1.8m 
French soldiers in German hands. 
95 Stalags, short for Stammlager or Mannschaftsstammlager, held soldiers and NCOs, and can in 
this respect be distinguished from Oflags, short for Offizierslager, which were smaller POW 
camps reserved for officers. As officers could not be required to work under the Convention, 
Oflags afforded prisoners better living conditions and a generally better experience of war 
imprisonment than Stalags. It is also Oflags that feature in many popular films and books about 
war captivity in the Second World War, written mainly by American and English air force 
officers recalling their war-time experiences. 
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also actively endeavouring to expel and kill its Jewish population. However, this 
strategy was made possible by the fact that the racial ideology underlying the war 
itself could be safeguarded through a legal treatment of foreign workers 
appropriate to their proclaimed inferiority (Herbert, 1997). Discrimination and 
oppression thus ensured that foreign workers were subordinated – and seen to be 
subordinate – to Germans in every respect, while also contributing to a 
successful management of the power imbalance in those locations where male 
foreign workers began to outnumber the German male population.96  
Western POWs were, however, excluded from this targeted 
discrimination. Although POWs were from the beginning subject to a system of 
control and repression not initially applied to civilian foreign workers when these 
were still employed on a voluntary basis (Herbert, 1997, p. 384), this system of 
control came to protect the POWs when an equivalent system was eventually 
established for civilian workers. POWs’ status entailed the obvious hardships of 
confinement, discipline, deprivation and hard labour, but did not amount to the 
direct and absolute control that other foreign workers were subject to under the 
penal code.  
In this respect, forced labourers in particular suffered the most. They soon 
made up the largest group of foreign workers in Germany, comprising civilian 
foreign workers either forcibly deported to Germany or no longer permitted to 
return home,97 concentration camp inmates, and POWs employed in 
contravention of the Convention (Ruggenthaler, 2010, pp. 51-52). Within the 
group of forced labourers, Jewish concentration camp inmates formed a 
subgroup. Exploited in conditions akin to slavery, many died in concentration 
camps under the 1942-instituted policy of ‘extermination through labour,’ i.e., 
the hyper-intensive work demanded by an industry that had especially been set 
up for this purpose around the concentration camps (Herbert, 1991). 
                                                
96 At its peak at the end of 1944, there were 8.2m foreign workers (including POWs) and 700,000 
concentration camp inmates in Germany, compared to about 23.2m German workers (Spoerer, 
2005, p. 494). 
97 Spoerer (2005, p. 550) writes that by 1942 at the latest, most foreigners working in Germany 
did so against their will. 
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While forced labourers were at the mercy of the German authorities, the 
employment of POWs was part of, and governed by, the laws of war. Between 
POWs and the Gestapo lay, to a varying degree of legal certainty and practical 
effectiveness,98 the Geneva Convention enforced by the protecting power, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and its visits and checks, the prisoners’ 
own administration and military hierarchy,99 the disciplinary powers of the camp 
commander, and the juridical jurisdiction of the German military courts, before 
which POWs were assisted in their defence by the protecting power.  
These layers of juridical authority protected POWs from three evils 
relating to sanctions. The first one was the imposition of disciplinary measures 
by their civilian employers, who had to bring a complaint with the unit guarding 
the commando if they thought a POW should be punished (Spoerer, 2005, p. 
555), as the military held the monopoly on the power to impose such punishment 
(Overmans, 2005, p. 857). Overmans, however, also writes that, due to the 
increasing break-down of communication structures between far-off work details 
and the main camps, as well as the almost complete integration of prisoners into 
their employer’s sphere of life towards the later stages of the war, this is likely to 
have in many instances failed to protect prisoners from the direct control of their 
employers.  
The second evil from which POWs were protected was a transfer to the 
authority of the Gestapo and their subsequent deportation to one of the 
concentration camps. For this to happen, POWs needed to be released first, and 
this added at least one hurdle to their disappearance into one of the other types of 
                                                
98 The ICRC’s inspection ‘rights,’ for example, were not codified and at this time could not even 
be called customary law; they had developed out of the visits by the ICRC to camps to distribute 
relief goods and were entirely dependent on their toleration by both parties (Overmans, 2005, p. 
843). 
99 Karner (1999, p. 408) states in this respect that very little is known about the self-organisation 
and administration of POWs other than those from Britain and the USA. In fact, as Overmans 
(1999, p. 498) notes, there has been little published on French POWs in German war 
imprisonment in general (Yves Durand’s writings being one of the notable exceptions), with the 
German-Russian relation captivating the interest of those publishing in this area, at least in 
Germany. 
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camp.100 And while for civilian workers criminal prosecutions were governed by 
jurisdictional rules so complicated and contradictory that at some point neither 
the judiciary nor the police knew who was responsible (Spoerer, 2005, p. 557 n. 
157), clarity reigned for POWs. Not only was their category clearly defined 
(something that could not be said for the different categories of civilian workers), 
but the legal framework of the Convention also prevented their falling into the 
web of disciplinary competences that governed other foreigners. Excluded from 
combat and its inherent sovereign decisions on one side, prisoners were protected 
from being transferred into the control of the sovereign power and its spaces of 
exception on the other. And yet, they did not thereby return to civilian life, which 
provided the third coordinate to their suspension; while their work took place 
within society, it was governed by other arrangements than the normal regime of 
labour law. Spoerer (2005, p. 504) thus writes that, although the military handed 
POWs over to civil enterprises under contract, a relation termed a ‘public legal 
relationship of special kind’ (öffentliches Rechtsverhältnis besonderer Art), 
POWs can in this respect be distinguished from other foreign workers that were 
equally placed outside normal labour laws (such as Ostarbeiter, Jews and 
travellers or gipsies), who were under an ‘employment relation of its own kind’ 
(Beschäftigungsverhältnis eigener Art (Spoerer, 2005, p. 499-500)), as in relation 
to POWs the laws of war continued to function as an overall governing 
mechanism. 
Finally, where POWs themselves were mistreated at work, the avenues of 
complaint open to them were perhaps more effective than those available to other 
workers, whose country representatives had often little leverage to negotiate the 
treatment of their workers with the German authorities (foreign workers in 
Germany were not permitted to go to court under German labour laws (Spoerer, 
2005, p. 551), and who were therefore helpless in the face of abuses by their 
employers. Overmans (2005, pp. 855-856) indeed writes that it was the units 
guarding the POWs who protected them from the excesses of their employers 
                                                
100 Although POWs could, and were in fact in certain circumstances sent to special disciplinary 
camps or commandos; a much feared prospect, as Bories-Sawala (1996, pp. 178-179) describes. 
Also see footnote 104 below. 
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until these units were themselves tasked with increasing the work rate of POWs 
towards the later stages of the war. 
Despite these effective legal protections that enclosed working POWs 
within a world of their own, excluding them from at least the worst abuses taking 
place all around them, the question remains whether Levinas, and other NCOs 
like him should not be properly regarded as forced labourers.101 While the 1929 
Convention envisaged for POWs below officer rank to work, it only made 
limited provisions for the work of NCOs, who could not be employed other than 
in a supervisory capacity, unless they volunteered to do otherwise. It was this 
condition of voluntariness that proved difficult in practice. 
The Vichy government had agreed with Germany that it itself would be 
the protecting power for French POWs, rather than a neutral third party (in this 
case, the USA), as provided by the Geneva Convention. This meant that 
Germany was able to negotiate with France directly in matters concerning the 
fate of French POWs. Given the unequal balance of power that existed between 
the two nations since the armistice (Hilberg, 1985, 2:609), this led not only to a 
visibly relenting attitude on the part of the French delegates (chosen themselves 
from POWs of officer rank) who were visiting the camps to ensure compliance 
with the Convention vis-à-vis the officers of the German army that were 
accompanying them (Hoch, 1992, p. 225), but also to the agreed setting aside 
altogether of certain requirements of the Convention (Durand, 1991), amongst 
them the requirement that NCOs could not be forced to work other than in a 
supervisory capacity. This resulted in ‘encouragements’ of French NCOs by their 
own representatives to sign voluntary work contracts (Durand, 1999, p. 7), while 
the Germans aided this effort from their side by applying ‘massive pressure’ 
(Bories-Sawala, 1996, p. 228), including threatening prisoners unwilling to work 
with a transfer to the East.102  
                                                
101 As Caygill (2010), for example, does. 
102 For this purpose, a camp was established in Kobierzyn near Crakow, into which resisting 
NCOs were transferred (Spoerer, 2005, p. 504). Bories-Sawala (1996b, p. 181) also mentions that 
POWs who generally insisted too much for the comfort of the Germans on compliance with the 
Convention were sent to disciplinary camps. Braudel was sent to such a camp, partly due to his 
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This blatant contravention of the law added to the well-known problems 
with the identification, classification and treatment of NCOs in the Second World 
War (cf., for example, Gascar, 1967, pp. 242f). Bories-Sawala (1996, p. 227) 
writes that it is likely that the rights of NCOs were at first not widely known 
amongst French POWs, and that once they were, only few succeeded in having 
their rights recognised. Others did not even try, whether out of solidarity or fear 
of making their situation worse. Durant (1982, p. 142) appears to attribute the 
NCO problem to the fact that NCOs were not, like officers, separated from other 
soldiers into different camps in the first place, and either had to get themselves 
assigned to supervisory positions on arrival in the camp, or refuse work 
altogether. While any wrongful treatment was applied to Jewish and non-Jewish 
NCOs alike, it is for obvious reasons likely that Jewish prisoners offered least 
resistance, especially when they were already separated from the rest of the 
prisoners with the sole purpose of discriminating against them.103 
While Levinas and other NCOs may have technically been ‘forced 
labourers,’ they should nevertheless be distinguished from other groups of 
foreign workers in Germany that were forced to work outside the overall 
protecting framework of the Convention. Even if, as Overmans (1999b, p. 18) 
claims, “[t]he fate of POWs and interned civilians [such as forced labourers] 
comingled, [and] the treatment was less dependent on differences in status than 
on the national socialist hierarchy of the race of peoples,” this should be taken as 
a statement about the comparatively humane treatment of French foreign 
labourers rather than the abuse of French POWs, given that he also states that the 
treatment of French POWs was “hard, but not in breach of the laws of war” 
(Overmans, 1999b, p. 18). At least POWs had the legal certainty that allowed 
breaches to be established in the first place. MacKenzie (1994, p. 500) thus 
concludes that even where the provisions of the Convention were already 
regularly violated in relation to POWs, it still protected prisoners from a 
                                                                                                                               
“intervention discouraging fellow inmates from offering voluntary labour to the Germans” 
(Caygill, 2004, p. 159 n. 11). 
103 Although according to one Wehrmacht camp inspector in 1941, 85 Jewish NCOs refused to 
work in one camp (Chambrun, 1989, p. 52). 
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wholesale exploitation as slave labourers.104 And while the influence of civilian 
authorities striving to increase labour output meant a worsening of the working 
conditions for POWs as the war progressed, their living conditions at least 
remained under the authority of the military (Kochavi, pp. 63-64).105 
As to the actual conditions under which Levinas lived and worked, Stalag 
XI B, the camp in which Levinas is usually cited to have lived, was established 
in 1939 on the site of a German military training ground that stretched over the 
Lüneburg Heath. The POWs were accommodated in wooden temporary barracks, 
around which fences were drawn. These barracks had initially been erected for 
the workers building the training ground barracks in 1935, and Stalag XI B and 
the cluster of other camps that arose in the area of Fallingbostel (including Stalag 
XI C, parts of which became the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen, and Stalag 
XI D, which housed (or rather, did not house, as there were initially no barracks) 
Soviet POWs) were now surrounding the training ground. On this training 
ground, the German military continued to train during the war. 
A very large number of prisoners were held in the camps at Fallingbostel; 
at its peak in 1944, the cluster of camps held 96,000106 (Fallingbostel Military 
                                                
104 A ‘problem’ for the German authorities that was solved by transferring some of the POWs into 
civilian status. 
105 There is also an argument, which, although not entirely convincing, occasionally appears in 
the literature and therefore deserves at least mentioning. This is that one should see the work 
required of POWs in the context of an enforced idleness that was the only alternative and which, 
as some (see, for example, Overmans, 1999b, p. 23 n. 49) claim, represented a far harder 
challenge for POWs than enforced work. Scheidl (1943, p. 372) thus writes: “A healthy human 
being who over a longer period of time is, as one may fittingly say, ‘banished’ or ‘condemned’ to 
idleness, always feels unhappy.” Scheidl (1943, p. 371) also claims that during the negotiations 
for the Hague Conventions, the possibility of employing POWs was supported “in the first place 
entirely in the interest of the POWs themselves.” Boredom, in any case, appears to have been a 
prevalent negative aspect of war captivity for officers who were not required to work (Overmans, 
2005, p. 848). 
106 Mattiello and Vogt (1986, p. 22) as well as the Stiftung niedersächsische Gedänkstätten cite a 
number of 95,000 prisoners under their information on Stalag XI B, while Malka (2006) gives a 
figure of 32,000 and the Pegasus Archive of 49,138. These lower figures are likely to refer either 
to the main camp on its own (without its branches and the work details) or to the number of 
prisoners at a certain point in time.  
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Museum) POWs of French, British, Belgian, Polish, Yugoslav, Soviet, Dutch, 
Italian, American, Romanian and Czech nationality, thereby constituting one of 
the largest POW camp complexes in Germany at the time (Stiftung 
niedersächsische Gedänkstätten). General living conditions are likely to have 
been similar to most Stalags, with overcrowding, rudimentary sanitation and 
medical care, insufficient or non-existent heating, infestation with vermin, and 
inadequate food and clothing being the norm (Tyas, 2010, p. 180).  
Levinas, however, is likely not to have been held at Stalag XI B itself. 
Each Stalag had a myriad of small ‘camps’ attached to it – in the case of Stalag 
XI B, these numbered more than 2,000 (Stiftung niedersächsische Gedänkstätten) 
– and he and his seventy or so Jewish comrades-in-arms (Levinas, 1990b, p. 152) 
appear to have lived in a disused farm called Stelterhof (Levinas, 2011, p. 27) in 
the vicinity of their place of work in the forest. This was nothing unusual; many 
POWs were accommodated in work details near to where they worked, as the 
daily return to the main camp would have been impracticable or impossible on 
foot.  
Living away from the main camp would have made a positive difference 
to Levinas’s life in captivity. For example, Levinas tells a story about a dog that 
lived with the Jewish prisoners on the farm, something impossible to think of, 
had he remained at Stalag XI B itself: 
 
A little dog associated himself with us prisoners one day as we were going to the 
workplace; the guard did not protest; the dog would install himself in the 
commando and let us go to work alone. But when we used to come back from 
work, very relieved, he welcomed us, jumping up and down (Levinas, 2001, p. 
41). 
 
While no information is available on the nature or capacity in which 
Levinas worked in the forest, it is known that the workers in his commando had 
one day off each week,107 which placed them in a better position than those of 
                                                
107 Malka (2006, pp. 75-76) writes that a son of a fellow inmate of Levinas had told him that they 
were allowed one day off a week, during which they could have a tooth removed, and that the 
father of said informant accordingly returned from captivity without any teeth left at all.  
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many ordinary foot-soldiers, who Tyas (2010, p. 200) reports as having been 
“forced to work 12 hours a day, day after day, every week of every month for 
years.” Although the commando was restricted to Jewish prisoners, there is no 
indication that the work carried out by this unit was more degrading or punishing 
than that of other units. POWs are said to have generally preferred work in the 
agricultural sector over that in the mining and production industries, as working 
and living conditions on the countryside were thought to be better (Bories-
Sawala 1996, pp. 216-217), but conditions in fact varied widely due to local 
circumstances and attitudes. Overmans (2005, p. 764 and 767) lists under one of 
the achievement of Scapini’s mission that restrictions on the guarding of working 
French POWs were loosened to the extent that POWs could “move freely, de 
facto unguarded with only a French commando leader as responsible person.” 
While it is not known whether this applied to Levinas’s commando,108 the 
reference to ‘the guard’ in the quote above suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that Levinas’s work did not belong amongst the harshest 
types of work imposed even on French POWs. The fact that Caygill (2010, p. 28) 
writes that Levinas “as a Jew was set to work in a ‘Forestry Commando Unit’ 
specifically assembled for Jewish POWs,” and that this meant “that his 
experience of the camp was even more insecure and traumatic that that of his 
fellow non-Jewish POWs” should therefore not, without more evidence, be taken 
as an inference of special hardship or targeted maltreatment. On the contrary, 
taking a comparative view on the different groups of foreign workers, Levinas’s 
position even as a French Jewish POW was, if not of a certain privilege,109 at 
least subject to the most basic protections at a time when for many, these were 
akin to privilege.110 
As to their general living conditions, prisoners in Levinas’s group are 
reported to have been able to send and receive letters and parcels (see Malka, 
                                                
108 It would not be surprising if it had, as escape would have been ill advised, if not altogether 
suicidal for Jewish POWs.  
109 Bories-Sawala (1996, p. 215) uses the term ‘relative privilege.’ 
110 Spoerer (2005, p. 555), for example, claims on the basis of reports by eyewitnesses that 
Western POWs were rarely hit by their civilian employers, which appears to have happened 
regularly to Soviet POWs. 
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2006, pp. 76f), read books in the camp’s library, and stage theatrical events, 
suggesting that the state of living conditions in the camp did not reach the “cruel 
reduction to the minimal conditions necessary for survival” that Bloechl (2011, 
p. 116) refers to. Levinas continued to be philosophically occupied during his 
time in captivity; he read a number of philosophical works111 unlikely to have 
made sense on an empty stomach,112 which he would have either obtained from 
the camp library, through book boxes circulating amongst the commandos, or 
through parcels sent to him. Like any good philosopher, Levinas is recalled 
scribbling from time to time into a little notebook or reading to the other 
prisoners “from texts that would make little sense to them” (Malka, 2006, p. 78). 
While the camp authorities did not allow Jewish prisoners to celebrate their 
religious holidays, the POWs were able to do so nevertheless, clandestinely, and 
Levinas appears to have experienced a spiritual awakening during his time in the 
camp (see Levinas, 2009).  
Unsurprisingly, however, towards the end of the war living conditions 
would have worsened.113 Durand (1999, pp. 72 and 75-76) in this context 
                                                
111 Amongst them was Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Caygil (2010, p. 28) writes that “the 
experience of forced labour in the Stalag, accompanied by a critical reading of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit in the prison camp reading room, led Levinas to an extreme degree of 
scepticism about the liberatory potential of work . . ..” For an analysis of Levinas’s concept of 
fatigue in this context, see Caygill, 2002, pp. 58f. 
112 One can therefore gather that conditions were not nearly as bad as Spanos (2010) describes for 
American foot soldiers working in a mill towards the end of the war, where food rations were so 
low that starvation combined with a heavy work load would have led to an eventual death of 
exhaustion had the prisoners not been liberated.  
113 A telegraph sent in November 1944 from the Red Cross in Geneva to the Red Cross in the US 
states the prevailing conditions in Stalag XI B: “Visited November 9th American representative 
Bedner Frank Sergeant 118956 out of 44,500 prisoners, 90 Americans of whom 2 officers 32 
noncommissioned officers. Constant flow new arrivals Dutch Front majority paratroopers many 
wounded. Overcrowding alarming. 3 Decker beds 1 blanket. Straw mattresses promised. Stock 
clothing exhausted men recently arrived must be completely reequipped. Prisoners prepare food 
reglementary rations insufficient individual preparation of food possible but fuel scarce. Marked 
diminution Red Cross shipments new shipments impatiently awaited nothing has been received 
for 4 months. Sanitary installations temporarily insufficient. 500 wounded recently arrived from 
front are in infirmary an [sic] Lazarett possibilities medical care limited reserves medical 
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describes how, mirroring the year of 1940, when Germany saw itself suddenly 
confronted with the task of looking after such a large number of prisoners,114 at 
the end of the war chaos once again resumed. Prisoner mortality sharply 
increased at this time, as Germany itself became a ‘battleground’ (Durand, 1999, 
p. 75). The approaching armies of the allies necessitated the movement of POWs 
(often by way of long marches without adequate provisions and under danger of 
bombardment, as the columns of marching prisoners were un-marked and could 
therefore not be identified as such from above) away from camps situated at the 
front and into the interior, where camps were now becoming overcrowded. 
Furthermore, due to the break-down in relations between Germany and France 
from August 1944 onwards, French prisoners suffered the additional hardship of 
seeing a temporary interruption in the delivery of their mail and parcels, which 
were vital in order to make up for the insufficient German food rations provided 
to them. “These hard living conditions during the last phase of imprisonment,” 
Durand (1999, p. 76) writes, “are not, however, attributable to a deliberate 
decision on the German side.” At this time, he explains, soldiers and civilians 
were suffering to an equal extent, and despite the conditions, POWs were able to 
“‘organise’ and make the long time spent in exile behind barbed wire bearable” 
(p. 75).  
It thus becomes apparent that the living and working conditions 
themselves must be distinguished from the factors that enabled them, if any sense 
is to be made from the legal framework in which the Western POW experience 
took shape. At certain times during the war, all groups in Germany would have 
undergone similar experiences, but this did not render them equal. Going hungry 
                                                                                                                               
dressings drugs exhausted need is urgent. Regular religious services. Conditions of work 
increasingly hard 72 hours weekly without increase of food rations frequent bombing stocks 
destroyed but victims few. Stricter discipline” (Pegasus Archive). 
114 At that time, the mass influx of POWs after the collapse of the French army had also meant 
that camps were growing larger in size and could no longer be managed through personal links of 
respect between prisoners and Germans that had characterised relations at the very beginning of 
the war, when there were few POWs, mainly British air force personnel. Overmans (1999b, p. 
15) writes of ‘an astonishing meticulousness’ in complying with the Convention by both 
Germany and Great Britain at the beginning of the war, both due to the lower amount of prisoners 
and less ideological pressure. 
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as a Jewish POW because of a shortage of food, for example, cannot be said to 
have been the same as being purposely starved of food in a concentration camp, 
even if the effect would have been very similar. The difference is important if 
one is to appreciate the remarkable fact that at one and the same time in 
Germany, Jews would either openly and in accordance with public policy be put 
to death, or kept alive by the authorities, depending on their legal status. Where 
commentators fail to take due care in making this distinction, such as when 
Hammerschlag (2012, p. 394) states that Levinas was interned in a “Nazi labor 
camp,” giving to the uninitiated reader the impression of persecution and 
punishment,115 what falls away is both an appreciation of the protection afforded 
by the laws of war and the hardship that any war, no matter how legal, imposes 
on its participants, amalgamating both these aspects of war with persecution. 
After all, that POWs would be asked to carry out work was not only 
envisaged by the Geneva Convention and thus part and parcel of war, but it had 
been so for some time before the Convention was drawn up. The work 
requirement had developed from the institution of ransom payments for captured 
knights in the late Middle Ages, where the capture and collection of a ransom for 
the prisoner was often the sole purpose for the hostilities. At that time, the 
obligation to secure and pay the ransom from the prisoner’s estate was the 
personal obligation  of the prisoner himself to the person to whom he surrendered 
on the battlefield. The relationship was one of private debt, which, if un-
discharged in the prisoner’s lifetime, would burden his heirs (Keen, 1965, pp. 
158-159).  
During the sixteenth century, the aristocratic practice of ransom was then 
transformed from a payment individually negotiated between captor and prisoner 
to one that was regulated through bilateral agreements between military 
commanders and increasingly applied to all soldiers. With the emergence of 
absolute monarchies that maintained permanent armies, prisoners became seen as 
representatives of a state rather than as individual opponents. At first, the state 
reserved the right to collect the ransom for particularly valuable prisoners. Then, 
                                                
115 Hammerschlag (2012, p. 394) indeed proceeds to depict Levinas’s writings immediately after 
the war as “an attempt at re-appropriating the experience of being persecuted.” Later in the same 
paper, she describes Levinas as “a victim of  [the Nazi] regime” (p. 406). 
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during the seventeenth century, ransom began to be paid to the state as a matter 
of course, and finally was also paid by states, who were soon ransoming those of 
their soldiers who would otherwise not have been released. The reason for this 
development can be seen in the significant investment that soldiers represented 
for states whose treasuries were not yet highly developed (Rosas, 1976, pp. 49f). 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the significance of ransom 
payments decreased, although it still formed part of prisoner exchanges during 
the war. From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 onwards, treaties had begun to 
stipulate the release of prisoners without ransom on the conclusion of the 
conflict, as states were increasingly able to accommodate large numbers of 
prisoners and were less reliant on having their own captured soldiers returned to 
them during the war so that they might re-join the fighting (Rosas, 1976, pp. 54 
and 66). After the French Revolution, the practice of an equal exchange of 
prisoners regardless of rank was advocated (previously, officers had been 
exchanged for up to 5,000 times as many soldiers or their value), even if not 
universally followed, and ransom was discontinued altogether between 
‘civilised’ states (Rosas, 1976, pp. 54 and 66-67). The emphasis now shifted to 
indirect advantages gained and disadvantages inflicted through the holding of 
prisoners. Not only were prisoners unavailable as soldiers while they were held, 
but their salaries continued to be paid by their home state, representing a strain 
on its resources. But in the 19th and 20th centuries, when armies were enlarged 
through conscription, even this became impossible, and prisoners were only kept 
for exchanges (Oeter, 1999, pp. 46-48). That is, until they were made to work on 
a large scale in the First and Second World Wars, ensuring they would pay for 
the considerable costs of their capture and upkeep,116 and support the war 
                                                
116 Davis (1977, p. 6290) writes: “The disadvantages or costs of taking and keeping prisoners are 
substantial. In military terms it costs lives, time, supplies, and diversion of forces to compel 
enemy personnel to surrender, although this may indeed be cheaper in the long run than 
compelling them to fight to the end. Having taken the prisoners, the captors must get them to a 
secure place, guard them, provide rations, and burden communications and transportation 
facilities to arrange more permanent accommodations. If prisoners are taken in large numbers 
their very presence may reduce the captor's tactical momentum. If they are in poor physical 
condition they may bring medical problems such as infectious diseases to the captor's forces.” 
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economy.117 Once again, prisoners were responsible for their own ransom. When 
Levinas (in Saint Cheron p. 36), who uses the term ‘hostage’ and ‘substitution’ in 
his later writings to describe the ethical relation to the other,118 states in a 1994 
interview that “[t]he hostage is the person who works in your place, and if he 
doesn’t work, he is killed,” he thus cannot be referring to his own experience. As 
a POW, he might have worked in the place of a German worker called to the 
front, for whom he thus substituted, but this substitution would have been 
independent from his position as a hostage held by Germany in order to influence 
French policy. As part of this relation, he was not the innocent victim caught in 
the middle, but working in order to pay his dues for the protection of his life. 
                                                
117 But see again Davis (1977), who warns in this respect against viewing prisoner’s labour as a 
straight-forward profit for the detaining power: “On balance, the economic advantages of keeping 
war prisoners are reduced by the costs of their maintenance and the fact that POWs have 
generally been inefficient workers, poorly motivated, ill-suited to their tasks, often unable to 
communicate in their employer's language and subject to eccentricities induced by confinement” 
(Davis, 1977, p. 630). Interestingly, Davis regards the taking of POWs by Germany after the 
surrender of France as an example of such hostage-taking, as POWs were held “just for leverage 
in dealing with the Pétain government” (Davis, 1977, p. 625, footnote omitted). While Bories-
Sawala (1996, pp. 215f) agrees that POWs were kept as hostages for negotiations with France, 
adding that it was also hoped they would minimise the resistance movement there, she sees 
POWs (together with forced civil labourers) as having been vital for the German war economy, 
writing that without them, “the German defeat would have likely occurred significantly earlier” 
(p. 215). Having said that, she assesses civil workers as having been much more profitable than 
POWs, who not only had to be guarded, but whose level of motivation was lower and in relation 
to whom the Geneva Convention had to be observed (p. 243). 
118 I am being held hostage by the other, for whose suffering and actions I am responsible to the 
point of substitution: “For under accusation by everyone, the responsibility for everyone goes to 
the point of substitution. A subject is a hostage” (Levinas, 1998. p. 112). 
Page 110 of 195 
Page 111 of 195 
 
3.3. Engagements 
Following Schmitt, Agamben (2005, p. 290) remarks of the space of 
exception that it is a ‘legal vacuum.’ Not only does law not apply in the state of 
exception, it has been withdrawn, the withdrawal creating the effect of a vacuum. 
In the concentration camp, where sovereign decisions ‘worked’ directly on the 
prisoner, who represented nothing than “the mere ‘capacity to be killed’” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 114), the absence of law would have primarily manifested 
itself as a potentiality: Where law no longer restrains and protects, things become 
possible for those in power that would not otherwise be permitted. In the POW 
camp, on the other hand, where it was the direct engagement effected by the 
sovereign decision (whether of one’s own command, or of that of the enemy) that 
had been withdrawn, and all that was left was law as a protection from such 
engagement, the vacuum effect would have been more tenable. After all, in the 
absence of the sovereign other, prisoners were left alone, facing nothing – except 
law, which, however, provided a framework within which little could happen: 
“Existence . . . in a vacuum,’ as Levinas (2009, p. 56) notes in his diary early on 
in captivity. 
When Agamben (1998, p. 59) refers to the relation of a person caught in a 
space of exception with the absent law as a mere ‘empty form of relation’ (the 
law applies without applying), he may be said to refer, properly speaking, only to 
the form of relation: Law as that which determines the form of relation to others, 
now an empty, meaningless form. However, the relation with such an other (the 
sovereign) was fully and immediately constituted in the concentration camp; 
indeed, constituted with lethal immediacy. In the POW camp, on the other hand, 
it was the relation with the other itself that was, if formally constituted, 
meaningless and empty. Surrounded as the camp was by German guards, fences, 
watchtowers and dogs, symbols of the enemy’s power that were only too present, 
Germany as the detaining power had at the same time its back turned to the 
camp. It was not towards the POWs that its efforts were directed, but towards the 
ongoing war. 
From this, one would assume that POW camps as spaces of exception 
would be found on the sidelines of war, if not of the European order as a whole, 
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whose limit they helped constitute. And yet, these borderline spaces were located 
neither on the borders of the conflict, such as neutral territory, nor on the borders 
(or even just outside) of Europe. On the contrary, they were placed in the middle 
of enemy territory.119 Therefore, exiting the war meant more often than not a 
transfer much further into enemy territory than most prisoners had ever been 
before. For pilots this was perhaps most pronounced, as captivity was preceded 
by a fall from the sky and the loss of distance associated with flying over the 
land, but for all soldiers capture tended to present only the first step in a long 
journey through and into unknown territory, with French prisoners being moved 
at times in forced marches or in cattle freight cars (Durand, 1999 p. 72), and 
often without adequate provisions. Therefore, although it marked the official end 
of hostile action for the prisoner (famously declared by German captors in the 
phrase ‘for you the war is over’), capture most often than not meant a worsening 
of conditions for the prisoner, and was perceived as leading further into, rather 
than out of, the war: It was an exclusion and protection from hostile action that at 
the same time rendered prisoners wholly into the hands of the enemy.  
And the danger did not just relate to the enemy, but also to civilians. 
These presented an object of fear particularly for air crews, as civilians could not 
be trusted to respect the laws of war and hand the prisoner over unharmed to a 
member of the armed forces. The problem of lynching became more pronounced 
after the allied bombardments of civilians towards the end of the war, although 
the police had already in 1943 been instructed not to interfere (Overmans, 2005, 
p. 864).120  
It was only at the end point of their journey, when paradoxically, the 
prisoners reached the camp where the enemy had most control over them – in the 
camp, they were confined to a purpose-built, closely guarded, watched-over 
                                                
119 This was not only for reasons of labour deployment; in 1943, for example, especially 
‘valuable’ groups of POWs, such as fighter plane crews, were moved as far away from foreign 
territory as possible, as an increased number of escapes sparked fears about a possible uprising 
amongst POWs and foreign workers (Overmans, 2005, p. 860).  
120 Interestingly, however, Overmans (2005, p. 865) also notes that despite propaganda claiming 
that it was no longer possible or appropriate to employ German police against German people 
when the latter took the law into their own hands, it was more often than not the police and the 
Gestapo who killed the pilots, 30 in total. 
Page 113 of 195 
space from which it was much harder to escape than from a freight car or 
marching column –, that they were safe, as their presence was at this point 
notified to the protecting power. Their corporate identity as a member of a state’s 
armed forces, an enemy (a status which had been threatened by the exposure to 
civilians, law enforcement and individual military personnel), was thus affirmed. 
Only once prisoners’ status as POWs was registered did they gain their ‘liberty,’ 
their lives now being protected under law. Of course, prisoners were still at the 
mercy of the German camp administration and its attitude towards governance 
and compliance with the Convention. This manifested itself in every-day aspects 
of camp life, such as in the punishment for attempted escapes or the delivery of 
food parcels. But they were no longer under threat of being killed, not unless 
they escaped or otherwise provoked their captors.121 
Provocation, however, played an important role in eliciting precisely the 
enemy stance from the camp administration that was missing in their role as 
detaining power under international law, recreating a situation within the camp 
that would at least in some way resemble combat outside. Anti-German activity, 
of which escaping was the most notable, but which also included a host of other 
tricks played on the German guards, is described by Durand (1988, p. 192) as a 
‘morale booster’ that was important to create ‘the feeling of active opposition’ on 
the part of the POWs. In practice, escape meant triggering an immediate 
engagement by the enemy once again as enemy; it meant being hunted and 
forced into hiding. It was an escape more into than from danger,122 more into the 
closed than into the open, given the distribution of power in Europe at the time: 
After the first period of occupation of France and Poland, “there existed,” 
                                                
121 Even when they escaped, they should not have been under threat of being killed as 
punishment, as the right to attempt escape constitutes the counterpart to the detaining power’s 
right to imprison, and the Convention hence imposes limitations on any punishment that may be 
imposed for escapes (Overmans, 2005, p. 860). Unfortunately, these limitations were not always 
complied with. Most infamously amongst such contraventions is the shooting of 50 recaptured 
escapees after the attempted mass escape at Stalag Luft III at Sagan, popularised by the 1963 film 
The Great Escape. 
122 This is true in particularly for Oflags such as the one Ricoeur was in, as here prisoners had 
tried “to create a replica of free society within the camp, ” including a university, a theatre, and a 
stock market (Ricoeur, 1998, p. 17). 
Page 114 of 195 
Overmans (2005, p. 859) writes, “in a – with the exception of Switzerland – 
largely closed European area of German-Italian rule, hardly any possibilities for 
escape.” To attempt escapes also gave prisoners a sense of usefulness – the 
guarding of the POW camps generally, and the search for escaped prisoners in 
particular, tied up German troops otherwise deployed at the front – and relieved 
“the utter boredom of camp life” (Tyas, 2010, p. 185).123  
Unless provoked into a reaction – into focussing their attention onto the 
prisoners – the camp, however, was an open space, guarded and yet without 
engagement. Especially for Jews, this must have been disorienting. Levinas, for 
example, declared his religious faith on the occasion of his capture,124 and 
according to his son, spent the next five years in the expectation of imminent 
deportation and death, accepting this to be his fate as a Jew (Malka, 2006 p. 262). 
Against all expectations, however, persecution did not follow, and his captivity 
remained uneventful. There is thus no reported evidence of specific instances of 
hardship that befell the Jewish prisoners interned in Stalag XI B, even though 
they were segregated from other prisoners, forming a separate unit. The 
protection afforded by the French uniform appears to have been effective, and 
given the extensive persecution of Jews at the time, perhaps the most outstanding 
aspect of Levinas’s time in war captivity is the absence of persecution. But this 
does not mean that life in captivity did not appear precarious for Jewish 
prisoners, to whom the Convention – that ‘sheet of paper’ as Levinas calls it – 
seemed no more than a ‘fragile guarantee’ (Levinas, 2009, p. 210, 207). The 
simultaneity of actual protection and potential danger, a lack of events together 
with the intense anticipation of them due to the ominous separation of the Jews 
from other prisoners, characterised the way time passed in the camp, which 
                                                
123 One should remember, however, that this was a game predominantly played by officers not 
otherwise occupied during their time of captivity. As Tyas (2010, p. 200) writes, for those who 
were working under difficult conditions, “there was little time to either think or plan means of 
escape when food was a prime requirement.” For Jewish prisoners, similarly, such activities were 
quite inconceivable, as they would not only have exposed themselves to re-capture and potential 
punishment by their detaining power, but also to persecution as Jews by authorities outside the 
camp. 
124 While this may seem brave (or foolish), it should be borne in mind, as Berg (1990, p. 201) 
points out, that Jews with overtly ‘Jewish’ names did not have much of a choice in this respect. 
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Caygill (2010, p. 27) describes as a time that was “at once compressed and 
distended, intense and empty:” 
 
The Jewish prisoners felt the deferred death sentences that hung over their work 
and their laughter like a familiar shadow. In the special Kommandos in which 
they were grouped, for the most part lost at some point in a forest, they found 
themselves at once separated from other prisoners and the civilian population. It 
was as if something was being prepared for them, but always postponed 
(Levinas, 2009, p. 210). 
  
Of course, there was still the protecting power watching over the 
prisoners, but for French POWs, this was France itself, and France as the figure 
of the ‘father’ – an image that was often appropriated by Marshall Pétain for his 
own relation to the POWs – proved itself a disappointment. Corresponding to the 
citizen’s duty to sacrifice his life for the defence of the state, it had been the duty 
of the state since the Enlightenment and the French Revolution to look after its 
soldiers in captivity (Overmans, 2005, p. 871), whose interests were without 
doubt best served by the establishment of a neutral protecting power. In relation 
to France in the Second World War, however, Pétain himself had “wanted to set 
aside the Geneva Convention in this point in order to make the question of POWs 
a matter of negotiation between two states (Durand, 1999, p. 74),” and French 
POWs thus had to endure the thought of the weakness of their own government, 
if not its outright collaboration with their captors:  
 
It [the Vichy government] chose in June 1940 to stop fighting. Captivity was 
therefore going to continue for French prisoners of war of 1940 for years not 
due to a struggle declared between their country and the enemy, but due to an 
interminable armistice. What’s more, this armistice was conceived by Vichy not 
as a truce in the continuation of war with Germany, but as a sort of half-peace it 
tried to negotiate with the leaders of the Reich. The Germans accepted the 
negotiation, but to their advantage, and moved to established a policy of 
collaboration between the vanquished and the victor, in which prisoners of war 
were, to some extent, the stake (Durand, 1987, p. 14). 
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This was of daily practical significance for the POWs. It meant, for 
example, that French POWs were significantly worse off compared to their 
British and American counterparts when it came to nutrition. The French, unlike 
other nations, opted to provide for their prisoners wholly on their own, and the 
latter therefore did not receive a share of the ample provisions sent by the British 
and American governments to their captured soldiers. Given the few resources 
available to the Vichy government at the time, this meant that up to the year of 
1943 (and not counting private parcels), French POWs only received about 800 
grams of extra food per month, which was about as much as British and 
American POWs received extra per day. From 1943 onwards, it then was about 5 
kilograms, which, although an improvement, was still a significantly lower 
amount than what others received (Overmans, 2005, p. 847).125 
In describing this and other disadvantages and breaches of the 
Convention resulting from the role France had taken on in relation to its own 
captive soldiers, Durand (1999, pp. 74-76) focuses on the role played by France: 
 
Even though the initiative for this breach of the international laws of war came 
from the Germans, it was accepted by the French government in Vichy and 
manifestly supported by the politics of collaboration with national socialist 
Germany. . . . [O]verall the fate of the French prisoners of war in the ‘Reich’ 
was determined more through the consequences of collaboration by the French 
Vichy regime with the German Reich than through the behaviour of the 
Germans vis-à-vis the French.  
 
Overmans (2005, p. 764) shows himself more sympathetic towards the 
Vichy government, describing the difficult situation that particularly Scapini, 
                                                
125 Overmans (2005, p. 848) also mentions, however, that until 1942 the ICRC did not assess the 
nutritional situation of Western POWs as a humanitarian problem. This shows how well British 
and American POWs were, overall, provided for, if even the much lower amount of food that 
French POWs received from their government did not constitute a ‘problem.’ In any case, it 
appears that Western POWs were often better off than the German civilian population, with this 
discrepancy becoming most pronounced towards the end of the war, when the bribing of guards 
by POWs with rare items such as chocolate and cigarettes became a real problem for the 
Wehrmacht (Overmans, 2005, p. 848 and pp. 860-861). 
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who had been charged with the oversight of French POWs in German hands, was 
in, given Germany’s threats to remove visiting rights of camps altogether should 
his mission refuse co-operation on the breaches. Be this as it may, French POWs 
could not be certain of the unconditional support of their home government vis-à-
vis their captors. One incident that exemplifies this ambivalence was the public 
call by Scapini following the escape of General Giraud from German war 
captivity, for Giraud to hand himself in and for POWs to consider the negative 
side effects of escape activity. This led French POWs, who, like all POWs, 
considered escape to be one of their patriotic duties, and who had applauded 
Giraud, to be confused about the side their own government was on (Bories-
Sawala, 1996, p. 233), leading to a suspicion that their fate was ultimately a 
matter of indifference to French politicians, whether or not this was in fact the 
case. Although the episode can be explained by the fact that Pétain, who was 
expecting the imminent end to the war in 1940 and who had taken a personal 
interest in the fate of the POWs, was hoping that they would benefit from the 
collaboration (Bories-Sawala, 1996, p. 223; also see Durand, 1982, p. 315), and 
that Scapini had tactical motivations in making the call regarding Giraud (Bories-
Sawala, 1996, p. 233), this would not have been readily apparent to POWs.  
Apart from such disappointments, prisoners had to come to terms with the 
fact that the French public was distancing itself from their fate. In Vichy 
propaganda, POWs had been characterised as ‘faithful followers of Marshal 
Pétain’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 418), and the now increasing loss of popularity 
of the latter’s policies implicated prisoners in turn. In addition, some blamed the 
soldiers’ performance for the defeat in 1940, and projected the shameful 
collaboration by France with its German occupiers on the prisoners (Bories-
Sawala, 1996b, pp. 616-617). The deal struck between Germany and France in 
1942 for the release of French POWs in exchange for civil workers sent to work 
in Germany at a rate of 1:3 (the rèleve) further supported the French public’s 
dwindling solidarity with POWs, who, without any wrong-doing on their part, 
were blamed for the forced recruitment of French workers under this scheme 
(Bories-Sawala, 1996, p. 237). Unsurprisingly, when the POWs became aware of 
this ‘indifference,’ they felt themselves ‘let down’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 
420). 
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Taken together, these conditions led to an increasing detachment of the 
camp from the French home side; it was beginning to feel like a free-floating, 
abandoned space, with POWs themselves becoming “’patriotic orphan[s]’ and in 
this lack of orientation probably more amenable to the opportunism of the 
moment than to principles that had seemed to have lost their course” (Bories-
Sawala, 1996, p. 243). For Jewish POWs, this feeling of abandonment must have 
been particularly pronounced, given the actions of the French government at the 
time in relation to its Jewish citizens. Protected by the French uniform, Jewish 
prisoners therefore felt let down nonetheless. As Levinas (2009, p. 207) writes: 
“Others spoke reform, relief, liberation – the Israelite knew he was in a tough 
world, without affection, without fatherhood. He existed without recourse to 
humans. He assumed alone all the weight of his existence.” And while French 
non-Jewish POWs at least still had each other, Jewish POWs had to bear the 
additional uncertainty associated with being separated into Jewish faith groups. 
Why separate them, if not for ‘special’ treatment? This was the kind of question 
Jewish prisoners had to ask themselves, and it is thus not surprising that Levinas 
(2009, p. 210) describes this separation as resulting in “a moral solitude that gave 
all of the acts and all of the thoughts a special gravity.”  
But this solitude may not only have resulted from the separation of Jews 
from their colleagues, but also from anti-Semitism that was itself present within 
the French armed forces; echoing, as Bories-Sawala (1996, p. 239) writes, the 
anti-Semitic politics of the Vichy government. Levie (1977, p. 175, n. 324) in 
this context notes that the German camp administration was not always able to 
separate out Jews, as they sometimes encountered resistance from the rest of the 
prisoners. From this one can infer that when they were able to separate them, no 
or little resistance was offered. For this and related purposes, anti-Semitic 
feelings were also actively encouraged by the Germans. Overmans (2005, p. 
766), for example, refers to a proposal issued by the camp commandment in 
Oflag XVII A to separate Jewish prisoners from the rest of the officers, which 
could only be implemented without using force after the anti-Semitic sentiments 
of inmates had been successfully strengthened. Lador-Lederer (1980, p.82) 
similarly claims that Germany employed anti-Semitic propaganda in order to 
create divisions between the prisoners that camp administrations could then use 
Page 119 of 195 
to their advantage. Nevertheless, it appears that the officier-conseil responsible 
under Scapini for the adjacent military district specifically requested the 
separation of named Jewish POWs into separate commandos from his German 
colleagues (Bories-Sawala, 1996, p. 240), and both Durand (1982, p. 355) and 
Berg (2001, pp. 201-202) recount an instance in which an influential French 
POW tried to accomplish that his Jewish colleagues would be required to wear 
the yellow star, only to be rebuffed by the German camp commander. From 
accounts of repatriated POWs, Durand concludes that, despite the often close 
solidarity between colleagues in the French forces, anti-Semitic sentiments were 
common. He writes: 
 
The racism of some French seems to have exceeded that of German officers, if 
one is to believe the testimony cited above. The truth obliges us to say that 
obvious traces of anti-Semitic spirit were sometimes expressed in the words of 
repatriated POWs; some denouncing the Jews as responsible for the black 
market in the camps, others for the political opposition to Maréchal Pétain, some 
for shady collusions with German guards (Durand, 1982, p. 356). 
 
French Jewish POWs would thus have encountered a certain amount of 
anti-Semitism from within their own ranks, weakening the relation to their non-
Jewish colleagues. But they are much less likely to have been aware of the severe 
persecution of Jews, Russian POWs and other targeted groups that took place all 
around them. Ricoeur (1998, p. 19), for example, responds as follows to the 
question at what time he ‘learned of the death camps:’ 
 
We witnessed the brutality inflicted on the Russian prisoners near our camp in 
Pomerania. But we had not discovered the horror of the deportation and 
extermination camps until the day we were liberated, because we found 
ourselves next to Bergen-Belsen. The English had emptied the village of Belsen 
as a reprisal, and we interrogated Germans who claimed not to know what was 
happening in the camp seven kilometres away. I saw the survivors coming out 
so haggard, many of them dying after taking their first steps, after eating jam or 
something. It was dreadful. All of a sudden, we had the feeling we had been 
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incredibly spared. And those who felt this difference most strongly were our 
Jewish buddies . . .. 
 
There were, of course, rumours about the events taking place that spread 
already during the war. News about deportations of friends and family members 
reached POW camps by way of returned mail marked ‘left without a leaving a 
forwarding address,’ and Levinas (2009, p. 210, but also see 206-207) writes 
after the war that they knew what this meant because they “knew of the mass 
exterminations of Jews in Eastern Europe.” Once during his captivity, Levinas 
saw a column of deportees destined for Buchenwald while working in the forest, 
and sensed the extent of the tragedy that was unfolding around him.126 It is 
unclear whether Levinas was aware of the conditions Russian POWs were 
subjected to (generally speaking, different nationalities were sometimes held 
within the same camp, and prisoners were able to observe the treatment and 
living conditions of other nationalities from across a fence separating the units 
(Stelzl-Marx, 2000, p. 43)), but what has been reported is that Levinas and his 
Jewish POW colleagues clandestinely threw food over the fence of Bergen 
Belsen to starving women when the opportunity arose (Gutman, 2011, p. 23). In 
any case, the full extent of the persecutions emerged only after the war, and it 
was then that Levinas received the news that many of his immediate family, 
including his parents, grandparents and two younger brothers, died in his home 
town of Kaunas in Lithuania, shot there by the Nazis (Lescourret, 1994, pp. 126-
127). Only his wife and daughter survived, who had been hiding in France. 
In the context of solitude, Levinas also writes about the separation from 
the German civilian population during his time in captivity, members of which 
appeared to view the Jewish commando with contempt.127 In one of the few 
                                                
126 This experience, Malka (2006, p. 263) writes, was one that Levinas could not forget, but 
“never evoked in his writings and confided only to those who were very close to him.” 
127 This suggests that the members of Levinas’s commando were marked as Jews, something that 
was prohibited in relation to Western POWs, although both Hilberg (1985, 2:627) and Durand 
(1982, p. 354) mention a contravention of this prohibition in a camp in the same military district 
(Wehrkreis) as Stalag XI B. After surveying the available evidence, Durand (1982, p. 356) 
concludes that there were, “although rare, cases in which the wearing of the yellow star was 
imposed on Jewish POWs.” Berg (1990, p. 201) writes about an instance in which Jews in a work 
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stories from his time in the camp, Levinas (2001, p. 41) tells how the above-
mentioned dog that lived with them was the only one who treated the prisoners as 
human beings:  
 
Now I am coming to the story of the friendly dog. A little dog associated 
himself with us prisoners one day as we were going to the workplace; the guard 
did not protest; the dog would install himself in the commando and let us go to 
work alone. But when we used to come back from work, very relieved, he 
welcomed us, jumping up and down. In this corner of Germany, where walking 
through the village we would be looked at by the villagers as Juden, this dog 
evidently took us for human beings. The villagers certainly did not injure us or 
do us any harm, but their expressions were clear. We were the condemned and 
the contaminated carriers of germs. And this little dog welcomed us at the 
entrance of the camp, barking happily and jumping up and down amicably 
around us.  
 
In a different version of the same story, Levinas (1990b, pp. 152-153) 
writes: 
 
The French uniform still protected us from Hitlerian violence. But the other 
men, called free, who had dealings with us or gave us work or orders or even a 
smile – and the children and women who passed by and sometimes raised their 
eyes – stripped us of our human skin. We were subhuman, a gang of apes. A 
small inner murmur, the strength and wretchedness of persecuted people, 
reminded us of our essence as thinking creatures, but we were no longer part of 
the world. Our comings and goings . . . passed in parenthesis. We were beings 
entrapped in their species . . .. Racism is not a biological concept; anti-Semitism 
is the archetype of all internment. . . . It shuts people away in a class, deprives 
them of expression . . .. How can we deliver a message about our humanity 
                                                                                                                               
detachment at Stalag IX A were made to wear a 15cm tall inscription reading ‘Jew’ on their 
uniforms, and says that in some, albeit not all, camps, Jews were made to wear the yellow star for 
two months before this requirement was then abolished. Another possibility is that the local 
civilian population came to know by word of mouth that a work detachment made up of Jews was 
working in the forest. 
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which, from behind the bars of quotation marks, will come across as anything 
other than monkey talk?  
. . . 
[But for the dog,] there was no doubt that we were men. 
 
Some commentators, such as Doukhan (2012, pp. 8-9), read this passage 
as a confirmation of Levinas’s status as a persecuted person, seemingly 
confirmed by Levinas’s own mentioning of the members of the commando as 
‘persecuted people.’ However, both the way in which civilians interacted with 
the commando and Levinas’s own feelings about this interaction point more 
towards an institutionalised racism that rendered POWs invisible as persons than 
to persecution as such. After all, it is not their actions that Levinas complains 
about, but the fact that they did not recognise the prisoners for what they were; 
that they had been excluded from normal life – which in a sense, they of course 
had – being ‘no longer part of the world’, having been put in ‘parenthesis,’ 
suspended from the possibility of communication. It was almost as if civilians 
were not looking at them at all.  
However, there are also general aspects of the relation between POWs 
and the German civilian population that may throw light on this story as one that 
should be read otherwise than as a story of anti-Semitic persecution. To begin 
with, one should say that all POWs working within German society, being the 
only flesh-and-blood representatives of the enemy that the civilian population 
actually came in contact with, naturally attracted feelings of hatred (Overmans, 
2005, p. 732). A xenophobic attitude, in which all foreign workers were looked 
at as dirty and unkempt, regardless of whether they were Jews or not, was, 
however, also actively propagated128 by the German security forces, who tried to 
keep the German population at a distance from POWs and foreign workers, who 
by their very presence were threatening the ideology of the ‘master race’ on 
many levels (Bories-Sawala 1996b, pp. 223f). But the civilian population may 
also have been genuinely taken aback at the sight of POWs. Karner (1999, p. 
                                                
128 Although not at the expense of the war economy, which, as the security forces well knew, was 
heavily reliant on the ability and motivation of foreign workers to carry out their work (Bories-
Sawala, 1996b, pp. 223f). 
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407) writes in this respect that living conditions of POWs were consciously kept 
well under that of the surrounding population, although the scale of the 
discrepancy would have depended on the nationality of the prisoners and the 
stage in the progression of the war. 
Then there was the view that foreigners did not deserve to be working in 
Germany, carrying out jobs of German men in relative safety when the former 
were at the same time dying at the front (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 231).129 Davis 
(1977, p. 627) furthermore refers to feelings of resentment directed at POWs by 
civilian workers; as a cheap labour force, POWs were thought to ‘depress their 
earnings.’ Such resentment may have been expressed in various ways. Hoch 
(1992, p. 233) in this context mentions the lack of engagement by civil workers 
employed in the same work places as POWs on behalf of their POW colleagues, 
for example when it came to the latter’s right to use bomb shelters during air 
raids, which was often denied to them; an engagement, Hoch writes, which 
would have been possible without danger.  
Already since 1939, the German population had also been discouraged 
through official decrees and amendments to legislation from any contact with 
POWs other than that absolutely necessary in the course of their work, or likely 
to raise labour output (considerations pertaining to the war economy again 
trumping ideological ones). While the killing of Jews was carried out in secrecy 
in the Eastern occupied territories, POWs (and other foreign workers) were 
employed side by side with the German population. This meant, firstly, that their 
fate could not be hidden, and secondly, that the attitude of the population towards 
them needed to be managed in order to make the labour deployment a success; 
‘success’ here meaning the maximum exploitation of all foreign workers without 
undue sympathy or fraternisation with foreign, ‘racially impure’ elements 
(Herbert, 1997, p. 394). POWs, however, at least did not need to be publicly 
terrorised in order to silence those German voices who claimed that the influx of 
foreign workers on such a large scale went against the ideological tenets of 
                                                
129 The fact of this envy by the German population alone should bring to mind how lucky POWs 
ought to have considered themselves, having been excluded from further participation in a war of 
such terrible scale. 
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National Socialism (Hebert, 1997, p. 385-386). Their presence in Germany 
remained part of the operations of war and could be justified on that basis. 
But “one should not,” Spoerer (2005, p. 559) writes, “underestimate the 
repressive pressure that in this context also particularly the common German 
person was subjected to under the NS-regime.” The legislation carried provisions 
for punishment that, for example in the case of forbidden contact with German 
women, could theoretically amount to death, although most often a lengthy 
prison sentence was passed (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, pp. 99 and 182). Speckner 
(2003, pp. 154-175) lists amongst the punished contraventions the taking of 
photos with POWs, single conversations, and even the passing of a half-smoked 
cigarette to a POW, while Bories-Sawala (1996, pp. 107-108) also mentions that 
POWs were not supposed to use sidewalks.130  
While the legal framework may have influenced, if not the attitude of the 
German population itself, then at least the extent of civilian interaction with 
prisoners of war generally, Jewish POWs would have been most likely to 
encounter actual disdain or hostility in the way Levinas describes.131 But 
whatever attitude prisoners witnessed, it is likely to have been institutionalised 
rather than personal if one is to follow Herbert (1997, p. 396, emphasis added) in 
                                                
130 Both, however, also point out that this pressure did not altogether work, especially in relation 
to French POWs, who proved popular with German civilians. Particularly where POWs were 
employed in rural areas that had always seen seasonal workers and where they were integrated 
into German family life, a strict prohibition of contact could not be implemented. Speckner 
concludes from this that despite the state’s continued efforts, an overall negative attitude towards 
POWs could not be established in the German population, but this is unlikely to have been the 
case overall. 
131 Although it should also be remembered that not all Germans were anti-Semites. Durand (1982, 
p. 356) thus recounts a story in which a Jewish POW working in a factory and illicitly engaging 
in small acts of sabotage, was discovered by the German foreman, who, if he knew what would 
happen to a Jew once removed from the protection of the laws of war and placed under civilian 
adjudication, had clearly no intention of bringing about such punishment. Instead of denouncing 
the prisoner, he simply told him, in referring to the sabotage: “’When one is called Bernheim, it is 
an imprudence that one better not commit.’”  
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his assessment of the German population as being overall indifferent132 to foreign 
workers: 
 
[O]n the whole, the vast majority of Germans evinced little interest in the fate of 
the foreigners. They neither took part in ill-treatment and harassment nor 
sympathized with the foreign laborers around them: they had problems enough 
of their own. . . . The foreigners were simply there, as much a part of wartime 
life as ration cards or air-raid shelters.  
 
Herbert argues that this indifference was not only the result of the 
mounting problems that the German population itself was experiencing, but also 
of the successful institution and internalisation of political values that rendered 
individuals mere tools in the political system of discrimination: “Yet this was 
precisely the essential underpinning of the Nazi system of forced labor for 
foreigners: the practice of racism became a daily habit, part of everyday life, 
without individual Germans having to participate in active discrimination or 
oppression” (Herbert, 1997, p. 396). Spoerer (2005, p. 560) appears to agree, in 
that he writes that where the reach of the German bureaucracy ended, it was the 
traditional attitudes of Germans vis-à-vis foreigners that took over, and that even 
where foreign workers were treated as fellow human beings, this was just as 
likely to be out of passed-on patriarchal thinking than out of actual empathy. 
In other words, what POWs encountered in members of the German 
population were not individuals with faces, but a system. German civilians were 
as much part of the prevailing law as the camp guards, which also acted not as 
the enemy in relation to the POWs, but as the representatives of law. Here, then, 
we come to a better understanding of the role of the dog in Levinas’s story. The 
animal, reacting to the prisoners authentically, presented to them its face, much 
in the way that the opponent in war or the concentration camp guard acting on 
his own account may have done, but which POWs, due to their excluded 
position, did not experience. It would be this ability to withhold oneself and act 
                                                
132 Cf. Geras (1998, p. 6), who terms the indifferent attitude of the non-Jewish population to the 
fate of the Jews as a ‘mental turning away.’ 
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in accordance with laws (and not, as Schmitt claims, the decision on the friend or 
enemy) that Levinas (in Levinas and Kearney, 1986, p. 29) would come term ‘the 
ability to be political:’   
 
The human being is characterized as human not only because he is a being who 
can speak but also because he is a being who can lie, who can live in the 
duplicity of language as the dual possibility of exposure and deception. The 
animal is incapable of this duplicity; the dog, for instance, cannot suppress its 
bark, the bird its song. But man can repress his saying, and this ability to keep 
silent, to withhold oneself, is the ability to be political. 
 
It is law that provides the framework for this ‘suppression’ of the face-to-
face, and indeed, it is law that Levinas (2001, p. 100) would come to regard as 
anonymous, suppressing ‘charity’ from one person to the other. The laws 
governing POWs enabled their living without a life, in a space from which, each 
in their own way, the enemy, the protecting power, German civilians, even their 
own comrades, had turned away. Jewish POWs were excluded from the 
political133 (now in Schmitt’s terms), they only encountered law.  
There is, however, one further aspect of the prisoners’ lives worth 
addressing under the rubric of ‘engagement,’ or rather, ‘detachment,’ and this is 
the past and the future. In relation to the past, prisoners became increasingly 
detached from the way of life they previously knew, where social expectations 
had formed a framework for behaviour. In the camp, where life had its own 
preoccupations, this framework now became redundant. Perhaps the most 
significant aspect of camp life was thus the egoistic attitude produced in 
prisoners by the conditions in the camp, of which many later came to feel 
ashamed. Kochavi (2005, pp. 49-50), for example, quotes the following from the 
diaries of one British officer Major E. Booth:  
 
                                                
133 Ultimately, the political is for Schmitt represented by the possibility of killing: “The friend, 
enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real 
possibility of physical killing” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 33). 
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Sometime, when I am depressed I feel that I have lost the art of being still in the 
constant hubbub of the last three years; it is not that I haven’t done any silent 
thinking – only too often my mind goes racing away on some meteoric flight – 
but that even my thinking when walking alone or when lying wakefully on my 
bed, has been in a way a frenzied reaction from the pettiness of prison life. 
Sometime I feel that I have been so completely engulfed in this pettiness that the 
most important factor in my life has been reduced to the next meal or an extra 
cup of tea, and that gradually my power of affection has withered, leaving 
nothing but an egoistically centered shell. 
 
Levinas (2009, p. 201) also writes that “in five years, life in the camps 
was organised. The rules are established – manners, customers – and habits, that 
poor comfort. So without destroying a kind of latent brotherhood, human defects 
appeared: selfishness, pettiness, shoving, conflicts.” In the camp, the moral 
education one had received mattered little; civilisation became a distant memory, 
if not a direct hindrance to one’s successful survival. Partly, this had been an 
achievement on the part of the captors, who purposefully humiliated prisoners in 
the beginning stages of their captivity to establish their authority, attacking ideas 
of the righteousness of their cause, separating them from their comrades who 
could have been a source of prestige and respect to them, and generally making 
sure that little of the social and psychological framework sustaining a healthy and 
confident self remained (Lunden, 1948-9, p. 727). Physical deprivation further 
contributed to this process, and Spanos (2010, p. 66) recalls the results: 
 
After several days in the camp I began to realize that many of my fellow inmates 
had lost, or were in various stages of losing, their national and cultural identities, 
that the deprivation not simply of human rights but also of the basic amenities of 
civilized life – sanitation, clothing, and bodily nourishment, above all, food – 
had reduced all too many of them to instinctual life, to the elemental condition 
of biological survivors. Tobacco was capital, and the knife was the arbiter of 
conflict.  
 
 The future was that which awaited prisoners, reserving their place, 
harbouring the possibility for a reunion with family and friends, for action by 
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which they could determine once again their own life, for events. Vichy, 
however, had its own ideas about the role POWs were to play in the future of 
France and the establishment of a new nation.134 Once Scapini was appointed as 
head of mission, he was accordingly instructed not only to look after the POWs, 
but also to convert them to the révolution nationale (Overmans, 2005, p. 763). In 
due course, specifically-targeted propaganda was directed at POWs with a view 
to instilling Christian values in them, so as to guarantee a new beginning on their 
return: 
 
Those who saw France’s defeat as punishment for its sins felt redemption could 
only come through suffering, and the prisoners of war were those who suffered 
most from the defeat. If they meditated on the ‘misfortunes of the fatherland’ 
while they were exiled from France, this reasoning went, they would be purified 
and would return to save the country. With this in mind, Vichy sent many 
brochures to the POW camps outlining the flaws of the Third Republic and 
setting forth the reforms of the National Revolution (Fishman, 1987, p. 187, 
footnote omitted). 
 
It is therefore not surprising that Levinas, like many commentators (see 
for example Durand, 1987), was comparing his own fate to those sent into exile; 
an exile that Agamben (1998, p. 110) associates with the sovereign ban, and 
which his commentators see as the paradigm of life in the space of exception.135 
Amongst the few references in Levinas’s work about his time in the camp thus 
stands out his mentioning in several interviews of the number 1492 that was 
displayed above the camp entrance: the year of the expulsion of Jews from Spain 
(see, for example, Levinas, 1990b, p. 152, 2001 and 2011). This analogy could 
easily be taken as referring to the persecution of Jews, but it must in fact be read 
as referring to the exile that French POWs, but especially those who were 
Jewish, were believing (and meant to believe) themselves to be in.  
                                                
134 One good reason, Overmans (2005, p. 762) writes, why Vichy should be interested in taking 
on itself the role of the protecting power in relation to French POWs. 
135 DeCaroli (2007, p. 53), for example, writes about “life that resides within the state of 
exception, exemplified here by the camp but perhaps best seen in those who have been sent into 
exile . . ..” 
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Exile entails the exclusion from one’s community, an exclusion which, 
through the negative link it establishes to that community, cannot be said to cut 
the subject wholly off from the legal order, so that the exiled comes to reside in a 
space of exception. The number 1492 might even have stood for the secondary 
‘exile’ experienced by Jews through their separation from their fellow 
countrymen. The number is in fact likely to have been the number of Levinas’s 
work detachment, not of the main camp, Stalag XI B. Gascar (1967, pp. 94-95), 
for example, reports that in relation to smaller work detachments and sub camps, 
the Stalag was like  
 
. . . the city, the county town, the administrative centre. The prisoner who arrives 
from his distant commando lost in the countryside feels homesick, being 
sometimes treated as an inferior person. Flabbergasted, he discovers many 
things of which he could not have imagine the existence: the black market where 
there is almost close to everything . . .. 
 
But prisoners also had personal futures. Despite the differing conditions 
across camps, certain features of camp life re-appear in all accounts, the most 
prominent one being the importance of mail for prisoners’ mental well-being. 
Durand (1987, p. 13, 1988, p. 237-238), for example, reports that the ongoing 
duration of captivity was not only an essential feature of war imprisonment, but 
also perhaps the one aspect that was most difficult to bear, and that only mail 
could lift the sense of all-encompassing meaninglessness associated with being a 
POW. Mail reminded prisoners that there was an outside after all, which 
contained – paradoxically it was the outside that contained, while the contained 
space of the prison was empty – events and a future awaiting their return.  
Mail, however, was restricted by censure as to political events, and only 
seldom reported honestly from family life: “[N]ews about accidents or the fact 
that the workshop, the business or the farm had to be given up were as far as 
possible kept from the prisoner” (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 417). Prisoners had 
their memories, but were unable to follow current events outside the camp, from 
the participation in which even through discussion they were therefore 
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suspended.136 And it was indeed not only home life and the life of the nation, but 
also messages about the progression of the war that prisoners lived for. Levinas 
(2009, p. 202) thus remembers:  
 
The prisoner, like a believer, lives in the beyond. He has never taken serious the 
narrow part of his life. For five years, despite his installation, he was at the point 
of leaving. The strongest realities around him wore the stamp of the provisional. 
He felt himself engaged in a game that exceeded infinitely the world of 
appearances. His true destiny, his true salvation, was being carried out 
elsewhere. In the communiqué. They were events of a cosmic scale. With 
regards to the peasant exiled directly from a corner of Bretagne or Corrèze and 
who once had no other horizon than the limits of his village, it was the universe. 
His life ranged from Benghazi to London, from St. Nazaire to Stalingrad, from 
Singapore to Bucharest. He took his meals fixing the oceans and the wind of the 
Russian steppes rocked him to sleep. Does one forget a life down to earth or 
does the down to earth never become Life? 
 
Despite following the events of the war where they could, there was no 
doubt that prisoners were barely able to take the position of spectators, and this 
impacted their perception of time: “Time for the detainees was a burden, not only 
because of the dreary routines of the prison regime but also because of the sense 
of being detached from crucial historical events and helpless to intervene in 
them” (Caygill, 2004, p. 152).137  
Detachment, in fact, is a theme that runs through POW accounts. The 
trauma of action and capture distanced prisoners from their past life, and 
interrogators were skilled in further reducing prisoners’ emotional ties to the 
                                                
136 Bories-Sawala (1996b, pp. 416f.) writes that this lack of news was partly alleviated through 
the arrival of French civil workers in Germany, who not only brought news from home, but 
through whom correspondence (including with those POWs who had been repatriated) could also 
be organised. A further source of information were illegal allied radio stations.  
137 Caygill makes this statement in the context of discussing Ferdinand Braudel’s captivity in an 
Oflag. While this experience of time would have been particularly acute for an officer not 
required to work, and more so for a historian, it can be taken as a general feature of war 
imprisonment. Caygill (2004, p. 152) goes on to characterise time in the camp as “discontinuous, 
streteched, compressed and reversed.” 
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world they left behind, so as to increase their control over them. Sooner or later, 
prisoners discovered that they were no longer able to remember details about 
their past. Lunden (1948-49, p. 73), for example, observes: “Every prisoner finds 
that his memory fails him in some way. He cannot remember dates, names, 
streets, addresses or his own phone number in his home. The past seems to fade 
out and there is only the present.” This present then played its part in turn to 
reduce prisoners’ sense of past and future. Its immediacy was overwhelming, 
‘melting’ prisoners’ hopes and memories (Spanos, 2010, p. 57). Spanos (2010, p. 
76, emphasis added) thus remembers his inability to escape the reality of the 
prison on his arrival at his work detachment:  
 
I chose a bunk, laid down on its rough and stale-smelling straw mattress in the 
hope of obliterating the nightmarish reality our higher cause had ordained for us. 
But nothing I imagined . . . could efface its disconcerting immediacy. The world 
I left behind when I was captured had become by this time a realm of shadows – 
disembodied, fragmented, gossamer, unresponsive to my effort to bring them to 
corporeal presence. 
 
In this way, the ever-outward expanding world of the prison overrode the 
prisoners’ sense of being held merely in temporary suspension. As the past sunk 
away and the arrival of the future, which “alone could finally date and give 
meaning to life” (Durand, 1987, pp. 137-138), became more and more uncertain, 
the present appeared as if time had stood still. Kochavi (2005, p. 57, footnote 
omitted) in this respect quotes from a letter written from an air force camp by 
Flight Lieutenant Lloyd S. Adams in 1944: “I have felt terribly depressed and fed 
up the past few weeks, I hate to admit it . . . but the longer I am here the will to 
live is becoming less and less. At the moment I feel there is no future, I have 
forgotten the past and am just living in a dream from day to day.”  
For most, this ‘dream’ turned out to be a nightmare,138 “a miserable 
present of which one only asks that it may end, and without future, because one 
never knows when it will finally begin. . . . the irremediable loss that these days 
                                                
138 In his prison diaries, Levinas (2009, p. 87) writes: “The sense of nightmare. Reality still – 
absolutely foreign. Night in daylight.” 
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in exile constitute” (Durand, 1987, p. 137). New arrivals to the camp would 
report on the war and the world left behind, causing the older prisoners to realise 
that time was moving on without them. Smith (1968, p. 133) thus recounts the 
following reaction of a long-term POW on seeing much younger soldiers stream 
into the camp: “He was now beginning to sense acutely the passage of time, not 
just in terms of captivity, but as a career officer. He felt sometimes that the war 
had left him behind like a piece of useless wrack on the tideline of 1939.”139
                                                
139 Pétain’s message to prisoners that ‘patience is a form of courage’ (reported by Gascar, 1967, 
p. 81) is likely to have proved of little comfort. POWs overwhelmingly regarded their time in the 
camp as having caused them to have ‘missed their youth,’ as Bories-Sawala  (1996b, p. 684) 
reports from her interviews. 
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4. Consequences 
For Schmitt (1996, p. 37), the political is a ‘mode of behaviour’ that 
precedes any battle, but is determined by the latter’s ever-present possibility. The 
seriousness of the threat of war forces an individual to think about his own 
situation in a way not required by every-day life, as he must now distinguish 
between friend and enemy. And for this, it is required that he address the 
question of his identity: “. . . the enemy, and war,” Meier (1995, p. 15) writes, “. . 
. confront him [the individual] with a question that he cannot evade at will. They 
confront him with decisions in which he must decide about himself, in the face of 
which he is compelled to achieve clarity about his identity.”   
The problem, however, is that this commitment to an identity also 
requires the merger with a group and the corresponding relinquishment of 
individuality. War, at least in its limited form, is not about individual feelings 
and actions; the enemy – hostis, not inimicus – is an enemy of the state or the 
people with which one identifies, and not a personal enemy:  
 
The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in 
general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists 
only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a 
similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything 
that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole 
nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship (Schmitt, 1996, pp. 28). 
 
The distinction between war as a collective enterprise from individual 
achievement already held true in ancient times, as Neff (2005, p. 17) points out: 
“Patriotism, in short, was less a matter of individual derring-do than of the 
extinction of the self in the community. The archetypal image of war in this 
sense was the Greek phalanx, with its forces marshalled into closely ordered 
ranks functioning as a single instrument of destruction.” In European inter-state 
warfare, the phalanx became the anonymous mass of soldiers, each of whom 
shielded behind the corporate identity of the state:  
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Corporate identity has informed both sides in war between modern states. The 
enemy is not killed as an individual. He remains the enemy even if he has done 
nothing wrong – indeed, even if he disagrees with the policies of his 
government. Friends can become enemies because the category has nothing to 
do with personal subjectivity. The enemy is always faceless . . . (Kahn, 2013, p. 
215). 
  
In European war, the enemy was fought in the guise of his corporate 
identity, but he was no less hated on account of this. On the contrary, the 
suspension of any overarching justifying framework meant that the parties to a 
conflict where meeting each other without this meeting being pre-determined or 
mediated by law. The conflict thus constituted a direct engagement of each other, 
each corporate identity hardened in its subjective assessment of its own cause, 
with no common source of moral or juridical law that would unite both under its 
remit (even if only in the form of Kant’s regulative idea)140 – except that war was 
limited.  
Part of this limit was the suspension, on the international level, of any 
sentiments of righteousness that motivated hostilities from a national point of 
view. This suspension, however, would become apparent to those engaged in 
combat only if they found themselves held on the threshold between war and 
peace, i.e., in the POW camp. Usually, the parties would pass through the 
threshold that divided unlimited from limited war at the beginning of the 
hostilities (silence, followed by the declaration of war), only to pass through it 
again at the end of the hostilities, this time from limited war to peace (silence, 
followed by the declaration of peace). As such, it would be non-apparent. But 
when combatants were captured, they became the limit; their protection marked 
limited from unlimited war, their imprisonment war from peace. What did they 
find between these three coordinates? 
 
                                                
140 In the terms of systems theory, one would say that even secondary observation or ‘re-entry,’ 
i.e., self-reflection on the part of the system or the process of “presenting the difference of system 
and environment within the system” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 12) must use the system’s own 
operations, which means it cannot ‘see’ any further than the primary operations of the system, nor 
observe itself observing itself in real time.  
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On the threshold, agency was not merely limited, but wholly suspended. 
In this respect, the POW camp can again be productively compared to the 
concentration camp. Both constituted the counterpart to the order to which they 
formed the exception. The concentration camp as an exception from national 
legal order was, as Fitzpatrick (2005, p. 68, footnote omitted) expresses it, “a 
work of death, set apart from and ultimately withdrawn from life, and 
constituently committed to its cessation.” This ‘work of death’ was accomplished 
through policy and guidance prescribing every detail of prisoners’ treatment, to 
the extent where even the precise wording to be used with prisoners was pre-
determined. At the same time, there existed a culture of arbitrary decisions and a 
constant tendency to employ violence (Karner, 1999, pp. 400-401).141 The 
outcome was always identical: The prescription of every detail of life by 
sovereign decision, with no space for self-determination remaining for the 
individual prisoner.  
The POW camp, on the other hand, was a ‘work of life,’ so to speak, 
committed to the exception and protection of life from war. Here, the detailed 
commands that determined every aspect of the lives and deaths of prisoners of 
concentration camps were absent. POWs were kept passive not through the 
agency of the sovereign holding them down, but through the agency of law 
sheltering their lives. In the same way in which a concentration camp inmate was 
“a mere object of political intervention” (Laclau, 2007, p. 18), a POW was a 
mere object of law. For Jewish POWs from Western nations, this situation was of 
particular significance; while everywhere Jews under German control were 
subject to the most detailed policies, no such policies existed for the Jewish 
POWs, almost as if their existence was denied. They effectively “disappeared in 
the anonymity of the mass of their nation” (Overmans, 2005, p. 872).142  
                                                
141 Karner (1999, p. 399) explains that in concentration camps, the camp commander was in 
practice accountable only to his superiors in the SS, and that the structure of the SS meant that the 
taking of initiative and the assumption of responsibility were valued and rarely disciplined.  
142 Overmans here writes from the perspective of the historian, searching in vain for 
documentation about the Wehrmacht’s specific policies relating to Jewish POWs. It is interesting 
that he describes the result, i.e., being unable to find out very much at all about the fate of Jewish 
POWs, as ‘ironic.’ Ironic, presumably, because one associates lawful treatment with 
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Given that its inhabitants were governed by law, one would assume that 
the POW camp opened up a space for individual agency. Indeed, the camp was 
open if one considers decisions as constituting closure. Thus, while concentration 
camp inmates were subject to the decisions taken by the camp administration that 
could not be appealed against, in POW camps the camp administration was itself 
accountable under the Convention, which ‘opened’ the structure of the camp to a 
supranational institution (Karner, 1999, p. 399). Furthermore, in a POW camp 
the functions of a court were carried out by the prisoners’ own military hierarchy 
and not the camp administration, which only had jurisdiction in certain cases. 
This meant that often either the trials themselves or the sentences were deferred 
to a time after liberation, leaving the camp open to an outside and future agency 
of law. 
Prisoners could thus be considered ‘free.’ But this freedom, which arose 
from the application of law, was empty, a prison made of law. After all, the right 
not to be killed was a negative right that did not enable prisoners to live. The 
laws of war protected prisoners’ lives, but merely so that this life might form a 
basis for agency in the future and under different law, when the war had ended 
and prisoners would have returned to their civilian lives. For now, prisoners were 
simply neutralised in the sense of being silenced, their agency suspended so as to 
prevent their taking up any stance at all, whether as friend, enemy, or indeed as 
neutral.143 The laws of war were not aimed at prisoners at all, but at the 
protection of war. The POWs themselves formed no other object of interest, their 
lives being simply postponed until another legal framework would take over. But 
what is life if all one has and can do is to be alive, not actively (war), not 
passively (persecution), but impersonally?  
                                                                                                                               
accountability, and accountability with documentation. It was, after all, the many members of 
persecuted groups that ‘disappeared’ without a trace into concentration camps. 
143 In this respect, one should distinguish their neutrality from that of third states on the one hand, 
i.e., a neutrality that more often than not amounts to a friendly stance towards both belligerent 
parties and thus constitutes at least a stance, and the neutrality of national law on the other hand, 
which acts as the common ground for the resolution of conflicts. 
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If one were to think about the consequences of life on this threshold,144 
someone like Levinas, who not only spent five years in a POW camp, excluded 
as a Jewish POW from both the war and anti-Semitic persecution, and thus 
exemplifying the three-way situation of the threshold between the co-ordinates of 
unlimited war, limited war, and peace, makes an interesting subject. This interest 
is in particular sustained by Levinas’s subsequent thought on ethics. One 
wonders what lessons life on this threshold, which was also the realm of ethics in 
Luhmann’s sense (i.e., protecting war from the excesses that national hatred 
would otherwise have caused) taught a young philosopher about the relation of 
self and other in war, persecution, and in civil society. 
 
                                                
144 And consequences there would always have been. Those engaged in research into war 
imprisonment not uncommonly say that having been a POW becomes the central experience of 
someone’s life (see, for example, Overmans, 1999, p. 483). 
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4.1. In the camp 
Levinas had known about anti-Semitic violence from a very young age. 
Burggraeve (2002 pp. 26-27, footnote omitted) writes:  
 
As a child he had heard much tell of the ‘pogroms,’ or popular outbursts of rage 
against the Jews in Czarist Russia between 1881 and 1917. At the age of eleven, 
he himself went through the Bolshevik October Revolution (1917) in Ukraine, 
when his family fled the violence of the war in several steps . . .. During this 
period, he also became closely acquainted with the bitter violence of the 
persecution of the Jews. . . . Levinas later testified in a letter (1975) that the 
Russian revolution ‘signified [for him] the beginning of all further 
developments. 
  
What Burggraeve omits to mention is that, according to Levinas’s own 
recollections, when in 1920 his family returned to the comparably quiet and 
ordered Lithuania from tumultuous Ukraine, “[t]he return to normality gave me 
the impression that something important had been missed, that history was 
continuing without me in Russia” (Levinas, 2001, p. 27). This feeling of being 
confined to the sidelines, and a corresponding desire to be part of what he 
thought was a ‘messianic era,’ stayed with Levinas until his arrival in France in 
1923 (Levinas, 2001, p. 27-28). Here, in particular during the years leading up to 
the Second World War, Levinas felt himself part of a movement of religious 
affirmation and political opposition that had arisen as a result of the hatred 
directed against Jews in the first half of the century. Henri Bergson may serve as 
an example of the sentiments and choices this involved. As Levinas recounts 
with deep respect, Bergson had offered in 1937 as an explanation for why he did 
not convert to Catholicism despite an attraction to the faith: “I would have 
converted had I not seen the formidable wave of anti-Semitism which broke out 
over the world taking shape over the years. I wanted to remain among those who 
would be persecuted” (quoted in Malka, 2006, p. 24, also see Levinas, 2009, p. 
219). 
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Underlying this wish ‘to remain amongst the persecuted’ was not just a 
feeling of solidarity, but the realisation that being and declaring oneself Jewish 
was no longer a matter of choice. As Levinas had already explained in his 1934 
essay Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism, truth bound to one’s being and 
thus one’s particular physical embodiment left no escape (Levinas, 1990, p. 69). 
In 1935, Levinas then wrote of Hitlerism as “the greatest trial – an incomparable 
trial – through which Judaism has had to pass. . . . The pathetic destiny of being 
Jewish becomes a fatality. One can no longer flee it. The Jew is ineluctably 
riveted to his Judaism” (quoted by Rolland in Levinas, 2003, p. 74). 
Once the war had started, anti-Semitism was one, but not the only factor 
that motivated Levinas to join the army on the side of France. Levinas had held, 
as his son (in Malka, 2006, p. 263) explains, “a Napoleonic image of France 
against the Russia of pogroms.” When he had first moved to France in 1923, this 
move had been accompanied by what Philippe Nemo (in Malka, 2006, p. vii) 
terms an “unwavering rational and spiritual decision” to become part of a nation 
that amongst Jewish immigrants was regarded as “a model of emancipation and 
an ideal of integration” (Malka, 2006, p. 53). Levinas (1990b, p. 291) saw in 
France “a nation to which one can attach oneself by spirit and heart as much as 
by roots,” and it is thus not surprising that he sought inclusion in the body politic 
through citizenship (granted in 1930), and later enthusiastically proclaimed his 
readiness to join the army in order to repay the debt (Malka, 2006, p. 25). As 
Berg (1990, p. 197) writes, for Jews the war took on ‘a double meaning’ as the 
war both against Hitler’s anti-Semitism and the danger Hitler presented to France 
and the rest of the world.  
The war, however, did not last long for Levinas. Once in captivity, his 
agency in aiding the protection of France from Hitler was suspended, as he found 
himself exiled from the world he had wished to fight for. In this respect, Levinas 
was in a similar position to many career soldiers, who felt ‘neutralised’ by the 
enemy on having been captured when they really had been out for “’[t]he chop or 
the top’ – death or glory” (Smith, 1968, p. 27). Levinas’s situation was different, 
however, in that he was not only suspended from serving France, but also missed 
– unbeknown to him at the time, although he had his premonitions – what he 
later called “[t]he great ‘experience’ of Judaism”, the “passion in the same sense 
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as one speaks of the suffering [Leiden] of Christ under the Romans” (Levinas, 
2001, p. 137), and “the Passion of Israel at Auschwitz” (Levinas, 2001, p. 226).  
Levinas short 1947 work Existence and Existents can throw some light on 
the way he himself experienced the camp. The book bears no express connection 
to Levinas’s time in war captivity, apart from a note in the preface, in which he 
explains that the book’s essays were “begun before the war [and] were continued 
and written down for the most part in captivity” (Levinas, 2001b, p. xxvii). And 
even this note Levinas (2001b, p. xxvii) feels he must immediately excuse, 
stating that “[t]he stalag is evoked here not as a guarantee of profundity nor as a 
claim to indulgence,” but merely in order to explain why he was unable to take 
account of certain important philosophical works published between 1940 and 
1945. Eager to re-join the universal philosophical conversation from which the 
interruption of war had excluded him, he thus disclaims any substantive 
connection between the thoughts written down and the concrete circumstances of 
their writing. Accordingly, Existence and Existents takes up themes and strands 
of philosophical argument by authors ranging from Hegel to Shakespeare;145 the 
camp is not mentioned again. 
Nevertheless, the central theme of the book, set out in the section entitled 
Existence Without Existents,146 appears to be a phenomenological exposition of 
life in the camp that matches the politico-juridical position of Jewish Western 
POWs precisely. The main concept is “the fact that there is,” (p. 5) or in short, 
the ‘there is;’ a concept that Blanchot (1985, p. 49) regarded as “one of Levinas’s 
most fascinating,” Fagenblat (2002, p. 583) as “one of his most well-known but 
least understood”, and about which Bernasconi (in Levinas, 2001b, pp. xii) 
writes “that Levinas can barely say even what it is not.” 
                                                
145 As Caygill (2002, p. 53) writes, the chapter on the ‘there is’ in particular is an “extremely 
complex and stratified text . . . of the most extraordinary density. It weaves together themes and 
preoccupations of the 1930s such as the confrontation between Heidegger and Bergson and the 
reflection on Durkheim and the Durkheimian school, but with a new sensitivity to Hegel, the 
insistent presence of Shakespeare and a sensitivity to the sombre themes of murder, horror, 
insomnia and the night.” 
146 First published in Deucalion I in 1946 under the title Il y a (Levinas, 2001b, p. 3). 
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This latter difficulty may be due to the fact that the ‘there is’ stands for 
pure being itself. Remaining after everything has been negated – therefore the 
emphasis on what it is not –, the ‘there is’ itself is nothing in particular – 
therefore one cannot say what it is. Levinas (2001b, pp. 51-52) begins as follows: 
 
Let us imagine all beings, things and persons, reverting to nothingness. One 
cannot put this return to nothingness outside of all events. But what of this 
nothingness itself? Something would happen, if only night and the silence of 
nothingness. The indeterminateness of this ‘something is happening’ is not the 
indeterminateness of a subject and does not refer to a substantive. Like the third 
person pronoun in the impersonal form of a verb, it designates not the 
uncertainly known author of the action, but the characteristic of this action itself 
which somehow has no author. This impersonal, anonymous, yet 
inextinguishable ‘consummation’ of being, which murmurs in the depths of 
nothingness itself we shall designate by the term there is. The there is, inasmuch 
as it resists a personal form, is ‘being in general.’ 
 
In the years before the war, Levinas had already written about being. 
Disclosed only in certain moods, such as nausea or shame, being appeared to him 
as a prison147 from which one only wants to escape, “to get out of oneself, that is, 
to break that most radical and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that the I 
[moi] is oneself [soi-même]” (Levinas, 2003, p. 55).  
Already at that time, the relation between this prison of being and the 
various destinations for escape was complicated; while certain forms of religion, 
idealism and bourgeois existence appeared to offer liberation, they in fact 
constituted nothing other than sleep, a dream simulating liberation. ‘Escape,’ 
then, had two meanings: On the one hand, bourgeois existence constituted an 
escape from the prison of being. On the other hand, ‘waking up’ in the prison of 
being and to the fact that one’s existence had been one long sleep itself 
constituted an escape from bourgeois existence, even though this destination was 
not the one sought in “the quest for the marvellous,” of which Levinas (2003, p. 
                                                
147 In On Escape, Levinas (2003, p. 60) writes of being as “the prison of the present time,” (p. 54) 
‘enchainment’ (p. 55) and ‘brutality’ (p. 56), containing “a kind of dead weight” (p. 60). The 
characterisation of being as ‘having weight’ then frequently reappears in Existence and Existents. 
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53) writes that it “is liable to break up the somnolence of our bourgeois 
existence.” The result was an impasse, and from then on, it would be Levinas’s 
aim to break out of the prison of being to effect a real escape. Throughout his 
career, he would in one way or another attempt to retrieve “those moments in the 
philosophical tradition that exceeded the limits of being . . . [, which] came to be 
articulated in terms of infinity, the other and the good” (Caygill, 2002, pp. 49-
50).   
When Levinas became a prisoner of war, this ‘escape to a prison’ became 
for him a physical reality. He did escape bourgeois existence. In his captivity 
diaries, he thus writes about the ‘long leisure’ of captivity that allowed him to 
catch up on reading and led to the discovery “that there were a lot of unnecessary 
things – in relationship, in food, in occupations” (Levinas, 2009, p. 70). After the 
war, Levinas (2009, pp. 201-203) then writes about the ‘romantic’ aspects of war 
imprisonment, in which prisoners were living ‘an exceptional present,’ ‘a new 
rhythm of life,’ a freedom from concerns such as those with possessions that 
determine bourgeois life: “Paradoxical as it may seem, they experienced in the 
narrow expanse [dans la close étendue] of the camps a magnitude of life larger 
and, under the eye of the sentinel, an unexpected freedom. They were not 
bourgeois, and that is their real adventure, their true romance” (Levinas, 2009, 
pp. 201-202). In an exception from the often sombre tones elsewhere in his 
captivity diaries, Levinas remarks on the lightness of being created by the sense 
of complete detachment from the world that prisoners had left behind: In his 
captivity diaries, Levinas (2009, p. 83), for example, writes: “Drunkenness is not 
only the effect of wine. It is this stage of detachment, the output of the life that 
we can know in every kind of excitement. The commando Sunday evening. The 
ease of everything because we are detached from everything.”   
This new freedom of existence, however, was soon crushed by the weight 
of the ‘there is,’ which appeared, “like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere 
belonging to no one” (Levinas, 2001, p. 53), when the detachment was complete 
on all sides. After all, captivity had not only negated bourgeois life, which the 
war would have already achieved to some extent, but had also negated prisoners’ 
capacity for agency, and, by withdrawing engagement from their lives, had at the 
same time withdrawn the meaning of their existence. In the camp, POWs were 
Page 146 of 195 
no longer combatants, nor persecuted, nor could they assume their normal 
civilian identities. What remained was only bare existence in the face of a world 
of which they were no longer part. “[T]he Being which we become aware of 
when the world disappears,” Levinas (2001b, p. 8) writes in Existence and 
Existents, “is not a person or a thing, or the sum total of persons and things; it is 
the fact that one is, the fact that there is.” 
A shared feeling that the world had come to an end had already prevailed 
in the inter-war period, when the First World War had proved wrong the 
intellectual certainties of the time:  
 
The first war forced philosophers – as it did artists and poets – to address the 
possibility, fact, and effect of such unprecedented carnage at the heart of a 
Europe identified with progress and the supposed pinnacle of modernity, 
opening up an apocalyptic imagination and by and large destroying the cultural 
optimism that had marked the turn of the twentieth century (Geroulanos, 2010, 
p. 5, footnote omitted). 
   
With the rise of National Socialism before the Second World War, there 
then came a renewed sense of impending doom. Levinas (1990b, p. 168) 
remembers: “Imagine the atmosphere of this period 1933-1939, as if the end of 
the world approached! How the war approached and how the swastika, cheered 
by the masses, spread!” It is thus unsurprising that Levinas (2001b, p. 7) begins 
Existence and Existents with the statement that “[e]xpressions such as ‘a world in 
pieces’ or ‘a world turned upside down,’ as trite as they have become, 
nonetheless express a feeling that is authentic.”  
What was different in the camp, however, was that Levinas was not only 
an intellectual diagnosing the end of the world from the position of an observer, 
but that he was now in fact excluded, pushed to the outside. He could not even be 
the one (the Jew, the intellectual) proclaiming the end of the world, which had 
ended in a different way than he had ever expected. Parcelled up and sent to the 
very edge of the European order, he was kept there until the drama had played 
out and the actors had returned to their places to resume their normal existence. 
Like the moods before the war, the camp disclosed a sticky, unbearably eventless 
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existence without meaning. The prisoners had been thrown into a realm 
antecedent to the world. From here, escape was not merely a matter of 
manoeuvring to achieve a better position in the world, as if one wished to move 
from the sidelines to the centre: “. . . we want to escape existence itself, and not 
only one of its landscapes, in a longing for more beautiful skies” (Levinas, 
2001b, p. 12).   
Some commentators locate the meaning of the ‘there is’ in ‘the 
impossibility of not being’ (Davies, 1990, p. 42) or “the impossibility of my 
death” (Critchley, 2004, p. 69). It is true that Levinas saw being as an 
‘unrevokable contract’ that forces one to go on living, to ‘act and undertake’ 
(2001b, p. 12), and it is also true that Levinas had expected to die when he was 
captured, perhaps already when he joined the war, and that this expectation 
remained unfulfilled in a camp (a ‘prison of being’) whose sole purpose was to 
keep prisoners alive. But when in Existence and Existents and Time and the 
Other Levinas (2001b, p. 56 and 1987, p. 51) writes about the impossibility of 
dying or death, he means not primarily the inability of the subject to die, but the 
inability of existence to end when the world has ended, or, which is the same 
thing, when the world as meaningful has ended: “The absence of everything 
returns as presence . . .” (Levinas, 1987, p. 46); “the horror of the unceasing, of a 
monotony deprived of meaning” (Levinas, 2001, p. 45). This never-ending 
existence includes the subject, which goes on living even though it can no longer 
find meaning (i.e., a way of escaping), can no longer forget itself, as Levinas 
(2001b, pp. 11-12) writes, “in the essential levity of a smile, where existence is 
effected innocently, where it floats in its fullness as though weightless and 
where, gratuitous and graceful its expansion is like a vanishing.” The subject is 
unable to leave pure existence for meaningful life, nor can it die, even in suicide 
(Levinas, 1987, p. 50). Already in On Escape, Levinas had written about nausea 
as that “which amounts to an impossibility of being what one is,” while “we are 
at the same time riveted to ourselves, enclosed in a tight circle that smothers” 
(Levinas, 2003, p. 66). 
The ‘there is’ thus brings together two things. On the one hand, the 
exclusion of the subject from the world as meaningful, the interruption of life as 
one knows it, exile. On the other hand, this absence of the world returning as a 
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‘presence of absence’ (Levinas, 2001b, p. 59 and 60), as existence apart from the 
world. This presence is neither finite, like life, nor nothingness, like death, but 
infinite. After the disappearance of the meaningful world, pure being expands 
ever more outwards like a pot continuously boiling over, its contents engulfing 
everything. In the ‘there is,’ each instant “is not redeemed by the next instant but 
is instead locked helplessly in the infinitude of frozen time” (Severson, 2013, pp. 
48-49). 
Without meaning, pure being offers no hope for escape. “For Levinas . . . 
the present, the instant, is a captivity” (Severson, 2013, p. 50); there is no exit, no 
tomorrow, because today is already infinite.148 The ‘permanent quality’ of 
existence is thus impossible to interrupt: “the condemnation to perpetual reality, 
to existence with ‘no exits’” (Levinas, 2001b, p. 58). The ‘there is’ becomes a 
permanent interruption.149 
So when Caygill (2002, p. 50) writes that, “[a]s a work of the parenthesis 
that was Levinas’s direct experience of National Socialism, Existence and 
Existents (1947) is suspended between presentiment [of Hitlerism] and mourning 
[of the victims of the Holocaust],” one should see that this work is not only of the 
parenthesis in the sense that it was composed during war captivity which itself 
represented an exclusion from war, persecution, and civilian life; and that it is 
not only suspended between Levinas’s pre- and post-war work, but that its 
subject is parenthesis and the in-between, suspension, interruption, and 
exclusion. 
Levinas describes the ‘there is’ through two images. In both, the ‘there is’ 
is produced through a change in the relation to the other person, and in both, it 
constitutes a halfway state between being alone and being in the presence of 
another. The first image shows the other turned away: “When you were a child 
and someone tore you away from the life of the adults and put you to bed a bit 
                                                
148 “‘Tomorrow, alas! One will still have to live’ – a tomorrow contained within the infinity of 
today” (Levinas, 2001b, p. 58). 
149 Davies (1990, p. 42) writes: “In testifying to a passivity that is never yet extinction but that 
always overruns any formation of a ‘proper end’, the il y a can be seen as a contribution to 
ontology that thereby ruins it, an idealist reduction rendering all idealism unfeasible. For Levinas, 
it turns us towards a thinking that is beyond idealism and other than ontology.” 
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too early, isolated in the silence, you heard the absurd time in its monotony as if 
the curtains rustled without moving” (Levinas, 2001, p. 45). And: “One sleeps 
alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the silence of his bedroom as 
‘rumbling’” (Levinas, 1985, p. 48). In the second image, the self kills the other, 
and the ‘there is’ is the presence that returns despite this negation of life: “Horror 
is the event of being which returns in the heart of this negation, as though 
nothing had happened” (Levinas, 2001b. p. 56). Accordingly, the ‘what’ that 
returns as the ‘there is’ no longer attaches to another person (or even thing); it is 
without author or ‘master’ (Levinas, 2001b, p. 64): 
 
There is is an impersonal form, like in it rains, or it is warm. Its anonymity is 
essential. The mind does not find itself faced with an apprehended exterior. The 
exterior – if one insists on this term – remains uncorrelated with an interior. It is 
no longer given. It is no longer a world (Levinas, 2001b, p. 53).  
 
In the ‘there is,’ one is outside the world made up by friends and enemies. 
Instead, one faces what Levinas (quoted by Rolland in Levinas, 2003, p. 27) 
terms an ‘inhuman neutrality.’ With this phrase Levinas clearly aims to denote 
something that is not the benevolent neutrality of the judge or the neutral state.150 
Here is something that is evil,151 ‘horrific neutrality’ (Levinas, 1990b, p. 292), 
something that is not only not human, but also inhuman in the sense that it is 
beyond the humanly bearable. From the ‘there is,’ no engagement is 
forthcoming; something is there but what it is, is ‘ambiguous:’ “anything can 
count for anything else” (Levinas, 2001b, p. 54). And of course, in the camp, this 
was precisely the problem, namely that the laws of war had ended prisoners’ 
involvement in the hostilities, but were not, thereby laws of agency; that the 
neutral protecting power was not neutral; that the German enemy was there, but 
not in his capacity as an enemy, and that even this status as enemy was double 
                                                
150 Davies (1990, p. 47) thus distinguishes the ‘there is’ from the neutrality that makes ontology 
possible, the neutrality that is “neither one thing nor the other but their ground, the guarantor of 
their commensurability, [that] is marked by its generosity and benevolence.” 
151 The present is known to be problematic for all prisoners: “The future and the past are 
perceived as full of goodness and beauty, the present as an absolute evil” (Frese Witt, 1985, p. 
20). 
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sided – enemy to the West, foe to the Jews in the East. Anyone could count for 
anyone else. 
It seems impossible to separate the rise of the ‘there is’ from the absence 
of the determinable other. The other turns away, and together with his 
engagement disappears the meaning it had cast like a net over the world. What 
arises is the indifference of the ‘there is’ – or is this the indifference of the 
turned-away other? The other’s indifference is his absence, which at the same 
time is also the indifference of the ‘there is,’ namely the in-difference (as Levinas 
sometimes spells it) of the not-constituting-a-difference, of there not being an 
other from which one could distinguish oneself.152  
For Levinas, this was not a matter of bemoaning the indifference of the 
world to one’s own suffering (or indeed, celebrating the “benign indifference of 
the world” that goes on while oneself has to die (Camus, 1998, p. 113)),153 nor 
                                                
152 This reading diverges from that offered by Rose in The Broken Middle (1992), where she 
refers the “malignant power [of] the echoic il y a” (p. 255) to the fear, desire and jealousy of the 
child (“or adult in the state of a child” (p. 255)), who is left alone at night: “It is fear of her desire, 
desire for her fear, exposed to such magnification an omnimobile projection because there is no 
Other present or proximate to receive, absorb and return such desire, such fear, and alleviate it by 
teaching it movement and configuration and growth. Jealousy too, perhaps, because the child has 
been sent to the silent, noisome night, while the ‘beloved’ parent continues, vivacious, to engage 
and be engaged not so far away – downstairs? – but infinitely removed from her fear and her 
desire – her desire for what she fears, her fear of what she desires” (p. 255, footnote omitted). 
What is problematic with this reading is that Rose reduces the ‘there is’ to the absence of the 
other on the one hand, and the needs of the self, expressed in its desires, fears etc. on the other 
hand. This has the effect of rendering the ‘there is’ superfluous as a concept, as it only stands for 
the sensible effects of abandonment. If one, however, takes the ‘there is’ as a type of relation in 
its own right, whereby the self finds itself in front of an indifferent other, then it is not the 
unfulfilled needs of the self for another type of relation as much as this relation which causes the 
horror of the ‘there is.’ After all, Levinas does not describe life in the ‘there is’ as full of pain, but 
as filled with the cold horror of the realisation that beneath meaningful relationships, there lies a 
realm of existence that offers nothing to which needs could even attach.    
153 Such benign indifference is what is at stake in the story by Blanchot that Critchley (2004, pp. 
74f.) relates to the ‘there is.’ In the story, a child looks out of the window and up towards the 
cloudy grey sky, which suddenly opens: “‘What happens next, the sky, the same sky, suddenly 
open, absolutely black, revealing (as through a broken window) such an absence that everything 
has been lost since always and for ever, to the point where the vertiginous knowledge is affirmed 
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the anxiety before the nothingness represented by one’s own death, an anxiety 
that Levinas (2001b, p. 58) attributes to Heidegger.154 Rather, it was the 
indifference itself that caused the suffering. The horror and ‘unbearable 
indifference’ (Levinas, 2001, p. 45) of the ‘there is’ consists in not mattering any 
longer, in not making a difference because there is no one in relation to whom 
one could position oneself. In this sense, the POW camp as a space of exception 
achieves what Agamben (1998, p. 175) on the national level calls ‘dislocation,’ 
namely the dissolution of the connection between the categories friend/enemy 
and the order of war.  
In a 1978 essay entitled Transcendence and Evil, Levinas (1998e, p. 180) 
writes about evil in these terms, calling evil an excess. In doing so, he 
distinguishes the excess that is at stake in evil from a simple ‘too much.’ It is not 
                                                                                                                               
and dissipated that nothing is what there is and above all nothing beyond’” (Critchley, 2004, p. 
75, quoting from Blanchot, The Writing of Disaster). The child, Critchley (2004, p. 76) writes, 
experiences “the night that is not the starry heaven that frames the Moral Law.” It understands 
that nothing is necessary, that nobody is watching, and therefore, that there is freedom. The 
absence of necessity here is not disabling, like in the ‘there is,’ but enabling of subjectivity. 
154 The difference here is perhaps less pronounced than Levinas makes out. After all, for 
Heidegger, as for Levinas, it is in the encounter with pure being that one first realises that one is 
and has to be. The difference lies in the consequences of this realisation. While for Levinas, the 
encounter with the ‘there is’ proves disabling, for Heidegger, it results in a turn towards the 
possibility of one’s own death, a consequent anxiety about one’s potentiality for being in the 
world (Heidegger, 1962, p. 232 [§40, p. 187]), and the final taking up of one’s life as a project, 
i.e., one’s projection towards death. Despite this difference, Heidegger’s description of pure 
being closely resembles the ‘there is’. Thus Heidegger (1962, p. 233 [§40, p. 188]) writes that the 
threat of uncanniness arises when confronted with the ‘indefiniteness’ of the ‘nothing and 
nowhere’ of pure being, which he describes as the ‘es’ of ‘es ist einem unheimlich’, perhaps best 
translated following David Farrell Krell as the ‘it’ of ‘it makes one feel ill at ease’ (Heidegger, 
1993, p. 101). Heidegger sees darkness as particularly conducive to evoking such feelings of 
uncanniness, precisely because in the ‘nothing’ of darkness, the ‘there’ of the world emerges: “In 
the dark there is emphatically ‘nothing’ to see, though the very world itself is still ‘there’, and 
‘there’ more obtrusively” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 234 [§40, p. 189]). This obtrusiveness manifests 
itself, like the ‘there is’, in a stifling of one’s breath: “[T]hat which threatens cannot bring itself 
close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already ‘there’, and yet nowhere; it is 
so close that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
231 [§40, p. 186]). 
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the fact that suffering is unbearable which makes evil an excess, but evil’s ‘non-
integratability’ that makes suffering a suffering in the first place: 
 
In the appearing of evil, in its original phenomenality, in its quality, is 
announced a modality, a manner: not finding a place, the refusal of all 
accommodation with…, a counter-nature, a monstrosity, what is disturbing and 
foreign of itself. 
 
On being shown some years after the war a pencil-drawn map of Stalag 
XI B and being asked whether he thought this was the face of evil, Levinas 
famously responded: “Evil has no face” (quoted in Malka, 2006, p. 75). It was 
not that there was no evil in the camp; on the contrary, the space of the camp 
represented evil precisely: 
 
There is nocturnal space, but it is no longer empty space, the transparency which 
both separates us from things and gives us access to them, by which they are 
given. Darkness fills it like a content; it is full, but full of the nothingness of 
everything (Levinas, 2001b, p. 53). 
 
It was simply that the question was incorrectly asked, as it assumed that 
evil could lie in signification, in a face, even in something as easily representable 
as physical co-ordinates. It was the absence of such meaning that was evil, the 
placelessness that lay behind the co-ordinates on the paper and that could never 
be represented in the format of a map.  
With the concept of the ‘there is,’ the meaninglessness that arises when 
the other turns away, and thus becomes ambiguous or indifferent, Levinas 
achieves to describe for the first time in his work a relation that is a non-relation. 
Later in his work, the other will again be the focus of such a non-relation, albeit 
then from the point of view of an ethical subject. Now, in the ‘there is,’ the 
subject loses its footing, unable to retain its subjectivity: 
 
For what holds me to my existence is my relation to things and people; when 
this relation disappears, my own existence as something personal is also 
extinguished. As a pure interiority, it cannot be said to be mine at all. It is the 
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impersonality of existence outside of any specific relation to things and people. 
Yet if this interiority is no longer mine, in what sense is it interior (Large, 2002, 
p. 138)? 
 
 Levinas (2001b, p. 45, emphasis added) compares this existence to 
existence in the world, where at the same time to being in the world, one “is able 
to withdraw from the world.” By contrast, the ‘there is,’ which does not allow for 
difference, offers no place to hide:155 “Before this obscure invasion it is 
impossible to take shelter in oneself, to withdraw into one’s shell. One is 
exposed. The whole is open upon us. Instead of serving as our means of access to 
being, nocturnal space delivers us over to being” (Levinas, 2001b, p. 54). 
Because no perspective can be gained on the ‘there is’ from within the ‘there is,’ 
subjectivity cannot securely establish itself:  
 
The absence of perspective . . . becomes an insecurity. Not because things 
covered by darkness elude our foresight and that it becomes impossible to 
measure their approach in advance. For the insecurity does not come from the 
things of the day world which the night conceals; it is due just to the fact that 
nothing approaches, nothing comes, nothing threatens; this silence, this 
tranquillity, this void of sensations constitutes a mute, absolutely indeterminate 
menace (Levinas, 2001b, pp. 53-54, emphasis added). 
 
It is for this reason that it is not only the ‘there is’ that is anonymous, but 
the subject itself, whose subjectivity is ‘submerged,’ ‘invaded,’ ‘depersonalised,’ 
and ‘stifled’ by the ‘there is:’ “The disappearance of all things and of the I leaves 
what cannot disappear, the sheer fact of being in which one participates, whether 
one wants to or not, without having taken the initiative, anonymously” (Levinas, 
2001b, pp. 52-53). “Horror is somehow a movement which will strip 
consciousness of its very ‘subjectivity’” (Levinas, 2001b. p. 55). 
This loss of subjectivity, then, is the consequence of existence in the 
camp. As a space of political exception, the camp is located between disorder 
                                                
155 There was no private existence in POW camps, no space to which one could withdraw from 
collective existence to collect oneself. This went so far that solitary confinement became a treat 
rather than the punishment as which it was intended (Kochavi, 2005, p. 56). 
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and order, persecution and war, war and peace. The ‘there is,’ in Levinas’s 
ontological terms, lies between being and nothingness, the “excluded middle . . . 
this horrible thing” (Levinas, 1985, pp. 48-49). Echoing Schmitt’s statement that 
the state of exception belongs to order by virtue of its exception, Levinas assigns 
the ‘there is’ to one side of the distinction as that which occurs within being as its 
‘interval and interruption’ (Levinas, 2001b, p. 60). If being is made up of the 
states of consciousness (the freedom associated with being a ‘master of being’ 
(Levinas, 2001b, p. 55)) and sleep (“relaxation, drowsiness, absence” (Levinas, 
2001b, p. 62)), the ‘there is,’ this nothingness that is not nothing, forms the 
foundational moment for both. It is accessible in insomnia, but also in the state of 
suspension of the POW camp.   
What Levinas is describing is the meaninglessness that follows the 
sinking into indifference of the other, an exclusion from the world that he 
experienced in war captivity and that will later re-appear as that which follows 
the death of the other person (but then, it will have meaning, it will respond). 
Like Agamben, who claims that the state of exception is the state of nature, 
created by the very same order from which it is exempt (see footnote 25 above), 
Levinas locates in the ‘there is’ the significance of nothingness. Nothing, Levinas 
appears to say, is not that which happens when one dies, but that which can 
happen in the middle of life, as the exclusion from the world constituted by the 
other:  
 
One starts with being, which is a content limited by nothingness. Nothingness is 
still envisaged as the end and limit of being, as an ocean which beats up against 
it on all sides. But we must ask if ‘nothingness,’ unthinkable as a limit or 
negation of being, is not possible as interval and interruption; we must ask 
whether consciousness, with its aptitude for sleep, for suspension, for epoché, is 
not the locus of this nothingness-interval (Levinas, 2001b, p. 60, footnote 
omitted).  
 
Page 155 of 195 
The prisoners of this interval, in which nothing happened and nothing 
appeared, lived as mere ‘phantoms,’156 suspended, as the son of a fellow POW of 
Levinas (quoted by Malka, 2006, p. xxxi) would recall later, “between the living 
and the dead.” On this threshold between unlimited and limited war, and between 
war and peace, where one cannot draw a distinction between foe and enemy, 
enemy and friend,157 there was no longer a god nor yet men who would 
determine justice:158 “There is no discourse. Nothing responds to us but this 
silence” (Levinas, 2001b, p. 52). 
  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                
156 In Existence and Existents, Levinas (2001b, p. 56) writes about the return of absence as 
presence in the form of the ‘there is:’ “A corpse is horrible; it already bears in itself its own 
phantom, it presages its return. The haunting spectre, the phantom, constitutes the very element 
of horror.” In his captivity diaries Levinas (2009, p. 126) similarly calls the members of his unit 
“[p]hantoms – they perform actions in the real world without reality – not only an absence of 
objects but an absence of progress, of achievement.”  
157 Analogous to the realm of politics (Luhmann, 1989, p. 73) or the ‘alegal’ (Lindahl, 2009, p. 
60), i.e., that which no longer belongs to the state of nature but has not yet been determined as 
either legal or illegal. 
158 Davies (1990, p. 49), who treats the ‘there is’ in the context of Heidegger’s, Blanchot’s and 
Levinas’s understanding of literature and poetry, writes: “[W]hen language becomes poetic 
language (when language turns into literature), what Blanchot will call the ‘neuter’ and Levinas 
hear as the il y a comes into play. The language of the poem shows itself as the interminable, the 
incessant. At the moment when the poem is experienced as an origin, it carries in its wake and at 
its centre the question of the most radical anteriority. An anteriority that renders nothing possible, 
not even the thought of nothing. The time of this encounter with the work is indeed the time of a 
‘between’, the no longer and the not yet, but it is a ‘between’ that is somehow ‘outside’; the time 
and the space of exile.” 
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4.2. After the camp 
Since the publication of Levinas’ captivity diaries, there has been some 
engagement with the question of the status of this experience in his work. The 
views expressed in this respect most commonly follow one of three lines. The 
first line is that Levinas’s time in the camp constituted a literal practicing ground 
for the philosophical concepts he would later deploy; an ‘apprenticeship’ 
(Cohen-Levinas, 2011, p. 15). Arbib (2011) thus describes Levinas’s experience 
of being a Jewish POW as an ethical experience that constituted a direct 
precursor to his later writings. Levinas’s biographer Simon Malka (2006, p. 80) 
similarly writes that despite the comparably few comments Levinas made about 
it, “[t]he experience of captivity was nevertheless decisive for Levinas: the 
encounter with the most simple things, the ordeal of loss and of liberty, the 
sensation of time, deliquescence, misery, absolute passivity, fragility, 
precariousness – everything that continually tormented his work.” After reading 
Levinas’s prison notebooks, Caygill (2010, p. 28) also confirms “the significance 
of the prison camp experience for his [Levinas’s] rethinking of the axioms of 
Western philosophy.” This line of thinking is problematic, as it appears to draw a 
direct link between Levinas’s own experiences as a protected combatant and the 
exposure of the self to the ‘persecuting’ other that characterises the ethical 
relation in Levinas’s mature work.  
The second line of thought simply brackets Levinas’s time in captivity 
from the analysis of his work, an approach that appears to be supported by the 
fact that, apart from a few instances in which Levinas directly engages with his 
time in captivity,159 his mature work appears wholly unconnected to the 
experience of war captivity. However, this leaves open the question of how this 
interruption in Levinas’s life represented by five years in captivity could be of no 
                                                
159 In the main, these are his diaries and a number of short essays and radio-programmes based on 
his experiences as POW (published as Carnets de captivité: suivi de Écrits sur la captivité et 
Notes philosophiques diverses), although there are also a handful of instances elsewhere in his 
work where Levinas tells a story from captivity. See, for example, ‘A Religion for Adults’ and 
‘The Name of the Dog, or Natural Rights,’ collected in Difficult Freedom. 
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significance when, in the final analysis, Levinas’s ethics is all about interrupting 
the self-sameness of the self.  
Part of this line of thought is that Levinas’s early work about the ‘there is’ 
– whether or not it is recognised as reflecting life in the camp – is no more than 
an impasse to be left behind. After all, the self will come to be properly 
‘liberated’ by the other as part of the ethical relation, thus overcoming its 
helpless subjection to pure being. Indeed, Davies (1990, p. 44) notes that 
commentators “ . . . see the il y a . . . as a marginal issue, as no more than a 
necessary (and polemical) moment in the development of Levinas’s work.”160 
While it has often been noted that the ‘there is’ re-appears in strange places 
throughout Levinas’s work, usually as the evil counterpart to the other’s 
goodness, but sometimes also as resembling the other (or rather, alterity in its 
various incarnations) to such an extent that the two may be confused – God is 
“transcendent to the point of absence, to the point of a possible confusion with 
the stirring of the there is” (Levinas, 1989b, pp. 179)161 – or even merging with 
the other altogether – “[t]he there is is all the weight that alterity weighs 
supported by a subjectivity that does not found it” (Levinas, 1998, p. 164) –, it is 
unclear, what, if anything, on the level of meaning (as opposed to philosophical 
exegesis) links Levinas’s early and mature work.  
What is clear, however, is that the ‘there is’ – “[t]race of a past which was 
never present, but this absence still disturbs” (Levinas, 1989b, p. 188, n. 16) – 
‘disturbs’ the relation with alterity as much as alterity ‘disturbs’ the intentionality 
                                                
160 Davies (1990, p. 44) asks: “Does Levinas not imply as much himself in the preface to the 
second edition of Existence and Existents? There, he seeks to situate the discussion of the il y a. 
He comments on its perhaps premature outcome in the analysis of the ‘hypostasis’ with which the 
books ends: the coming about of the existent that is the overcoming or vanquishing of this 
existence without existents.” 
161 Cf. also Levinas, 1998, p. 97 (footnote omitted): “The trace of a past in a face is not the 
absence of a yet non-revealed, but the anarchy of what has never been present, of an infinite 
which commands in the face of the other, and which, like an excluded middle, could not be aimed 
at.”  
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of the subject.162 In fact, throughout his entire career Levinas aims to establish 
the disturbance or interruption of the subject’s capacities for self-formation, 
agency, and the finding of meaning, laying bare beneath the world a foundation 
that, once recognised, will forever prevent a comportment of the self in the world 
forgetful of itself and others.  
This begins with the phenomenological method Levinas employs, 
whereby he seeks to supplement the clarity of the object as it appears with that 
which is hidden by this clarity; “the object which, left to itself, is clarified, as 
much as it closes off the gaze – as if the giving was like an eyelid which lowers 
itself as an object appears, and consequently as if the objective is always 
abstract” (Levinas, in Mortley, 1991, p. 14). This method was directed against 
idealism in the aim of unmasking the self-confidence of an intentionality striding 
out into the world, only to return to itself in self-sameness, having ‘captured’ 
stable meaning:  
 
Idealism has always wanted to interpret experience. In a sense it wanted to think 
that the real was absolutely equal to consciousness, that there was no 
overflowing, deficit, no surplus. However . . . [f]rom the outset, we think more 
than we can think. . . . The things that we have within our horizon always 
overflow their content. . . . Idealism always imagined that reality was only 
representation; phenomenology teaches us that reality constitutes more than 
what captures our gaze. . . . Reality has weight when one discovers its contexts 
(Levinas, 2001, pp. 159-160). 
 
After the unprecedented destruction caused by the First World War, the 
subject could no longer be regarded as being in control of the world objectively 
constituted. It was the notion of the human being as the seat of universal reason, 
a reason that was also thought to govern nature and thus make it controllable 
through science, which was to be blamed for the belief in almost unlimited 
human potential, which the carnage of the war had revealed as mistaken. By 
                                                
162 Critchley (2004, p. 90), for example, writes: “Is the neutrality of the il y a ever decisively 
surmounted in Levinas’s work? And if this is so, why does the il y a keep on returning like the 
proverbial repressed, relentlessly disturbing the linearity of the exposition?” 
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turning from an object taken on its own (and related to other objects within a 
scientific system) to the ‘forgotten experience’ or context in which such an object 
was intended, one can give, so Levinas (1969, p. 28) would claim in Totality and 
Infinity, an account of the object richer than if it were cut lose from such context, 
i.e., considered abstractly. Ultimately, this was about showing the fragility of 
abstract thought that might at any time fail to accomplish its aim of establishing 
meaning. 
When Levinas began to write about the ‘there is,’ this phenomenological 
method revealed beneath the sensible world a realm of pure being: 
 
The il y a makes us mindful that all representations rest uneasily on structures 
that fade away in the night, and this fading reveals a reversal of intentionality. 
The experience toward which Levinas is gesturing is the antecedent of all 
events, the before that is not a recoverable or prior moment (Severson, 2013, p. 
47, footnote omitted). 
 
But of course, the time in the camp also constituted itself a bracketing of 
meaning. When war became bracketed, it was the POW camp that came into 
existence as the exception to the rule. Both Severson (2013, p. 48) and Caygill 
(2010, p. 30) seem to assume that the ‘there is,’ insomnia, and in Caygill’s case, 
the “material reduction, the removal of the comforts and alleviations of 
civilization and the literal entry into a winter landscape devoid of colour” that 
Levinas describes in his captivity diaries arose as a result of the application of the 
phenomenological method of epoché. But why would Levinas even need to 
apply this method, if he already found himself in a real space from which 
everything that was meaningful had been bracketed? If Levinas’s business as a 
phenomenologist was to conduct “research into the staging [mise en scène] of 
that which is the object” (Levinas, in Mortley, 1991, p. 14), then he was already 
in the right place: imprisoned behind the stage of Europe as the theatre of war, 
and behind the ‘drama of European Judaism.’163 
                                                
163 As Levinas (2009, p. 209) himself says, “[i]n the drama that comes from living European 
Judaism, Israelite POWs have not held the first role. They have not lived in the death camps.” 
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After the Second World War, the critique of idealism took a renewed 
urgency: “The unburied dead of wars and death camps accredit the idea of a 
death with no future, making tragicomic the care for one’s self and illusory the 
pretensions of the rational animal to a privileged place in the cosmos, capable of 
dominating and integrating the totality of being in a consciousness of self” 
(Levinas, 2003c, p. 45). As Drabinski (2009, p. 136) explains, Levinas was 
facing what he thought was the death of the Western philosophical tradition: 
“Without the tradition, there is the complete disorientation of subjectivity. There 
is no footing or ground on which subjectivity might gather itself or make sense of 
the world.” This perceived lack of ground affected the possibilities for writing 
philosophy (both in the sense of content and of making a name for oneself, 
finding one’s place). While the death of tradition had created a space for a new 
beginning, how was one to begin if the aptitude for beginning, the notion of the 
subject as origin, autonomy, strife, even knowledge itself had been discredited?  
For Levinas personally, this is likely to have presented a particularly 
difficult problem to overcome due to his own upbringing. Levinas’s parents had 
been tradition-observant Jews, for whom religious observance provided a 
structure for day-to-day life (Malka, 2006, p. 6), but who did not live in a closed 
community. Instead, they followed “an ideal of Bildung and of emancipation 
through education, which was popular among the Jews of the time” (Malka, 
2006, p. 9). This meant that throughout Levinas’s childhood, daily religious 
observance went hand in hand with an intellectual thirst for Russian language 
and literature as the ideal of this education. Instruction, symbolised through 
books (the bible as much as Dostoyevsky; a copy of Cervantes’s Don Quixote 
that Levinas’s mother had received as a prize when she herself was a student, 
prominently displayed on the dining room cabinet (Malka, 2006, p. 7)) was 
valued above all else.164 Levinas (1985, p. 22) would claim later that reading 
                                                
164 For example, when after 1914 the family had to flee from the German occupation to the 
Ukraine, Levinas’s father engaged a Hebrew teacher immediately upon their arrival as “the first 
source of comfort” (Levinas, 2001, p. 26). In 1917, Levinas’s admittance to the Russian lycée 
along with only four other Jewish boys was “celebrated at home like a true family holiday, a 
promotion! A doctorate” (Levinas, 2001, p. 27)! This faith in instruction appeared to have lost 
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books “is a modality of our being,” and Burggraeve (2002, p. 31) accordingly 
gives a Levinasian reading of the activity of reading, whereby “[to] read is to 
raise oneself up to, to listen to and obey exteriority, the essentially new which 
does not rise up from within ourselves but breaks in upon us as a ‘revelation’ 
from the foreign . . ..”165 The sense of impotence as an individual that Levinas (in 
Levinas and Kearney, 1986, p. 24) later expresses in the words “the self cannot 
survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-world, 
within the ontology of sameness,” may therefore not only be an outcome of 
Levinas’s life experiences, but have its earliest roots in his upbringing. 
When Levinas began to study philosophy at the University of Strasbourg 
in 1923, philosophy represented for him the concern with those ‘fundamental 
things’ that had also been the subject of the Russian novel (Levinas, 2001, p. 28). 
In the first years, the sense that deference to masters must come before the 
articulation of one’s own thoughts was confirmed by the philosophy faculty’s 
understanding of philosophy as a field for which the study of its own history is of 
primary importance. “This ascetic commitment to transmission, this respect for 
the great masters, this rumination of foundational texts was enough to win over 
the mind of the young Levinas” (Malka, 2006, p. 22). However, when Levinas 
had in 1928 almost completed his studies, this approach left him with little 
options for the future. He could not see himself merely repeating or expanding on 
what others had said before him, but the free inception of philosophical work 
also attracted his negative judgement.166 
Now, after the war and its destructions and disappointments, the relation 
to tradition became one that Drabinski (2009, p. 137) describes as one of 
complete disconnection, free from any nostalgia. If there was to be a new 
beginning, it had to be “utterly ungrounded” (Drabinski, 2009, p. 147). 
                                                                                                                               
none of its strength by the time Levinas’s own children went to school. His daughter Simone thus 
recalls: “School . . . was placed above everything” (in Malka, 2006, p. 237). 
165 Interestingly, Primo Levi (1989, p. 112) writes in this respect about the role of books (in his 
case, cultural works recited by memory) in the concentration camp as one of fashioning a link to 
the outside world. Through books, prisoners felt themselves ‘spoken to.’ 
166 To this, phrases such as “the vanity of fabricating books,” “running the risk of proceeding by 
chaotic intuitions” (Levinas, 1985, pp. 28-29), and “distrust of untutored fabrications” (Levinas, 
2001, p. 26) may testify. 
Page 163 of 195 
It was at this time that Levinas increasingly deployed the relation to the 
other as the element of disturbance. The other’s always-prior demands to which 
the self must respond but to which it can never respond adequately, disturb it in 
its efforts to establish itself, thus determining the formation of subjectivity. It is 
in this sense that Levinas (in Levinas and Kearney, 1986, p. 22) writes about 
philosophy: 
  
Now what I am interested in is precisely this ability of philosophy . . . to 
question itself, and ultimately to unsay itself. And I wonder if this capacity for 
interrogation and for unsaying (dédire) is not itself derived from the 
preontological interhuman relationship with the other. The fact that philosophy 
cannot fully totalize the alterity of meaning in some final presence or 
simultaneity is not for me a deficiency or fault. Or to put it another way, the best 
thing about philosophy is that it fails. It is better that philosophy fail to totalize 
meaning . . . for it thereby remains open to the irreducible otherness of 
transcendence. 
 
The question of the status of war captivity in Levinas’s work appears to 
become redundant at this point. His work now appears as a whole to have been 
directed from the beginning at the violent assimilation of the other person, the 
eradication of difference that stems from the self’s unhindered imposition of its 
terms onto the world. Taken on its own, such a view of Levinas’s work is not an 
issue, but it becomes problematic when one links this thought back to his real-life 
experiences. And there is good reason for doing so, as phenomenology has 
always privileged the subjective origin of knowledge, effecting a shift from the 
explanation of facts or the ‘objective’ world to the self-reflective clarification of 
meaning (Levinas, 1998b, p. 55). Levinas (1998e, p. 177) thus writes: 
 
Phenomenology has taught us thus not to explicate a meaning by conceiving it 
uniquely or principally in terms of its relation with other objective meaning, for 
then all sense gets relativized, and every signification closed up in a system 
without issue. Phenomenology has taught us to make explicit or to elucidate a 
sense in terms of the irreducible psyche in which it is given, to thus seek it in its 
origin, to seek out the originating meaning.  
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It thus becomes an imperative to understand Levinas’s own life 
experiences if one is to understand his thought, which Levinas never wanted to 
be treated as a ‘system’ that could simply be studied.167 In this respect, what 
would be more obvious than to draw a link between Levinas’s concern for the 
other, his remarks on the Holocaust (which, as Spargo (2006, p. 24) notes, appear 
“with ever greater frequency in the latter half of Levinas’s career”), the loss of 
his family to the Nazis, and his own captivity in Germany during the war?168 
This explains why even commentators such as Burggraeve, who place Levinas’s 
work in the context of his experiences, bracket his time in war captivity from 
their analysis. Burggraeve (2002, p. 28) thus writes: 
 
The whole of Levinas’ thinking can be interpreted as an immense effort to bring 
to light the roots of violence and racism, and as an attempt to overcome this in 
principle by thinking otherwise. This ‘thinking otherwise’ is developed from the 
beginning as a thinking about the ‘other,’ since according to Levinas the other is 
precisely that which is denied in racism. For him, evil lies in ‘being’ in so far as 
the being - expressed eminently in his or her effort to be - absorbs the other into 
itself.  
 
                                                
167 In fact, even such recourse to Levinas’s own life is insufficient. For Levinas, the 
phenomenological refusal of an objective point of view in favour of “a manner of thinking 
concretely” (Levinas, 2001, p. 94) means that each person must discover the meaning of the self-
other relation for him or self, that it cannot be prescribed to others: “[I]f I say that ‘virtue is its 
own reward,’ I can only say so for myself; as soon as I make this a standard for the other I exploit 
him, for what I am then saying is: be virtuous towards me – work for me, love me, serve me, and 
so on – but don’t expect anything from me in return” (Levinas, in Levinas and Kearney, 1986, p. 
31). Levinas therefore also discouraged his readers from simply repeating the content of his own 
work without a sustained engagement with the subject matter itself: “[O]ne should distrust people 
who repeat what one opens up to them, and who do not enter into where the opening should 
happen” (Levinas, 2001, p. 82). “’We do not dissociate a lesson from the face that was the 
necessary interlocutor,’ Levinas used to say in recalling Husserl” (Malka, 2006, p. xxxiv). 
168 Derrida (1978, p. 103) notes that Levinas’s thought is to be understood through the central 
experience of “the passage and departure toward the other,” but appears to treat this as a universal 
rather than an experience personal to Levinas. 
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Some commentators, however, have even gone further than merely noting 
the relevance of Levinas’s ethics to the Holocaust, and this is the third line of 
thought regarding the status of Levinas’s experiences during the war. They 
claim, with more or less explicitness, that Levinas’s thought was an outcome of 
his personal experiences as a (persecuted) member of a persecuted minority; that 
there was an “intertwining of the autobiographical and philosophical genres” 
(Plant, 2012, p. 983) in this respect. Wood (2005, p. 53, footnote omitted), for 
example, asks whether the particular origin of Levinas’s ethics is “a response to 
the particular circumstances of imprisonment, degradation, and genocide,” and 
concludes that “Levinas’s view of human nature as ‘naturally murderous’ is 
perhaps understandable, even ‘natural’ given what he went through, what he 
suffered, what he saw” (Wood, 2005, p. 61). Others are less explicit, but by 
leaving open the precise nature of Levinas’s experiences during the war, they 
lead the reader to draw the wrong conclusions. Finkielkraut (1998, p. 83), for 
example, writes of the ‘Nazi trauma’ that effected Levinas’s approach to history, 
without specifying whether this trauma was caused by Levinas’s own 
‘persecution,’ by the death of his family members, or by the Holocaust as a 
historical event of some importance. Cohen (in Levinas, 2003b, p. viii) avoids 
this difficulty by grouping Levinas’s war imprisonment and his family losses 
together as if they belonged into the same category of experience: “Are we to 
forget that Levinas spent the war years in a prisoner-of-war work camp for 
Jewish French soldiers or that this parents, siblings and millions of his 
coreligionists were murdered by the Nazis?” So does Bernasconi (2005, p. 172), 
when he writes about “the depth of Levinas’s personal suffering during the 
Second World War, which included the loss of all his family members with the 
sole exception of his wife and daughter . . ..” Even more vaguely, Srajek (1998, 
p. 16) writes that both Levinas’s and Derrida’s biographies are “marked by the 
fact of their Jewishness and the fear, persecution, hatred and exile which they 
had to confront because of that heritage.” 
And indeed, Levinas himself contributes to the general uncertainty about 
what he suffered and saw, and what, perhaps, he did not suffer or see, and 
therefore could not remember other than through an empty memory, a memory 
of non-involvement. Immediately after the war, Levinas forgoes the language of 
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persecution and repeatedly169 refers to the ‘protection of the uniform’ afforded to 
him and other Jewish POWs. When he talks about the suffering undergone, he 
terms it “the sorrows he [the Jewish prisoner] shared with his fellow non-Jews” 
(Levinas, 2009, p. 210). But later, he begins to use phrases such as “[a]fter living 
through Auschwitz . . .” (Levinas, in Mortley, 1991, p. 21), and when he is 70 
years old, adds to the second edition of Difficile Liberté the statement that his life 
had been “dominated by the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror” 
(Levinas, 1990b, p. 291). This, however, could not be the same horror each time. 
After all, the horrors of the Holocaust consisted in what was done and said, while 
the horror Levinas experienced, and thus could remember, was that of silence in 
which nothing happened.170  
But perhaps the best example of the increasingly blurred distinction in 
Levinas’s work between the exile of the concentration camp and the exile of the 
POW camp – the first, an exile from law; the second, an exile from war and 
persecution – is his 1966 essay Nameless. This was first published under the title 
Honor without Flag (1996b, p. xii), a reference to Diaspora Judaism (Robbins, 
1999, p. 135). Levinas (1996b, p. 120) writes that “[o]ver a quarter of a century 
ago, our lives were interrupted, and doubtless history itself:” 
 
What was unique between 1940 and 1945 [incidentally, the dates of Levinas’s 
own imprisonment, not of the war, nor of the Holocaust] was the abandonment. 
One always dies alone, and everywhere the hapless know despair. . . . But who 
will say the loneliness of the victims who died in a world put in question by 
Hitler’s triumphs . . . (Levinas, 1996b, p. 119)? 
                                                
169 See for example Levinas, 2009, pp. 207 and 209. 
170 Interestingly, Caygill (2002, p. 52), in picking up on these remarks of Levinas (another one is 
the “presentiment of Hitlerism and the Hitlerism that refuses itself to any forgetting” that Levinas 
(2001, p. 39) mentions in an interview later), first writes of the “presentiments and experience of 
horror” that in his opinion links Levinas’s pre- and post-war work.  Then, a few lines on and as if 
to correct himself, he writes: “The horror of il y a is intricately bound to haunting, to the dead 
who cannot be forgotten – il y a is the continual ‘presence’ of the murdered awaiting justice.” In 
other words, the horrible ‘presence of absence’ of the ‘there is’ persists after the war as the 
haunting presence of those who have been killed by the Nazis, and not as the ordeal undergone 
by those killed.  
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From this apparent empathy with the dead, Levinas (1996b, p. 119, 
emphasis added) then continues, as if to correct himself: “Who will say the 
loneliness of those who thought themselves dying at the same time as Justice . . 
.?” This ambiguity between, on the one hand, his own experiences as someone 
expecting but not in fact suffering death at the hands of the Germans, and those 
of the persecuted on the other hand, continues when he writes about the 
“[a]bsence of any homeland, eviction from all French soil,” “[i]nsecurity of all 
companionship” (p. 120); themes which could as much refer to the concentration 
camp as to the POW experience. In an interview with Salomon Malka, Levinas 
(2001, pp. 96-97) then directly describes his work as ‘translating a Jewish 
ordeal:’ “It is incontestable that in every philosophical reflection, in every 
philosophical essay, there are memories of a lived experience which is not 
rigorously intellectual . . . I do not contest that it is a Jewish ordeal which is 
translated.”  
The relation between Levinas’s wartime experiences and his work is 
further complicated by the fact that in a sense, Levinas was a ‘survivor;’ he had 
emerged unharmed from German captivity. Plant (2012) in this respect compares 
Levinas’s own references to survival with those of Primo Levi, categorising 
Levinas as a ‘post-Holocaust thinker.’ Schrift (2006, p. 159), after stating that 
Levinas was a POW during the war and that his family was killed by the Nazis, 
goes on to write: “Levinas would often allude to the guilt of the survivor in his 
later writings, and there is little question that his account of the obligation to the 
other is inflected in part by his experiences as a European Jew.” In 1983, Levinas 
then refers in an interview directly to a memory of the Holocaust and the guilt of 
surviving, staying just on the right side of a false appropriation by inserting a 
reference to ‘those closest to us,’ which clarifies that the memory in question 
here is not of his own suffering: “No-one has forgotten the Holocaust, it’s 
impossible to forget things which belong to the most immediate and the most 
personal memory of everyone of us, and pertaining to those closest to us, who 
sometimes make us feel guilty for surviving” (Levinas, 1989, p. 291). 
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The fact, however, is that Levinas was not a survivor in the full sense of 
the term.171 His survival was not at all like the survival of ex-concentration camp 
inmates, not even like the survival of those who managed to hide from the Nazis, 
whether abroad or in close proximity to the events.172 Not only had he not been a 
witness to the events (and could therefore have no memory of them), but he had 
also been intentionally exempted from the persecutions by the very persecutors 
themselves. As Overmans (2005. p. 872) writes, “[d]e facto the safest place for a 
Jew in the German sphere of influence was in an Oflag or a Stalag.” 
His special status during the war meant that Levinas’s situation repeated 
itself once the war had ended, the ‘presence of absence’ returning in the face of 
the death of his family members, he himself excluded from the agency and 
meaning associated with having been a witness and the ability to now provide 
testimony of the events.173 There was a past that Levinas had prepared for, his 
past by right and fate, but this past had not come to pass, or rather, had passed 
him by, leaving him nothing but an empty memory.174 All he witnessed was the 
time in the POW camp, suspended from history, uneventful, a time in which time 
stood still, and which was therefore equally resistant to representation in memory 
and consciousness. It was as if he had been led through the most important 
events of his lifetime blindfolded, only to find that, by the time the blindfold was 
removed, history had already been made and the silence of all those who died 
had descended. What Levinas had ‘survived’ was not the death of others but the 
                                                
171 Just as no-one could be said to have 'survived' a plane crash unless they had been on board the 
plane, even if they could be said to have 'survived' family members who were on board. 
172 The fact that Levinas was ‘barely fifty kilometres’ from the next concentration camp while at 
Stalag XI B, mentioned by Levinas’s son Michäel and quoted in Bloechl (2011, n. 8, p. 113), can 
hardly be said to be relevant in this context (or rather, it is relevant in that it meant Levinas was 
not at Bergen-Belsen, excluded from the acts of persecution that went on there despite his close 
proximity.) 
173 This option was consciously taken up by concentration camp survivors, such as Primo Levi or 
Imre Kertész. 
174 This gives a new sense to when Levinas (1998, p. 11) writes: “Immemorial, unrepresentable, 
invisible, the past that bypasses the present, the pluperfect past, falls into a past that is a 
gratuitous lapse. It can not be recuperated by reminiscence not because of its remoteness, but 
because of its incommensurability with the present.” 
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exclusion from such death. He had lived all along and would continue do so; his 
existence, meaningless in the camp, was just as meaningless now that the 
proposed return to the world had been revealed as the return to an absence of 
those who had made it meaningful. No wonder, then, that Levinas and his fellow 
Jewish inmates barely kept in touch after the war, and that Levinas himself 
hardly ever spoke about his time in captivity (Malka, 2006).  
In a sense, all French ex-POWs were in a similar situation, as they faced 
the difficulty of assigning meaning to their time in captivity in a post-war society 
that was overwhelmingly indifferent to their fate (Durand, 1987, pp. 16-17). 
Thanks to Vichy propaganda, many in France had an idealistic image of the 
nature of war imprisonment. News of the hard labour, disciplinary camps and 
bombardments had not been widely distributed (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 617); 
on the contrary, Vichy propaganda actively encouraged an image of war captivity 
as something between monastic life and “an extended summer camp of sorts” 
(Fishman, 1991, p. 236). Fishman (1991, p. 243) writes:  
 
How successful was Vichy in shaping attitudes towards the POWs and prison 
camps? Most people had no means of correcting the picture of prison camp life 
they read about. The repetition for four years of the half monastic retreat, half 
summer-camp image of prison camp life left people with the general sense that 
the POWs had little to complain about. Preoccupied with the problems of 
acquiring their own daily bread, most people in France, aside from the 
immediate families, responded to the prisoners with indifference rather than 
concern.   
 
The public perception was that POWs had not suffered any more from the 
war than the civilian population at home, who had to undergo “restrictions, 
bombardments [and] the oppression by the occupier” (Durand, 1987, p. 17). In 
any case, there were other, more important, victims within the ‘hierarchy’ of 
suffering and victimhood (Durand, 1987, p. 17), such as those who had been 
deported to concentration camps and their families, and workers who had been 
forcedly recruited and sent to Germany in exchange for POWs as part of the 
relève. In the midst of the general post-war struggle, the fate of POWs counted 
for little (Durand, 1987, p. 16), prolonging “the alienation of the prisoners from 
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French society beyond the period of actual physical separation” (Fishman, 1991, 
p. 246), and causing the prisoners concern that they were being misunderstood 
and that their suffering175 would be forgotten (Durand, 1987, pp. 16-17). 
There were also those, who rather than being indifferent, blamed the 
POWs for the defeat in 1940 and their supposed subsequent support of the Petain 
government. There were doubts about the adequacy of the French army in 1940, 
given Germany had been able to capture such a large number of soldiers: “People 
wondered how so many soldiers could have been taken. Had they gone down 
without a fight” (Fishman, 1991, p. 244)? These doubts extended to relatives of 
POWs,176 and indeed to the prisoners themselves, despite the price they paid for 
their capture through prolonged captivity. While the nation concentrated on the 
actions of the résistance, whose members became the “individualised, heroicised 
elite of 1945” (Durand, 1987, p. 17), ex-POWs, who were still presented as the 
defensive units they had been in 1940-41, i.e., as an ‘anonymous masse’ 
(Durand, 1987, p. 17), were faced with a wholesale taboo concerning their 
experiences in the camp (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 610). As Durand (1987. p. 11) 
writes, “[t]hey themselves felt the stigma of [having been a POW involved in the 
debacle of 1940] with particular acuity”. 
Even though no longer excluded from society, POWs thus found 
themselves again in a space of silence and suspension. They were faced by the 
fact that all social and political key positions in the newly liberated state had 
                                                
175 War captivity, even when not amounting to effective persecution, nevertheless often resulted 
in mental trauma. Already during their time in captivity, prisoners showed signs of mental strain, 
suffering mental breakdowns and in some cases losing all ability to concentrate (Kochavi, 2005, 
p. 57). At the time, the British War Office even thought that all prisoners who had been interned 
for more than four years would need mental rehabilitation, with social readaptation proving more 
difficult with POWs than with any other group (Kochavi, 2005, p. 56). According to newer 
medical findings, “[s]ervice personnel captured and detained as POWs have significantly higher 
rates of emotional and physical trauma than service members not so detained . . ., exhibiting as a 
group the highest rates of posttraumatic stress disorder . . . and other mental health conditions” 
(Doran et al. 2006, p. 241). As Bischof et al. (2005, p. 9) note, “[t]he traumas of war 
imprisonment troubled the repatriated [prisoners] for the rest of their lives.” 
176 “French POWs returning in 1945 were welcomed by their relatives not as victors, but as 
losers. The real French heroes were the fighters of the résistance” (Overmans, 2005, p. 11). 
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already been taken and that those who had remained in France or returned home 
early had an undeniable career advantage; invariably, they felt as if they had 
come too late (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, p. 609). Assessing that their wartime 
experiences were of no further interest to the public,177 nor even to their own 
families, they concentrated on getting on with their lives in the wish to make up 
for lost time and show that they deserved their survival (Speckner, 2003).  Most 
did not publish memoirs until years later, and even then, did so mainly for the 
sake of their own children and grandchildren, and in order to consolidate their 
experiences and achievements at the end of their life (Bories-Sawala, 1996b, pp. 
671-672).178  
Levinas, however, was able to turn this situation into his advantage. 
Firstly, he created a notion of subjectivity that would depend on interruption. 
Interruption, he came to claim, would not mean impersonal, neutralised, 
existence as part of the ‘there is,’ as he had himself experienced it in the camp, 
but ethical subjectivity as part of the relation to the other. This served the 
purpose of providing a new concept of subjectivity, thereby lifting the suspension 
in which the subject had been thrown (both in terms of the philosophy of the 
subject and his own position after the war), without, however, returning to the 
“voracious, eliminationist” (Drabinski, 2009, p. 140) subject of idealism. The 
subject, in being disturbed by the other, would attain subjectivity; election rather 
than exclusion. Secondly, Levinas would describe this subjection to the other in 
such terms as to almost imperceptibly shift his own position from one who had 
been excluded from war and persecution, to one who had been persecuted all 
along. 
                                                
177 In America, ex-POWs were even officially encouraged not to speak about their time in the 
camp at all, so as to forget the unpleasant memories (Stelzl-Marx, 2000, p. 212). 
178 Stelzl-Marx (2000) and Spanos (2010) view the heroic memoirs published at this point as a 
mechanism to speak about the camp experience, to reclaim suffering, and to reject suggestions of 
responsibility for any wrong-doing. But there were also earlier processes to achieve this. Bories-
Sawala (1996b, pp. 617-618) reports in this respect that a French court of honour was established 
by the association of former men of confidence in the POW camps. This court ruled, for example, 
on officers who had volunteered to work for the Germans and other such wrongs; a process 
Bories-Sawala calls one of ‘self-cleansing’ on behalf of the POWs, showing the distrust and 
accusations that ex-POWs were subject to. 
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In Levinas’s mature ethics, the self is ‘persecuted’ by the other, or is the 
other’s ‘hostage’ (see, for example, Levinas, 1998, p. 166 and 1998f, p. 125). 
Persecution, however, is here not at all the bearing of the other’s unprovoked 
action upon oneself, and the suffering that may be connected with such action. 
Rather,179 it is the obsession with the suffering and the deeds of others, and the 
bearing of responsibility for this suffering and these deeds despite the fact that 
one has done nothing to deserve it. “To bear responsibility for everything and 
everyone is to be responsible despite oneself. To be responsible despite oneself is 
to be persecuted” (Levinas, 1990, p. 114-115). The suffering usually associated 
with persecution thus stems in Levinas’s use of the term not from the action of 
the other upon one, but from the burden of responsibility and guilt that one must 
innocently assume for the suffering of the other.  
Bernasconi (1995) connects this sense of persecution with Levinas’s 
understanding of Judaism as ‘universally persecuted’ (p. 81) (something which 
Plant (2012) also notes), a persecution that is not only universal to Jews, but also 
shared with all others who are persecuted. Having considered Levinas’s 
dedication in Otherwise Than Being, which links this work with the concrete 
persecution of the Jews by the Nazis,180 he then concludes that the non-
philosophical experience of being persecuted, on which Levinas’s philosophy 
rests, is “in some sense Jewish” (p. 84). 
One could, however, come to a very different conclusion. Rather than 
seeing Levinas’s philosophy of underserved guilt (and thus persecution) as a 
primarily Jewish phenomenon – in which case it would relate to the real 
instances of persecution that people of Jewish faith were subjected to throughout 
the ages – one could see it as the reaction of someone confronted by events of 
real persecution, which he, however, did not experience himself. In other words, 
a specifically un-Jewish phenomenon that nevertheless achieves its own 
inclusion under the notion of universal persecution.   
                                                
179 I am relying here on Bernasconi’s (1995) analysis. 
180 Which reads: “To the memory of those who were closest among the six million assassinated 
by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, 
victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-semitism” (Levinas, 1998). 
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“[T]he unjustified privilege of having survived six million deaths,” 
(Levinas, 1996b, p. 120) which for Levinas was making itself felt as an obsession 
with the suffering of others after the war, could at this point reveal itself as 
having been a Jewish experience all along. In this way, the exclusion Levinas 
experienced in the POW camp is turned into the ground that makes persecution 
possible – he could only be obsessed, i.e., responsible for the suffering and the 
deeds of others because he himself was neither suffering nor doing anything 
particular at the time.  
Time, in fact, as the present after the war, is always split,181 as it contains 
a reference or ‘trace’ to an unrepresentable past, “as though the invisible that 
bypasses the present left a trace by the very fact of bypassing the present” 
(Levinas, 1998, p. 12). The cry of help of the dying other, not heard at the time, 
now appears as a trace in the face of the other, my response to this cry being 
always already doomed to failure, as there is nothing I can do to change the past. 
One always arrives late on the stage of human relations, implicated and accused 
by the other already before one arrives, not because of some Jewish essence, but 
because Levinas, as Hammerschlag (2012, p. 403) writes, was “at the center of 
war, . . . at the center of history’s drama” without, however – and Hammerschlag 
omits to mention this ‒ being in the drama itself. The position one then takes on 
the stage, finally a subject, comes, as Drabinski (2009, p. 145) remarks, at the 
price of “sealing ethical subjectivity in that which was, which, in an important 
twist, becomes that which could never have been: the immemorial as otherwise 
than being, where being itself is configured (then punctured) as time.” 
Levinas would also describe this foundation as ‘vulnerability.’ In the 
1982 essay Useless Suffering, having set out to describe suffering as a sensation 
that is borne or received by the subject, but that is at the same time unbearable 
and therefore rejected (the sensation of a rejected sensation making up its ‘quasi 
contradictory structure’ (1998d, p. 92)), Levinas proceeds to attribute the evil of 
suffering to its passivity. This passivity, however, is not simply the fact that 
                                                
181 “Proximity is a difference, a non-coinciding, an arrythmia in time, a diachrony refractory to 
thematization, refractory to the reminiscence that synchronizes the phases of a past” (Levinas, 
1998, p. 166). 
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suffering is something received (or received-rejected) from the outside, but what 
he calls a ‘vulnerability:’  
 
The passivity of suffering is more profoundly passive than the receptivity of our 
senses, which is already active reception, immediately becoming perception. In 
suffering, sensibility is a vulnerability, more passive than receptivity; an 
encounter more passive than experience. It is precisely an evil (Levinas, 1998d, 
p. 92). 
 
 This vulnerability is reminiscent of the ‘there is,’ where “[i]nsomnia 
locks me in a moment, pinning me to an unavoidable affectivity that leaves me 
stripped of defenses. Enchained to the night, and to the raw fact of being, I can 
only wait” (Severson, 2013, p. 47). Indeed, like vulnerability, this was not an 
experience at all. “If there is experience here, it is the experience of needing to be 
rescued, redeemed” (Severson, 2013, p. 50, footnote omitted). 
Evil as persecution thus merges with evil as the absence of persecution, 
causing the subject to suffer in each case alike. But while the primary suffering 
of Holocaust victims is ‘senseless’ because no justification exists, the secondary 
suffering of those suffering for the suffering of others has meaning, and “the only 
one of which suffering is capable” (Levinas, 1998d, p. 94) at that. This suffering 
can therefore become the acceptable “nexus of human subjectivity” after a war 
that left dead those who suffered the most and discredited by implication almost 
everyone else; a nexus of subjectivity, furthermore, which, because it is based on 
“the expiatory suffering of the just who suffers for [the unjustly caused suffering 
of now-dead] others” (Levinas, 1998d, p. 241 n. 5, emphasis added), can be 
distinguished from the actions and suffering of both these groups and elevated 
“to the level of supreme ethical principle – the only one it is impossible to 
question . . .” (Levinas, 1998d, p. 94). 
In a radio broadcast from 1945, Levinas (2009, p. 211) compares the 
situation of the deportee to that of the Jewish POW: “[I]f for the deportee 
martyrdom was immediate, the prisoner had time to prepare himself. Between 
man and his suffering, there was an interval that permitted the taking of an 
attitude with respect to the pain before being seized and torn by it.” Of course, 
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that martyrdom never materialised for the prisoner, so strictly speaking, there 
was also no interval. But as Caygill (2010, p. 29) points out: 
 
The theme of the interval as a space for ‘mediation’ both spiritual and 
philosophical becomes central to Levinas’s thinking in and after the Stalag. He 
later described the captivity itself in terms of an interval between the intimations 
of National Socialism in the 1930s and the mourning of its murderous course 
after the war. The interval is a space of horror and anguish, but it also sustains 
the frail possibility of escape or survival. 
 
The interval, then, was the time in the camp before Levinas knew (and 
could therefore be ‘obsessed’ by) the extent of suffering others had undergone. 
And yet, the interval also signifies, as Caygill expresses it, the ‘possibility of 
escape or survival.’ This is not only because being a POW saved Levinas from 
deportation and death, but because it is precisely through the experience of 
persecution in the Levinasian sense that the subject attains its subjectivity: “The 
subjectivity of the subject is persecution and martyrdom” (Levinas, 1998, p. 
146).  
In this way the interruption that the time in the POW camp constituted in 
Levinas’s life, and that also turned out to have been a lack of involvement in 
history’s drama, becomes the reason why one is persecuted by the obsession with 
the suffering of others, and thus an interval between premonition and 
persecution. But as an interval it also constitutes the space for the other in one’s 
life, whose suffering could hardly be said to become an obsession if one had 
been persecuted and were suffering oneself. The self, which at the time of 
captivity was simply interrupted or suspended, in this way turns into a host for 
the other’s suffering; it becomes interrupted by the other. The time in the camp, 
the lack, the suspension, is transformed into an interruption or suspension of 
selfhood, which itself provides the ground for a new subject as martyr.  
After the war, Levinas had two choices: He could either mourn silently, 
or make this mourning into a new beginning. He took the second choice, and 
took it in such a way as to make this mourning not only into a new beginning for 
himself, but make the foundation for such mourning, namely the fact of having 
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been excluded from persecution himself, into the disturbing element of this 
subjectivity. In the insomnia of the ‘there is’, such new beginning had been 
signified by the “exterior noises that may mark insomnia” (Levinas, 1987, p. 48) 
– the adults, who continue life. After the war, these noises, now died down 
completely, are re-imagined as the question about the justification for one’s own 
continued life. Re-imagined, because Levinas is ultimately unable to give a 
reason why the death of the other should concern (‘regard’) me in such a way as 
to put my life in question: “Whether he regards me or not, he ‘regards’ me,” 
Levinas (1989c, p. 86) simply states.182 
With the question “Is it righteous to be?” Levinas (2001) finds his place 
in post-war society. This question both disturbs or ‘destabilises’ (Levinas, 1989c, 
p. 86) the subject and enables a voice: “being-put-in-question, but also put to the 
question, having to answer – the birth of language; having to speak, having to say 
‘I,’ being in the first person, being precisely myself; but, henceforth, in the 
assertion of its being as myself, having to answer for its right to be” (Levinas, 
1998c p. 130). With this invitation to speak, Levinas has crossed the threshold of 
silence and into the realm of subjectivity once again. The positing of a relation of 
responsibility and the question of his own survival thus became both the 
mechanism for speaking and the topic of Levinas’s talks, in light of which it 
seems plausible that Levinas (2001, p. 225), in an interview in 1985, should 
describe the question of the right to be as his ‘principal theme:’ “[T]he question 
‘Have I the right to be?’ expresses above all the human in its concern for the 
other. I have written much on this theme, it is now my principal theme: is not my 
place in being, the Da of my Dasein, already a usurpation, already a violence in 
respect to the other?” 
Paradoxically, therefore, the questioning of his own right of place was 
Levinas’s way to take up position within the community of Jewish as well as 
philosophical thinkers. Levinas could now give form to his reluctance to follow 
Heidegger’s path: “Dasein? Dasein never wonders whether, by being da, ‘there’, 
it’s taking somebody else’s place” (Levinas, in Mortley, 1991, p. 19)! And with 
                                                
182 The ‘he’ is strange here, as it is the other’s death that becomes ‘my affair:’ “As if the invisible 
death which the face of the other faces were my affair, as if this death regarded me” (Levinas, 
Paix et Proximité, quoted by Critchley, 2004, pp. 88 and 245 n. 43). 
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this, he would establish his own right of place. This paradox explains Ricoeur’s 
(quoted by Malka, 2006, p. 194-195) puzzlement about the fact that Levinas 
never ceded his position despite his theoretical remorse at the subject’s always 
already accomplished usurpation of another’s place:  
 
When he [i.e., Levinas] says, ‘I am the hostage of the Other,’ it is vital to see 
that Levinas was hostage to no one. One did not get one’s claws into him. When 
he says, ‘I am here, do I not take another’s place?’ – if you were familiar with 
the man, you would know that he quietly stayed in his place. I must say that, for 
my part, I cannot comprehend this.  
 
The subject called Levinas, then, was a subject in mourning, a suffering 
Levinas, who, however, could never forget himself in this suffering, as every 
time he mourned the dead he would at the same time remember why it was 
possible for him to mourn the dead – his exclusion from persecution under the 
protection of the laws of war. In this way, the trauma of finding out about the 
Holocaust (the ‘death of the other’) continuously oscillates with the fact of his 
own non-involvement (the ‘there is’) in his work, both of which were of the past, 
and both of which were, each in their own sense, unrepresentable to memory: 
“[T]he uniqueness of the responsible ego is possible only in being obsessed by 
another, in the trauma suffered prior to any auto-identification, in an 
unrepresentable before” (Levinas, 1998, pp. 122-123). Levinas could thus never 
free himself from the ‘there is,’ could never escape that present, which had 
become an eternity without renewal: “The present is welded to the past, is 
entirely the heritage of the past: it renews nothing. It is always the same present 
or the same past that endures. A memory would already be a liberation with 
regards to the past” (Levinas, 1987, p. 48). But memories Levinas did not have.  
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5. Conclusion 
Although Schmitt and Levinas were contemporaries, they did not 
comment on each other’s work. After the war, Levinas was intent to never set 
foot on German soil again, and it is easy to see why Derrida (1999, p. 147, n. 95) 
should write that Schmitt would “embody for Levinas the absolute adversary.” 
Indeed, Levinas would henceforth equate limited war with unlimited war, 
lawful killing with murder. Where Schmitt saw the need to protect the freedom 
of the state to enter into war, which also meant protecting Europe from any 
overarching claims to justice, Levinas saw only the injustice of the natural strive 
to unilaterally impose one’s will on another. Ethics, contained in the command 
‘Thou shalt not kill,’ issuing from the other’s face (Levinas, 1985, p. 89), was to 
stem that natural drive; it was “against nature because it forbids the 
murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first” (Levinas, in 
Levinas and Kearney, 1986, p. 24).  
And yet, Schmitt and Levinas had much in common. For Schmitt, the 
enemy was he ‘who can put me into question.’ For Levinas, humanity consisted 
in “the putting in question of the good conscience of the being that perseveres in 
being” (Levinas, 1998, p. xiv). Both, in other words, saw the need to safeguard 
difference, protecting the other from the hegemonic ambitions of the self.  
In the form of the jus publicum Europaeum, Schmitt described a plural 
order in which states could fight, but not destroy each other. The laws of war 
guaranteed this plural order as laws whose sole intention was that nothing, apart 
from themselves, should ever become necessary. With this order, Schmitt 
attempted to put forward a defence of the middle ground, situating himself 
between the extremes of utopia and nihilism: War should neither be outlawed nor 
become total. As limited war, war was not only possible once, but continued to 
be possible, retaining its own possibilities for the creation of order in the future. 
For Schmitt, sovereignty crystallises in the figure of the katechon, who protects 
the political community from both the coming of the Antichrist and Christ.183 
                                                
183 See Rasch, 2004, ch. 5, for an account of the role of Schmitt’s sovereign as katechon. 
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In the European order, this sovereignty was constituted by the laws of 
war. Levinas, subsumed under these laws for five years, paid the price for 
guaranteeing the order of war, in which, despite his own survival, he recognised 
nothing but a potentiality for destruction. Captivity itself, furthermore, did not 
merely present an exclusion from war. As the threshold of silence through which 
the parties to the conflict had to pass, the POW camp made up the ground for 
order, present on each of its sides as war, law, and persecution. But it itself had 
no order; its silence represented law without a content, a law that does not 
proscribe what is just or unjust, silently occupying the position of the sovereign 
for the sole reason of guaranteeing that no-one else may take it.  
Levinas tried to describe this absence of meaning. The choice of words he 
uses for the ‘there is,’ such as ‘murmuring,’ ‘rumbling’ or the ‘swarming of 
points’ (Levinas, 2001b, pp. 52-53), were designed, as Caygill (2002, p. 55) 
explains in this respect, to disfigure the classical metaphors commonly used for 
the opposition of being and nothingness in order to denote their middle ground. 
The horror that Levinas associates with the ‘there is’ in this respect does not 
describe its meaning, but the reaction to the latter’s absence.  
Agamben (1998, p. 174) claims that “the [concentration] camp in our 
time appears as an event that decisively signals the political space of modernity 
itself.” Perhaps beyond this political space of modernity, there lay a space that 
signalled the fact that neither this political space, nor a departure from it, is 
necessary, and that the only law one needs is the one that prohibits such 
necessity, calling one to silence. That this is a hard sell is attested by Durand 
(1987, p. 83), who dedicates his work on war captivity to its “harsh banal 
historical reality,” which he was neither able to sensationalise nor romanticise, 
but for which his work was an expression of respect. He would have understood 
why Levinas (2009, p. 201), on emerging from captivity, began a short piece on 
his experiences there by writing:  
 
Everything has been said of captivity: the greyness of the barbed wire enclosure 
and, in the commandos, foggy mornings when one leaves for work. 
Abandonment. Damp. Cold. Or spring sunshine that mocks you. Count lost of 
days passed and days to come. 
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